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7 March 1983

USSR REPORT
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SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

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PROBLEMS OF LIBERAL MODERNIZING IDEOLOGY EXAMINED

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[Article by A. F. Shul'govskiy: "The State of 'Universal Prosperity': Theory and Reality"]

[Text] The analysis of Latin American political systems is being given increasing attention by scholars specializing in the social sciences. The growing interest in these matters is understandable: The process of substantial changes in the socioeconomic and political structures of the countries of this continent has recently accelerated, acquiring increasing depth and breadth. It is no coincidence that Latin American sociologists and political scientists are paying special attention to the complex and contradictory interrelationship between the state and society, or the "civil society," to use a term widely employed in Marxism. Karl Marx wrote: "Take any specific civil society, and you will have a definite political order that represents only the official reflection of the civil society."¹

The term "civil society"--that is, the correlation and composition of social and class forces and their political, trade-union and other associations and organizations--presupposes the analysis of the interaction of the state and society in dynamic, rather than static, terms. This can reveal the deep-seated causes of the crisis in the political systems and regimes of the Latin American countries in recent decades and explain the appearance of new forms of political power in ruling classes. In addition, this approach reveals the historical laws governing the birth of the political system--or, more precisely, their separate elements--which represent, to one degree or another, the alternative political plans of various segments of the dominant classes.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the evolution of the most representative Latin American ideas about the role of the state and society from this vantage point.

Theory of Development: The Role of the State in the 'Peripheral Society'

The theory of development, or the ideology of developmentalism [desarol'izm], has played an important role in the formulation of several major Latin American

* This is the first in a series of articles by the author on the evolution of sociological and political thinking about the state and society.

problems that have led to heated debates. The influence of this ideology on Latin American economic and sociological thought stems from the circumstances of its concession and the ideals propounded by its adherents. Although many of the fundamental concepts of developmentalism were formulated as early as the late 1940's and early 1950's by famous Argentine economist Raul Prebisch and his followers, who were active in the creation of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)--for which reason the theory of development is sometimes called the "ECLA Doctrine"--its basic ideas were developed in detail and in their fullest form at the beginning of the 1960's.

This was the time when the military-political system which had been created in Latin America during the "cold war" years by U.S. imperialist circles with the aid of their Latin American allies from the bourgeois-landowning oligarchy, was undermined by the rise of the liberation and democratic movement. The liberation processes of this period reached their culminating point or peak with the victory of the Cuban revolution. It had a tremendous effect on the struggle of people in other countries, helped to radicalize the positions of various population strata and questioned many traditional ideological dogmas and stereotypes, like the belief in the futility of struggle against imperialist domination.

At the same time, the victory of the Cuban revolution promoted more energetic activity on the part of various types of bourgeois-nationalist and reformist parties and currents when their members tried to neutralize the Cuban revolutionary influence by reforming outdated socioeconomic structures and striving for equitable relations with the United States and other imperialist countries. For this reason, the ideologists of these currents made constant references to "economic nationalism" or "national capitalism," which they perceived as some kind of "ideal" capitalist society of harmonious social and class relations.²

Noticeable changes also took place in U.S. Latin American policy and its ideological basis, as reflected in the "Alliance for Progress" program. With the aid of this program, U.S. ruling circles tried to consolidate capitalist positions in Latin America, prevent the intensification of liberation and anti-imperialist processes and preclude the appearance of "another Cuba" by relying on the support of reformist and liberal-bourgeois forces in this region.

The developmentalists [desarol'isty] became quite active at this time. They declared the need to create their own theoretical Latin American model of development and to put an end to the blind, as they put it, imitation of foreign "ideological models" in the analysis of Latin American realities. "The policy of development," one ECLA analysis said, "must be based on the correct interpretation of reality. The theories we have imported and are still importing from the large industrial powers often appear to be universally applicable. We who represent the peripheral countries have been assigned the unique mission of correcting these theories and supplementing them with the dynamic elements needed for the comprehension of our reality."³ The developmentalists pointedly criticize the "orthodox" liberal views on the "naturally" inferior status of the Latin American countries in the system of international division of labor as a raw material appendage.

The supporters of the theory of development believed that the best way of putting an end to Latin America's inferior, "peripheral" status lay in the implementation of an entire group of social reforms to modernize the Latin American countries and give their socioeconomic structure flexibility and mobility. The ideas propounded by the developmentalists fell on fertile soil. Their appeals for an end to the inferior status of the Latin American countries, for the restriction of foreign capital's domination and for social reforms evoked a sympathetic response from broad segments of the public and were regarded as a positive contribution to the search for solutions to urgent problems.

Latin American communists have taken an understanding and sympathetic view of the developmentalists' analytical investigations. For example, Orlando Millas, one of the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party, stressed that the developmentalists have done much to analyze the mechanisms of the inferior status of the Latin American countries by proposing ways of overcoming dependence by means of industrialization. This kind of analysis, in addition to everything else, helped the working class gain a better understanding of the reasons for the Latin American countries' dependence on imperialism. At the same time, the communists revealed the limited nature of the theory of development by pointing out its bourgeois-reformist aims. "Developmentalism is based on the assumption that the capitalist system will continue to function," O. Millas wrote. "It does not go beyond the framework of this system in its analysis and, what is more, essentially praises it. Its main objective consists in clearing the way for the unimpeded development of capitalist relations."⁴

The ECLA Doctrine was also criticized by ultra-leftists, who saw the developmentalist concept of the state only as an attempt by bourgeois ideologists to lay an analytical foundation to justify an even more inferior status for the Latin American countries in relation to the imperialist powers. The vulnerability and weakness of this criticism naturally did not stem from the description of the developmentalist concept of the state as a reformist theory. In general, the "leftist" criticism disregarded this aspect of the matter, concentrating on the exposure of the "pro-imperialist" sympathies of the developmentalists.

The developmentalists' most uncompromising opponents were those who defended the status quo. According to prominent Brazilian sociologist Fernando Enrique Cardoso, "the zealous supporters of the belief that the very 'logic of the market economy' was the best mechanism to ensure genuine development saw the ECLA Doctrine as a kind of leftist Trojan horse."⁵

The concept of the state is the central element of the philosophical constructs of supporters of the ideology of developmentalism. "If the state is to play its role in development, it must be transformed and it must become effective," Prebisch wrote. "It must be valued by society. It would be difficult to envision accelerated development if the state is regarded as a defender of old privileges or as an unavoidable and tolerable evil."⁶ Prebisch criticized the ideological basis and policy of the "liberal-oligarchic" state, whose supporters saw it as an instrument for the preservation of the traditional way of life. Changes in the political superstructure of the state and purposeful activity (this was the reason for the developmentalists' persistent appeal for state planning) to accomplish the

necessary "structural changes"--all of this, in Prebisch's words, would create the necessary conditions for the full disclosure of "developmental strength."

The developmentalist concept of the state assigns it extremely broad functions and powers. It was supposed to initiate agrarian, tax and other reforms necessary for the accelerated industrial development of the Latin American countries. The state was supposed to play an important role in the implementation of a social policy which would prevent the "excessive" concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, ensure its "fairer" distribution and improve the status of the poorest population strata.

Finally, the transformed and reformed state was supposed to create the necessary conditions for the Latin American countries to gradually overcome their peripheral status, which presupposed the outside determination of the nature of their development. The momentum for these reforms, Prebisch stressed, should come from Latin America itself, from each country's thorough belief in the need for urgent reforms.⁷ There is no question that the developmentalist concept of the state was of an antioligarchic, reformist nature.

Furthermore, in the interpretation of the developmentalists, the state was a supra-class institution, expressing the interests of various classes and social groups, an institution capable of planning a strategy of socioeconomic and political development that would be in the interest of all the people. According to Uruguayan sociologist Octavio Rodriguez, priority was assigned to the interests of the "national industrial bourgeoisie." At the same time, the political plans of the developmentalists were of a "polyclass" nature because these plans, in their opinion, were simultaneously in the interest of the middle strata, the working class and, in general, underprivileged segments of the population. In other words, the state, as O. Rodriguez remarked, was supposed to ensure the rapid development of "social capitalist relations in the particular regions which were commonly called "peripheral or underdeveloped."⁸

The development of capitalism in depth and breadth, according to the developmentalists, was supposed to alleviate social conflicts and prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. It was no coincidence that their analytical constructs virtually disregarded the conflicts between labor and capital. At best, these were examined from the standpoint of their unavoidable abatement and eradication during the process of the development of productive forces and the incorporation of new "progressive" technology.

The resolution of labor and social problems was assigned a prominent place by the supporters of the theory of development. Labor legislation, participation by trade unions in the drafting of plans for socioeconomic development and much more was supposed to become part of the reformist activity of the state and bring it closer to society.

The reformist and normativist approach to the role of the state was clearly reflected in the developmentalist solutions to such problems as the achievement of "harmony" between the process of the intensive accumulation of capital and the alleviation of social inequities and the improvement of living conditions for broad segments of the population. They could not escape the touchy subject of the

role of state coercion in the attainment of these goals. Prebisch, for example, acknowledged the need for this kind of coercion with regard to privileged classes in the interest of development, but he stipulated that the state should also take measures of this kind in its dealings with underprivileged strata.⁹ He felt that these measures could be minimized through the thorough use of state persuasion--that is, the activity of the "enlightened state." In other words, Prebisch proceeded from the normativist assumption that the aggravation of social tension and class antagonisms could be avoided with a correct understanding of the interests of various classes and social groups and of their ability to act in accordance with national needs. An important role was assigned to international assistance from the United States and other developed capitalist countries.

Experience demonstrated the illusory nature of the developmentalist hope of solving fundamental socioeconomic problems with the aid of reformist policy and the preservation of the institutions of "representative democracy." The dramatic exacerbation of social conflicts in the Latin American countries illustrated more and more clearly the huge discrepancy between the analytical constructs of the developmentalists and the actual processes in the countries of this continent.

These processes were often connected by Latin American sociologists and political scientists with the crisis of the "populist" state, which was essentially equated with the developmentalist concept of the state. The term "populism" is generally used in two ways. In the narrow sense of the term, populism presupposes a mass political movement of the nationalist type, primarily Argentine Peronism and Brazilian Vargasism, or Trabahism, movements in which the laboring public made up the social base. In spite of the strong influence of the bourgeois nationalist ideology on the masses in the Peronist and Vargasist movements, anticapitalist feelings gradually grew stronger.¹⁰

Latin American sociologists and political scientists also use the term "populism" in a broader sense, to designate the particular forms and methods of interaction between the society and the state at times when the main social conflict, in their opinion, was a confrontation between the people and the oligarchy. The most diverse segments of the population, whose interests coincided in general over the short range, were united by antioligarchic slogans. They were united by a temporary disillusionment with the "liberal-oligarchic" state and a desire to build a "new" state, based on the principles of "economic nationalism" and capable of stimulating industrial development. This kind of unique consensus of various social forces predetermined, according to Uruguayan sociologist Liliana de Ris, the nature of the "populist" antioligarchic state.¹¹

It is easy to see that, in this sense, this state essentially represented the ideal "model" for the ideologists of developmentalism. But it was this "model" that lost meaning when the exacerbation of class conflicts undermined the basis of the consensus, brought about a crisis in the "populist" state and intensified the struggle over alternative modes of social development. The same factors brought about the crisis of other state "models," which differed from developmentalism and from populism.

The 'Industrial' or 'Mass' Society: The Role of the State in the 'Westernization' of Latin American Countries

In contrast to developmentalism with its ideas about the "peripheral" status of the Latin American countries and their "marginal" position in the system of world economic ties and with its aim of establishing a Latin American concept of social development, the theory of the "industrial" or "mass" society clearly revealed its genetic relationship with various plans to "Westernize" the Latin American states.

The views of the Latin American supporters of the theory of the "industrial" society were greatly affected by the concepts of the American sociological school advising the "Westernization" of the Latin American countries, one prominent representative of which was Kalman Silvert. His views were based on the assumption that the Latin American countries were being influenced more and more by the Western model of development and were overcoming the regressive effect of the "Ibero-American culture," with its negative attitude toward the values and institutions of the "industrial" society, on their traditions.¹²

In a broader context, the views of the supporters of the "industrial" society were influenced by the analytical constructs of one of the authors of the theory of functionalism, American sociologist Talcott Parsons, and his followers. According to Parsons, each social group and each institution in society (for example, the church or the armed forces) has its own strictly determined and virtually unchanging spheres of activity and functions, and any deviation from these leads to dysfunction and engenders social anomalies. It was also axiomatic for the supporters of this theory that this kind of society could only achieve normal and effective development within the framework of institutions of "representative democracy." According to these functionalist constructs, the state was supposed to monitor the unconditional performance of the functions of various social forces and institutions and strive for a consensus.

The theory of the "industrial" society became most popular in the Latin American countries where the working class and leftist forces were playing an increasing role in public life or where populist movements had considerable influence. These were primarily Chile and Argentina, and Brazil to some degree.

In their sociological studies, the theorists of the "industrial" society reflected Latin American realities to some degree, distinguished by accelerated processes of capitalist development and substantial social changes in the structure of society. The bourgeois-reformist nature of their views, however, was apparent even to the naked eye. They did not add anything new with regard to the use of political and sociological categories for the analysis of the workings of the "industrial" society and confined their writings to functionalist constructs. The only matters on which they focused to a sufficient degree were the problems connected with such concepts and categories of political science as political culture and political awareness.¹³

The propagandists of the theory of the "industrial" society maintained that the working class in several Latin American countries would achieve maturity if it followed the example of workers in Western Europe and the United States, who were acting in accordance with the conditions of the "industrial" society. They also

made extensive use of the thesis about the supposedly reactionary role of class struggle, stating that it inhibited economic development and pulled a country backward, back to the "pre-industrial" era. Their ideal was pure syndicalism of the North American type.¹⁴

The supporters of this view advocated the creation of a modern society in their countries, resembling, in their words, society in the developed capitalist states. "Our economic system," Oscar Dominguez, one of the theorists of the Chilean Christian Democrats, wrote, "does not have the social effectiveness of the industrial capitalism of the more developed countries."¹⁵

The problem connected with the role of mass nationalist movements of the populist type in political systems and their effect on the evolution and transformation of these systems was given a prominent place in the concepts of the theorists of the "industrial" society. For example, the phenomenon of Peronism had the most profound effect on the theoretical constructs of the supporters of the theory of the "industrial society" in Argentina. One of the most prominent propagandists of this theory, sociologist Gino Germani, called Peronism a product of the pre-industrial era with its characteristically spontaneous working class struggle and lack of social integration. Advocating the "integration" of the working class in the "industrial" society, he and his followers proceeded from the belief that a society of a "general consensus" was taking shape in Argentina, despite all obstacles, and that it would be defended by a "prosperous state" of the Western type.¹⁶

The supporters of the "industrial" society theory made considerable efforts to substantiate the thesis regarding the apolitical nature of armed forces, maintaining that any departure from this would give rise to dysfunctions in social development. As a rule, their chief argument was the thesis about the fundamental incompatibility of the professionalization of the army with its politicization. There were obvious contradictions in this interpretation of the place and role of armed forces in Latin American society. Verbally, the supporters of the "mass" society advocated a purely professional armed service. In fact, however, and this is clearly demonstrated by their "positive program," they were trying to politicize and ideologize the armed forces to develop loyalty to the standards and values of the modernized capitalist society.¹⁷

The dogma regarding the "apolitical" nature of the armed forces was probably the first of the many dogmas and stereotypes of supporters of the "Westernization" of Latin American countries within the framework of "representative democracy" to be shaken by the abrupt infiltration of the political stage by armed forces. This dealt a perceptible blow to the analytical constructs of those who were earnestly propagandizing the reinforcement of the principles of consensus and the creation of a "state of universal prosperity." At the same time, the excesses of the struggle of progressive and anti-imperialist forces in a number of Latin American countries attested to the illusory nature of normativist beliefs about the approach of the "conflict-free" era of "social harmony."

The Role of the State in the Struggle Between Alternative modes of Social Development

By the middle of the 1950's the openly counterrevolutionary developmental alternative took on increasingly distinct outlines in Latin America on the political

and the ideological levels, as exemplified by the military coups in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966). The birth of this alternative reflected significant changes in the balance of forces within the dominant classes and was the result of specific changes in the strategy of imperialism and the multinational corporations (MNC) in relations with dependent and developing countries.

The monopolization and concentration of capital became an intensive process in the Latin American states with the most highly developed economies, and this accelerated the formation of a local monopolistic bourgeoisie and contributed to the creation of a financial-industrial oligarchy. This process, which was the result of the general laws governing the development of capitalism, was stimulated to the maximum by imperialism, which was striving to accelerate the capitalist development of Latin America. It was on this basis--the protection of capitalism as a system--that the local monopolistic bourgeoisie's alliance with the MNC's was built.

The army served as the main force and instrument of this alliance because many representatives of the military elite were closely connected with the local grand bourgeoisie and imperialist monopolies. The armed forces acquired direct political power primarily as a result of the fact that the dominant classes--or, more precisely, the more extremist segments of the bourgeoisie which were most interested in modernization--were constantly striving, with the aid of the army, to achieve their main strategic goal--to smash the democratic and workers movement and thereby create favorable conditions for the accelerated modernization of capitalism through the more intensive monopolization and concentration of capital, primarily by means of the brutal exploitation of the laboring masses.

This goal of the authoritarian counterrevolutionary regimes was most clearly recorded in the doctrine of "national security" which became a kind of symbol of trust and the official ideology of these regimes. It was supposed to provide philosophical grounds for the achievement of primarily two goals: the suppression and defeat of the communist and democratic movement and the creation of an effective model of capitalist development under new conditions.

At the same time, a tendency contrary to the policy of the counterrevolutionary bloc began to acquire distinct features in the middle of the 1960's in Latin America. It was personified by progressive forces proposing various programs and plans for the avoidance of crisis by means of profound social and anti-imperialist reforms and a socialist outlook. In the late 1960's and early 1970's they were able to seize the initiative and win substantial victories in a number of countries. The main factor was the expansion of the front of anti-imperialist and liberation struggle and the consolidation of the unity of progressive forces. In some states these forces were able to consolidate their ranks within united fronts and coalitions.

An important factor stimulating the development of liberation processes was the birth of progressive and anti-imperialist tendencies in the armed forces of some Latin American countries. The activities of progressive military leaders who had taken power in Peru, Panama, Bolivia and Ecuador marked the beginning of anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist reforms. They acquired particularly impressive scales and depth in Peru, when General Velasco Alvarado was president (1968-1975).

The struggle between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary alternatives had a noticeable effect on the political systems in the Latin American countries. New forms of political domination by the exploitative classes came into being. In turn, progressive, anti-imperialist forces tried to create political systems capable of mobilizing the popular masses in support of profound social and anti-imperialist reforms.

Regardless of the ways in which domination was exercised by the political bloc of various segments of ruling classes in an alliance with multinational corporations, counterrevolutionary regimes characteristically tried, at any cost, to create the most favorable conditions for what could be called the "expanded reproduction" of capitalism and to develop effective political mechanisms for the achievement of this goal. Destructive and repressive functions occupied an important place in the policy of these regimes because they wanted to eradicate or substantially modify the institutions of "representative democracy," which were accused of displaying too much leniency toward leftist forces and trade unions.

This is the reason for the counterrevolutionary bloc's efforts to destroy, with the aid of the state, all previous forms of mass mobilization--whether developmentalist or populist, not to mention the mobilization of the laboring public by leftist forces. The mechanism of ties between the "civil society" and the state was radically modified. After the state had destroyed all traditional mechanisms of party and trade-union ties in the society, it tried to dominate it. Despite the fact that the authoritarian-repressive and modernizing regimes had certain features in common, there were differences in the political mechanisms of their functioning and in the role assigned to the state in conducting the policy of these regimes. For example, it was a distinctive feature of the Chilean counter-revolution that its ideologists launched a propaganda campaign against the "totalitarian state" and suggested that the state should play an auxiliary, "subsidiary" role.

Exposing statements of this kind, Chilean sociologist and economist Sergio Bitar analyzed the essence of the socioeconomic "model" being cultivated in the country and underscored the apparent paradox between the curtailment of the functions of the "economic state" and the wholesale expansion of the prerogatives of the "political state." In the first case, Bitar said, favorable conditions were being created for the more pronounced exploitation of the proletariat and other laboring strata. The expansion of the state's political functions, on the other hand, is needed to secure the necessary conditions for the intensive exploitation of the laboring public. "Consequently," Sergio Bitar concluded, "the role of the state was not reduced in all areas. There is no question that its economic role was limited, but its repressive-police functions were augmented immeasurably."¹⁸

In contrast to Chile, where the fascist counterrevolutionaries who took power planned to establish a government differing radically from the institutions of Western democracy, in Brazil the regime had a slightly different political plan. Some of its ideologists, such as Roberto Campos and Mario Simonsen, did not conceal their admiration for Western democracy and its institutions and announced that an effective and modern political system could be created only if Brazil could be "lifted up" to the level of the most highly developed countries of "Western civilization."¹⁹

In this strategy, an extremely important role was assigned to the state, which was not only supposed to ensure the unconditional implementation of the doctrine of "national security," but was also expected to conduct the kind of policy that would help the most dynamic business circles acquire prominence by restricting the interests of "antimodernization" segments of the bourgeoisie.²⁰ The authoritarian traditions in the history of the Brazilian state, particularly Vargas' "new state" in the 1930's, played a role in cultivating statist loyalties in the supporters of the elitist-technocratic "model."

The appearance of political regimes with progressive, anti-imperialist aims in the late 1960's and early 1970's attested to attempts to create government institutions and mechanisms which could ensure the institution of social reforms with the aid of broad segments of the population by means of the mobilization of the laboring masses, rather than their exclusion from politics. These regimes were also distinguished from regimes of the repressive type by their coordination of social reforms with the improvement of the status of the people and their refusal to accomplish modernization by means of a drastically lower standard of living for the laboring public.

While reforms were being carried out in these countries, the elements of a new type of state--or, more precisely, a kind of bridgehead for a transition to this new state--came into being, attesting to the presence of alternatives to the bourgeois type of state. In this context, the appearance of elements of the "transitional" type of state in Latin America can be discussed, although this is naturally a conditional category. Although the policies of these regimes had certain similar features, there were also significant differences between them. Above all, the depth and scales of their reforms and the degree to which their political plans were implemented differed considerably. When the Popular Unity government took power in Chile in 1970, this marked the culminating point of the development of these processes in Latin America after the victory of the Cuban revolution.

There was much that was unique and new about the reforms instituted by the military government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru. They provided conclusive evidence of the profundity and perspicacity of Marx' words that "all of the history of the civil society is summarized with amazing clarity in the history of the army."²¹ Indeed, the evolution of the Peruvian armed forces in the direction of antioligarchic and anti-imperialist reformism would be difficult to comprehend without an examination of the processes occurring in the Peruvian society. When the Peruvian communists described the revolutionary process in their country at their sixth congress in November 1973, they expressly stressed: "The program of antioligarchic and anti-imperialist reforms being carried out by the revolutionary government of the armed forces is the program for which the working class, peasantry and revolutionary intelligentsia were fighting."²²

For many complex and diverse reasons--which have been discussed at length in Soviet works on Latin American affairs²³--attempts to create a "model" of development differing from the bourgeois one have generally ended in failure. Nevertheless, the serious and purposeful study of the policy and ideology of progressive and anti-imperialist regimes has retained all of its political and scientific

pertinence and value. This is particularly true in view of the fact that opinions are still often heard from the "right" and the "left," which define the characteristics of these regimes and their concepts of the state in an extremely arbitrary and onesided manner.

The viewpoints of those who regarded the Popular Unity policy as part of the theory and practice of populism became quite popular. Chilean sociologist Fernando Mires said, for example, that the reforms of Salvador Allende's government were in line with the policy of a "populist state."²⁴ On the other hand, even when the Popular Unity government was in power, representatives of various ultra-leftist and Trotskyist groups accused it of reformism and proposed the creation of a parallel popular government. Similar appeals were heard in Bolivia for an alternative to the government of General Torres. Viewpoints of this kind do not contribute to an understanding of the fundamental ways in which the Popular Unity government's policy differed from various types of populist plans, not to mention the rightwing authoritarian "model" of the state.

Equally onesided and biased opinions were and are expressed about the activities of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces in Peru when it was headed by General Velasco Alvarado. Members of various ultra-leftist and Trotskyist groups called it "pro-fascist," "bourgeois-reformist" or "capitalist-modernizing."

The idea that the policy of the Velasco Alvarado government had "populist" aims is widespread inside and outside Peru. For example, Brazilian sociologist D. Ribeiro categorized the Velasco Alvarado regime as one with populist, reformist and modernizing-nationalist aims, ignoring the clear revolutionary-democratic aims of the strategy of the Peruvian military leaders at that time.²⁵ But after all, their political plan, much of which was supported by, in particular, Peruvian communists,²⁶ envisaged the creation of an effectively functioning regime of associated forms of ownership, the broad-scale and purposeful involvement of the laboring masses in production management and the augmentation of labor productivity.

The opponents of the revolutionary-democratic and anti-imperialist reforms in Peru have asserted, as is now being done, for example, by VISION magazine, that the government of Velasco Alvarado "disregarded" the laws of economic development and was flirting with "communism."²⁷ And Peruvian journalist Arturo Salazar Larrain fiercely attacked the Peruvian military leaders for their tendency to, in his words, substitute a purely voluntarist and politicized approach for the economic approach to national problems, which was supposedly corroborated by their policy of nationalization and expropriation.²⁸

Therefore, the struggle over alternative modes of social development, which led to significant changes in the political regimes in a number of Latin American countries, posed the problem of the state's relationship to society in a new way and had a strong effect on the development of the social sciences in Latin America. "In recent years," Mexican sociologist Oscar Cuellar wrote, "many of the socio-logical studies and works of political science that have been published in Latin America have focused their attention on the problems of the state."²⁹ The next article will analyze these problems.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 27, p 402.
2. For more about this theory, see A. F. Shul'govskiy, "The Ideology and Policy of the National Bourgeoisie," in "Osvoboditel'nyye dvizheniya v Latinskoy Amerike" [Liberation Movements in Latin America], Moscow, 1964, p 97.
3. "Hacia Una Dinamica del Desarrollo Latinoamericano," COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Mexico, 1963, No 4, supl, p 9.
4. ESTUDIOS, 1981, No 79, p 60.
5. F. Cardoso, "The Originality of the Copy: ECLA and the Idea of Development," Cambridge, 1977, p 10.
6. R. Prebisch, "Transformacion y Desarrollo," Santiago de Chile, 1970, p 173.
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8. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1979, No 11, p 1192.
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13. For more detail, see "Politicheskiye sistemy sovremennosti" [Present-Day Political Systems], Moscow, 1978.
14. M. Troncoso and J. Barnett, "Rise of the Latin American Labor Movement," New York, 1960; F. Duran Bernales, "La Politica y los Sindicatos," Santiago, 1963.
15. O. Dominguez, "El Condicionamiento de la Reforma Agraria," Louvain, 1963, p 45.
16. G. Germani, "Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transicion. De Sociedad Tradicional a la Sociedad de Masas," Buenos Aires, 1964, pp 148-152.
17. T. S. Di Tella, G. Germani, J. Graciarena et al, "Argentina, Sociedad de Masas," Buenos Aires, 1965, p 247.

18. NUEVA SOCIEDAD, San Jose, 1979, No 43, p 67.
19. M. Simonsen, "Brasil 2001," Rio de Janeiro, 1969, p 231.; R. Oliveira Campos, "De Outro Lado de Cerca," Rio de Janeiro, 1967, pp 137-138.
20. General Golbery, "Geopolitica de Brasil," Rio de Janeiro, 1967, p 225.
21. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., Vol 29, p 154.
22. "Sexto Congreso del Partido Comunista Peruano. Documents," No 2, Lima, South America, p 19.
23. See, for example, "Politicheskaya sistem obshchestva v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Political System of Society in Latin America], Moscow, 1982.
24. ALAI, Montreal, 1980, No 48, pp 559-561.
25. NUEVA POLITICA, Mexico, 1976, No 1, p 98.
26. See, for example, A. F. Shul'govskiy, "Armiya i politika v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Army and Politics in Latin America], Moscow, 1979.
27. VISION, Mexico, 1979, Vol 52, No 7, p 22.
28. A. Salazar Larrain, "La Herencia de Velasco 1968-1975. El Pueblo Se Queda Atras," Lima, 1977, p 15.
29. REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA, Mexico, 1980, No 3, p 1033.

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U.S. SCHOLAR: U.S. LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 'INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY'

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10 Oct 82 (signed to press 14 Sep 82)
pp 20-25

[Article based on speech presented by Russell Bartley, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee, United States), at the First Soviet-American Symposium on Latin America's Place in Today's World: "Notes for a History of Ideological Currents in Latin American Studies"]

[Text] Scientific knowledge never develops in a vacuum, particularly in the social sciences, which, in the words of Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "reflect the prevailing forms of social organization of their era." From the geoethnographic writings of the 16th century and the anthropological excavations of the 19th to the processing of systematized data with the aid of the modern achievements of cybernetics, the social sciences in the West were closely connected to colonialism and imperialism "as international systems of domination and exploitation."¹ In the final analysis, they serve as a kind of theoretical framework supporting the authority of contemporary empires.

Latin American studies in the strict sense of the term first appeared in the industrial Western countries--first in Europe and then in the United States, where the development of this field was promoted by the openly expansionist interests of capitalism. Japan and Israel have recently became new centers of Latin American studies.

Under the conditions of the increasingly intense struggle between socialist and capitalist forces, a number of socialist countries established their own science on Latin America on a fundamentally different basis. It is closely connected with the ideology advocating the socialist reorganization of society.²

Furthermore, Marxist scholars believe that only fundamental research and the strictly scientific analysis of the historical evolution of a country can provide an accurate understanding of current events and serve as a basis for the analysis of future developments.

The field of socialist Latin American studies developed under the conditions of a fierce ideological and conceptual struggle against the ideas of Western, especially American, scholars. And whereas the knowledge accumulated by Western researchers of Latin American affairs established the necessary

conditions for the development of socialist Latin American studies, it was precisely the achievements of the latter that have produced the largest number of productive scientific projects.

Western European and U.S. specialists of the early 20th century were certainly not guided by consciously perceived political interests in their scientific work. Most of them were archaeologists, anthropologists and ethnographers who were interested primarily in the pre-Columbian civilization in America. But their work laid the foundations for the contemporary academic Latin American studies which served the pragmatic interests of capitalism more and more consciously and purposefully throughout the 20th century.

The Ibero-American Institute, founded by the Nazis in Berlin in the 1930's, was an example of a scientific establishment serving purely political interests on the European continent.

It was precisely in the United States, however, that Latin American studies began to be used systematically as an instrument of foreign policy, and it was here that the political goals of this science began to be manifested openly. "The scales of research in U.S. Latin American studies," Soviet historian N. T. Poyarkova wrote, "are due primarily to the special role Latin America plays in North American imperialism's policy."³ As American anthropologist Charles Bagley wrote a few years ago, "the study of Latin American societies has never before been so important to the United States.... The future of the Latin American states and the Latin American people, whose numbers are rising at an impressive rate, will definitely influence our way of life.... The future of Latin America will be extremely important to our own security."⁴

Even before World War II, the social sciences in the United States were evolving in a direction allowing for their use in the planning and conduct of foreign policy. A prominent role in this process was played by the Rockefeller Foundation, under whose auspices a massive series of bibliographical works, known as the "Handbook of Latin American Studies," began to be published in the mid-1930's. Foundation's activities were the first substantial step in the adaptation of Latin American studies to meet U.S. political needs.

During World War II systematic contacts were established between many scholars of Latin American affairs and various government agencies in the United States. It was at this time that the underlying political framework of Latin American studies became particularly evident. The political orientation of the social sciences in the United States was corroborated by a 1964 U.S. State Department document entitled "The Use of Behaviorist Research Findings,"⁵ in which the foreign policy value of such sciences as sociology, psychology and anthropology was underscored.

By 1964 there were around 3,000 private organizations in the United States which were satisfying the ideological needs of American imperialism by propagandizing new theories of capitalist development, free enterprise, "independent" labor unions and so forth abroad. This naturally affected the training of personnel from the Latin American countries, who were instilled with pro-American feelings. Scientific centers in the United States painstakingly cultivated feelings among the Latin American intelligentsia which had been

defined by Jose Enrique Rodo at the beginning of the century as "nordomania"--a passion for anything from the United States.⁶ Although these sentiments were expressed in different ways, all of them became varieties of the dependent mentality which traditionally prevailed among much of the Latin American intelligentsia. According to Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, "the final goal of those who cultivate this mentality is the standardization of thinking throughout the Western Hemisphere--that is, completely coinciding criteria on the part of ruling circles in the hemisphere's countries, which will contribute to the attainment of U.S. imperialist goals."⁷

For the same purpose, several private and government organizations in the United States provide the facilities for the technical and ideological training of thousands of future Latin American specialists and administrators. Military as well as civilian personnel are trained there. The results of all this have been of cardinal political importance--for example, the establishment of reactionary semifascist regimes in a number of countries in the southern cone in the 1960's, whose leaders were military men trained in the United States.

The study of Latin American affairs has been developed quickly in American universities. They trained not only national experts in this field, but also personnel from the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Whereas there were already five integrated Latin American research programs by the beginning of the cold war in the United States, another 13 programs had been established between 1958 and 1968, financed by a government fund created in 1958 on the basis of the "National Defense Education Act."

Private foundations also showed greater interest in Latin American studies. Along with government agencies, they provided considerable funds and intellectual resources for the organization of an entire series of academic programs. The purpose of these efforts was still the cultivation of the "American way of life" and the establishment of U.S. hegemony throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The distribution of funds for Latin American studies in the United States and in Western Europe is indicative in this context. The funds were designated for the following purposes: 1) the training of specialists in Latin American studies; 2) economic research; 3) analysis of sociopolitical processes; 4) demographic analysis; 5) special programs; 6) the training and advance training of technical personnel; 7) the standardization of Latin American psychological values in accordance with the American "model." Of all the categories listed above, the latter seems particularly important to us. It reveals once again the obvious connection between U.S. policy and the science of Latin American studies.

Precisely this kind of standardization was the purpose of the International Latin American Research Institute (ILARI), founded in 1966. It was supposed to mobilize intellectual forces in Latin America and enhance their prestige throughout the world.⁸ The institute administration had the arrogant ambition to turn into a center for the coordination of social sciences in the region and the dissemination of the achievements of Latin American social scientists.

At the same time, the institute was supposed to be a connecting link between Latin American specialists and U.S. scholars of Latin American affairs.⁹

It was indicative that the institute was the successor to the so-called "Cultural Freedom Congress," a recognized ideological instrument of cold war which was founded in 1950 for the organization of propaganda attacks on the USSR. The congress, which was financed by contributions from numerous U.S. foundations and the CIA, established a number of cultural centers in the Latin American countries to disseminate the ideology of anticomunism in the refined form of elitist intellectualism.

The ILARI came into being when the ideologists of anticomunism sensed the need to camouflage their activity more heavily. The institute grew out of the Latin American department of the abovementioned congress and inherited its headquarters, contacts and centers in Latin America. The only new feature was the institute's declared "complete independence," which its administrators loved to discuss. The organizational base of the institute, however, was soon revealed, after which the progressive public in Latin America began to regard it as a covert instrument of imperialism. Less than a year after the institute had been founded, its administrators already had to defend themselves against the attacks and criticism of the people they had called "right-wing and leftwing inquisitors." "Where do our funds come from?" the institute news bulletin asked hypocritically. "Quite simply, from the foundations willing to support our program without making any stipulations. We are now receiving funds from the Ford Foundation. Tomorrow we might be getting them from Latin America or, who knows, from Europe. In any case, the people who give the institute money are not forcing it to change its line of reasoning, goals or program."

However, funds never did come from Latin America or Europe. They continued to come from the United States, and there was good reason for this. The institute's patrons were trying to turn it into an instrument for the cultivation of the "American way of life" and the standardization of spiritual values. This was only superficially inconsistent with the fact that, as the institute's own researchers maintained, their views and concepts were quite heterogeneous, reflecting their considerable "ideological, philosophical and political differences." The institute administration declared that the only purpose of the meetings, conferences, roundtable discussions, colloquiums, seminars and research projects organized by the institute was the "maximally objective and scientific process of the recognition of all cultural and social problems in the region without exception."¹⁰

As historian Christopher Lasch correctly notes, the Western cold war strategists had long been aware that the different views characteristic of intellectuals should not be perceived as a threat, but, rather, as something that could be used to great advantage in the ideological offensive against socialist forces. The only important thing was that intellectuals, in spite of all their differing views, should be united by a fundamentally common approach to the so-called "communist threat." On the other hand, each time this intellectual heterogeneity ceased to serve the interests of its financial sponsors, they stopped providing material assistance. This is what finally happened to the ILARI.

Despite the institute's obvious connections with North American capital and the compromises, at least tactical ones, it was forced to make by its financial support, the ILARI had some positive influence on the development of Latin American studies in the region by stimulating interest in the field among the Latin American intelligentsia. Works by such specialists as, for example, Fals Borda, in which regional subject matter was examined in accordance with the authors' own criteria, appeared in institute publications. The basic premises of the U.S. social sciences were questioned more and more in works of this nature, and social liberation concepts began to be developed as a counter-balance to these premises while Catholic authors revealed a thirst for "liberation theology."¹¹ The intellectual potential of Latin American scholars, who were brought together by the ILARI, began to escape the control of institute sponsors. As a result, the ILARI lost its Ford Foundation grant in 1972, and this necessitated the closure of the institute.

The collapse of the ILARI was a natural result of the clashes between two diametrically opposed approaches to Latin America--namely the neocolonial and the scientific--within its walls. The purpose of neocolonialism is to develop the "domesticated" type of researcher among the Latin American intelligentsia, encourage the use of behaviorist criteria in the Latin American social sciences and find the optimal mechanism for "maneuvering in crisis situations" and "overcoming crisis situations," which represent the focal problem in behaviorism. The ideal is the achievement of so-called "social harmony and order," which, according to Western political scientists, is a preliminary condition for rapid economic development.

In contrast to these ideas, the Latin American studies developing in Latin America itself have nothing in common with the field which serves as an instrument of imperialist domination. As a science free of all types of geopolitical influence, it proposes to promote the cause of social liberation in the region.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Stavenhagen, "Sociología y Subdesarrollo," Mexico, 1974, p 207.
2. M. S. Al'perovich, "Sovetskaya istoriografiya stran Latinskoy Ameriki" [The Soviet Study of Historical Works About Latin America], Moscow, 1968, pp 74-75.
3. N. T. Poyarkova, "Notes on Latin American Studies in the United States," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1973, No 1, p 116.
4. "Social Science Research on Latin America. Report and Papers of a Seminar on Latin American Studies in the United States," New York-London, 1963, p 1.
5. "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive," Washington, 1964, pp 751-755.
6. J. E. Rodo, "La America Nuestra," Havana, 1977, pp 78-79.

7. O. Fals Borda, "Ciencia Propia y Colonialismo Intelectual," Mexico, 1973, p 16.
8. ILARI. Trabajos. Boletin Informativo, Paris, 1966, No 1, p 1.
9. LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH REVIEW, Austin, 1966, Vol 1, No 3, pp 174-175.
10. ILARI. Trabajos. Boletin Informativo, 1967, No 4, pp 1-2.
11. See, for example, O. Fals Borda, "La Crisis Social y la Orientacion Sociologica: Una Replica," APORTEs, Paris, 1970, No 15, pp 62-76; J. Graciarena, "La Crisis Latinoamericana y la Investigacion Sociologica," REVISTA PARAGUAYA DE SOCIOLOGIA, Asuncion, 1969, No 16, pp 5-31.

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SCHOLARS DISCUSS REGION'S GROWING POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM U.S.

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pp 48-68

[Responses to discussions of current events: "Latin America: Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Doctor of Historical Sciences D. D. Prygov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations)

Significance of Concrete Historical Approach to International Life and the Political Consequences of the Development of State-Monopoly Capitalism in the Region

First of all, I would like to say that the discussions of current events organized regularly by the journal editors are a great help in the development of Latin American studies in our country. The discussion of problems in the disclosure of the general trends and characteristics of the foreign policy of Latin American countries is no exception to the rule. The discussion organizers' practice of posing an entire serious of specific questions certainly does not "dissipate" the attention of participants. Each is free to choose his own area of interest and vantage point.

I would like to focus attention on one aspect--the effect of the important changes taking place in the international political climate on the foreign policy of states in the region, and the significance of the political consequences of the development of state-monopoly capitalism in several Latin American countries.

I must agree with A. N. Glinkin that "the reorganization of the foreign policy activity of a large group of these states, which had followed in the wake of U.S. imperialism during the cold war era, began at the end of the 1950's and was a result of the victory of the Cuban revolution and of socioeconomic advances in the region."¹ I must say, however, in the first place, that some Latin American countries did not always follow the lead of U.S. imperialism prior to the cold war era; for example, some countries, especially Argentina, departed from this line before and during World War II. In other words, the disclosure of trends in the Latin American countries' relations with the United States requires the examination of a longer period in their history.

In the second place, U.S. imperialism's escalation of tension in the world at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's caused the foreign policy of several countries in the region to move back toward the right and promoted their convergence with the United States, which means that we should pay more attention to such factors as "detente" and "antidetente" in international relations when we study the causes of changes in the foreign policy of capitalist countries in the region. In the third place, the socioeconomic advances in the region in the 1960's and 1970's did not always contribute to the departure of ruling circles in some countries--and these were the ones with the most highly developed economies--from the U.S. foreign policy line (although departures, and sometimes quite abrupt ones, did take place, and this was mentioned by many participants in the discussion), because, as A. N. Glinkin notes in another part of his report, "the formation and consolidation of local groups of the monopolistic bourgeoisie considerably broadened social support for American imperialism on the continent, as these were precisely the groups which cooperated closely with the United States."²

Although it appeared that the considerable influence of the development of monopolistic capitalism in a number of countries in the region on the foreign policy of the Latin American states was one of the main topics of discussion (reported on by A. F. Shul'govskiy, Yu. N. Koroleva and V. P. Totskiy and, in part, by V. B. Tarasov), it was almost ignored by some speakers who used the terms "anti-imperialism" and "anti-imperialist struggle" in reference either to U.S. imperialism or to "extraregional" imperialism.

It does seem, however, that the "watershed" between different opinions about the nature of the tendency toward an "independent" foreign policy on the part of capitalist countries in the region lies somewhere in the approach to the question of whether any real "Latin American" imperialism or variety of imperialism actually exists (as was so cogently discussed by A. F. Shul'govskiy and V. P. Totskiy).³ The essence of the "dispute" lies in the fact that some specialists, and not only those who took part in the discussion, regard "sub-imperialism" in the region precisely as a variety of imperialism, while others believe that "sub-imperialism" is some kind of transitional form leading to imperialism. What is more, this "sub-imperialism," judging by the statements in A. A. Matlina's interesting article, is still only in the developmental stage.⁴ Opinions about the future international positions of the Latin American countries and their relations with the United States also depend on the approach to this matter.

In his book "El Subimperialismo Venezolano," E. Lanza, renowned researcher and member of the Venezuelan Communist Party, shows how the five features of imperialism discovered by V. I. Lenin are manifesting themselves in Venezuela.⁵ Not all of these features are clearly defined, but all of them exist. This is the author's conclusion. But what about the policy of the governments of countries where all of these imperialist features are more or less clearly defined? I agree with V. P. Totskiy that today's sub-imperialism is a form or variety of imperialism.⁶

A statement by Yu. N. Koroleva seems quite convincing: "The foreign policy of the Latin American bourgeoisie in power at the present time is dictated primarily by the interests of monopolistic capital in many countries."⁷ It is

obvious that this refers to "Latin American" monopolistic capital (either the capital of individual countries or Latin American multinational companies).⁸ Policy in the interest of monopolies is imperialist policy--in other words, it is obvious that imperialist features are present in the foreign policy of several countries in the region, both in relations with extraregional states and in relations with other countries in this region. E. Lanza believes that Venezuela has the necessary economic, military and political potential to pursue a sub-imperialist policy at least in the Caribbean basin and Andean zone.⁹ A struggle for spheres of influence is also being waged in regions or subregions of Brazil, Argentina and Chile, and Brazilian sub-imperialism has displayed clearly expansionist intentions with regard to the countries of tropical Africa. This is why the classification of groups of countries in the region with similar parameters indicating their "line of behavior" in international affairs must include the category of states in which imperialist features are already an obvious element of policy.

In view of the nature of imperialism, all of these statements indicate the following three important facts: 1) the polarization of the struggle between individual capitalist states and groups of states is inevitable in this region; 2) some Latin American countries in which the development of state-monopoly capitalism and the presence of imperialist tendencies in foreign policy are apparent, are becoming involved, even if not totally, in the system of world imperialism, and this will naturally affect other developing countries; 3) it has become more difficult to maintain the common platform of Latin American opposition to the main centers of imperialism, although the social base of this opposition has expanded as democratic, progressive forces inside and outside this region have grown stronger. Obviously, all of these characteristics of present-day Latin America are manifesting themselves, and will continue to do so, in various ways and to varying degrees, depending again on specific conditions during the specific stage of historical development in a specific country and in the world in general. It is particularly important to consider the correlation of sociopolitical forces in the world, region and country under the conditions of detente or "antidetente" when the class solidarity of the ruling circles in the capitalist country, especially monopolistic circles, grows weaker or stronger. The rightward shift, for example, in the foreign policy of such countries as Venezuela and Colombia in the late 1970's and early 1980's resulted from the specific features of the socioeconomic development of these countries in the 1970's and from the actions of the main imperialist power, the United States, in the international arena at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. At the same time, the existing conflicts between Latin American countries and the United States are no secret. However, the fact that some large countries (Argentina and Brazil) took a number of steps contrary to Washington's wishes during that period (more active trade with the USSR) does not diminish the importance of the "detente-antidetente" factor, even though it is obvious that the growing strength of socialist forces is having a significant effect on international life. Here I would like to cite another general statement, made by A. F. Shul'govskiy: When a particular Latin American state shows an interest in broader ties with the socialist countries, this fact alone just not attest to anti-imperialist foreign policy aims.¹⁰

Such phenomena as the escalation or de-escalation of international tension and the manifestation of expansionist features in the policy of some Latin American countries are clues to the causes of changes in the foreign policy "signature" of capitalist states in the region during a given stage and to the prediction of their future behavior.

Candidate of Historical Sciences E. S. Dabagyan (Institute of Latin America, USSR Academy of Sciences--ILA)

A Firm Grip on Reality

We feel that the discussion entitled "Latin America: Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence" was one of the most representative discussions organized by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA magazine in recent years. In particular, a broad range of topics of some interest to all Soviet scholars of Latin American affairs, regardless of their special fields, were raised in this discussion.

This stimulates even those who could not take part in the discussion for various reasons to express some opinions, particularly since the discussion--and this is indisputably one of its chief merits--provides food for thought and invites response.

The discussion reflected the degree to which all of the topics on the agenda had been researched and the different approaches of our scholars of Latin American affairs to the matters discussed. On the one hand, it revealed differences of opinion among economists, experts on international relations and scholars of sociopolitical processes in such important areas as the degree of dependence and level of development of Latin American countries. On the other, it reveals methodological errors of varying significance on the part of some participants, and these should be discussed in greater detail.

It appears that some researchers still have not overcome certain old lines of reasoning in their assessment of Latin America's place and role in the system of international relations. This is particularly reflected in the tendency of some to view, either consciously or unconsciously, the Latin American states only as objects, and not subjects, of international relations. This approach is apparently a direct result of the mistaken belief that Latin America's dependence on imperialist centers is not decreasing despite the definite progress in its development. This leads to the conclusion that the countries in this region cannot have an independent foreign policy. This could be why some researchers have difficulty explaining certain moves by Latin American countries in the international arena when these moves are inconsistent with the customary pattern. In connection with this, we should support the conclusions of the particular participants in the discussion who disagreed with this line of reasoning, particularly A. N. Glinkin, who stated that "positive changes in the foreign policy of a large group of Latin American countries and their more energetic action in the world arena independent of imperialism appear to be a stable trend."¹¹ In our opinion, A. A. Atroshenko was completely correct when he said "What is happening today is not an increase, but A DEFINITE DECREASE, in the economic and, consequently, foreign policy dependence of some sectors and countries of the capitalist 'periphery' on world

imperialism, not to mention some kind of specific imperialism" (emphasis mine--E. D.)¹²

In the introduction to the discussion, its organizers noted that the articles by A. A. Matlina and Marcos Kaplan, published in LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, and the article by Academician Ye. M. Primakov in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNNYE OTNOSHENIYA (1980, No 12) served as the basis for the discussion. Unfortunately, only a few participants (A. N. Glinkin, A. F. Shul'govskiy and P. P. Yakovlev) gave the necessary credit to Ye. M. Primakov's article entitled "The Law of Uneven Development and the Historical Destiny of the Newly Liberated Countries," while others confined themselves to mere acknowledgments of the article or ignored the questions it raised. But this article is directly related to our discussion. To a considerable extent, it provides a key to the understanding and interpretation of the phenomena around which the discussion revolves. In his discussion of differences between developing countries and of the present effects of the law, formulated by V. I. Lenin, governing the uneven development of capitalism during the imperialist era, Ye. M. Primakov describes the objective material basis of the new role played in international relations by many former colonial and dependent countries, including the most highly developed states in Latin America.¹³ In what appears to be an amplification of this thesis, A. N. Glinkin correctly stresses: "When the current foreign policy of the Latin American countries is analyzed, the fundamental phenomena serving as the basis for positive changes must not be overlooked."¹⁴

Therefore, the essence of the matter is that the Latin American countries, or at least many of these countries, are gradually turning into active subjects of international relations. It is on this basis, as speakers pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, that their role in world politics is growing. This is a natural tendency with an objective basis. This is the unavoidable conclusion of an analysis of the deep-seated processes taking place in this part of the world.

Another common shortcoming of several reports, in my opinion, is that the authors are guided, whether they want to be or not, by the "Third World approach" in their analysis of the role and place of the Latin American countries.

I will explain what I mean. Many of them categorize Latin America as part of the "Third World" almost unconditionally. This, in addition to everything else, is the primary cause of terminological confusion, particularly with regard to such terms as "anti-imperialism" and "anti-imperialist policy."

In this connection, I would like to make the following hypothesis. The foreign policy of countries which have progressed far enough along the path of capitalist development cannot be anti-imperialist. In the strict scientific sense of the term, anti-imperialist policy must be directed against capitalist exploitation on the international level. This is why clearly defined anti-imperialist features in Latin America in recent years (of course, with the exception of Cuba) are found only in the policy of the governments of states which are striving to incorporate socialist elements of development (for example, Chile

during the Popular Alliance period, Peru under Velasco Alvarado and Jamaica in the last years of the People's National Party regime). Now, however, an anti-imperialist policy is being pursued by Nicaragua and Grenada, which have begun to lay the foundations of a new society devoid of capitalist exploitation. Incidentally, this was also discussed by A. F. Shul'govskiy.

The international behavior of the Latin American states which have progressed the furthest toward capitalist development acquires more similarity to the policy of Western European countries with each year. I am absolutely in agreement with the opinion expressed by A. F. Shul'govskiy during the discussion, namely that "the interrelations between the capitalist Latin American countries (or, at any rate, the most highly developed ones)" and the imperialist powers have many characteristics in common with the 'model' relations...between the United States and the developed capitalist countries in Europe."¹⁵

When the term "pro-imperialist" is used in reference to the policy of a particular Latin American state, caution should obviously be exercised. I think that the policy of a specific Latin American state cannot always be called "pro-imperialist" if it coincides with the policy of U.S. imperialism because this might simply be a case in which the independent policy of this state coincides to some degree with Washington policy. This, strictly speaking, is a pro-capitalist foreign policy, a policy in defense of capitalism on the international level. There is no question that this kind of policy can coincide in many respects with the policy pursued by U.S. imperialism.

Now I would like to discuss the frequently used term "sub-imperialism." I personally find this term to be vague and indefinite. As yet, as far as I know, there are no precise definitions of this term, although some participants (A. A. Atroshenko and M. L. Chumakova) certainly tried to define it. There are two or even three interpretations of "sub-imperialism." One interprets "sub-imperialism" as a peculiar stage in the development of capitalism, when the elements of state-monopoly capitalism are already taking shape in its foundations, when the features and characteristics of state-monopoly capitalism are already apparent, or, more precisely, when certain characteristics of imperialism are evident. According to this interpretation, "sub-imperialism" is something like pre-imperialism, or the stage directly preceding the imperialist stage of capitalism. This seems to be the view of Venezuelan researcher Eloy Lanza, the author of the interesting study mentioned by D. D. Prygov. Judging by all indications, A. A. Atroshenko was another participant who is inclined to interpret "sub-imperialism" in this way. I feel that there is a grain of reason in this interpretation.

Another interpretation, which is much more popular among foreign and Soviet scholars, is that "sub-imperialism" is something like "second-rate" imperialism, feeding on the other, stronger type of imperialism and in a position of total submission to it and dependence on it.¹⁶ When the term "sub-imperialism" is used in this sense in reference to Latin America, it usually refers to Brazil, which supposedly represents something like a regional policeman. I cannot agree with this. It is wrong to call Brazil a "sub-imperialist" country in this sense. Its ruling circles are quite able to interpret and defend their own interests, passing them off as the national interests. They can rely

on the growth of the economic, military and political potential of this country, which has many of the objective prerequisites to some day be ranked with the developed capitalist states. In this connection, P. P. Yakovlev appears to be correct in his assumption that "Brazil is turning into a developed capitalist power like Canada" and that a new kind of relationship, based on tangible socioeconomic factors, is taking shape between the imperialist centers and Brazil, and the main factor is the formation of state-monopoly structures.¹⁷

I would like to say a few words about the term "autonomy." The use of the term "autonomy" in reference to foreign policy, which achieved general recognition during the discussion, reflects, in our opinion, the dual, intermediary position of researchers who, on the one hand, cannot deny the increasing independence of the Latin American countries in the international arena but, on the other, continue to subscribe to the ideas and concepts of "dependent capitalism," "sub-imperialism" and so forth. This is why we feel that a more constructive approach is reflected in M. L. Chumakova's statement that "the term 'sovereign' could also be used to describe the essence of the foreign policy of the most highly developed countries of this continent."¹⁸

Incidentally, there are quite significant, and I would even say qualitative, differences between the terms "autonomous" and "sovereign." When a state of autonomy exists, sovereignty is restricted to certain limits, while sovereignty presupposes the independent making of decisions within the competence of a particular legal person.

Finally, I must say something about the term "force field of dependence." As they say, once K. L. Maydanik had started the ball rolling, many participants made liberal use of the term. Without delving into the essence of this term, I would like to appeal for greater caution when the laws of physics are applied to social phenomena. Without trying to draw any analogies, I would simply like to mention V. R. Haya de la Torre's lack of success when he tried to use Einstein's theory of relativity to explain the peculiarities of Latin American historical development, constructing a "historical space-time" theory as a philosophical basis for the APRA [American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] doctrine.

In connection with the use of some concepts and definitions in the discussion, I think we could even say that some participants were obviously performing a "terminological balancing act." It frequently confused the issue and was counterproductive. In connection with this, we naturally support A. N. Glinkin's remark, in his concluding speech, about "the need to quickly develop the appropriate concepts and terms for the study of Latin American foreign policy."¹⁹ We can only add that this does not apply only to foreign policy.

In conclusion, I would like to agree with the opinion expressed by many participants that another discussion should be organized to investigate matters which have never been fully elucidated.

V. N. Dmitriyev

Some Factors Contributing to the Foreign Policy Dependence of the Latin American Countries

A tendency toward increased foreign policy dependence has been witnessed in the Latin American countries in recent decades. In connection with this, the investigation of the socioeconomic roots of this process is of great theoretical and practical interest. This would reveal the internal causes of Latin America's advancement to the forefront of contemporary international relations. This is why the discussion organized by the journal was indisputably pertinent.

If we consider only the Latin American countries taking the capitalist road of development, despite the increasing complexity of their dependence on imperialist centers and the formation, as K. L. Maydanik pointed out, of an entire "field of dependence," presupposing the existence of a variety of ties connecting Latin America with the world capitalist system, the overall impact of this dependence, in the sense of its degree of influence on the policy of Latin American states, is decreasing perceptibly.

The economic dependence of the "periphery" on the "center" today is not what it was 20 years ago, and V. P. Totskiy's suggestion that international imperialism dictates various forms of capitalist development to such countries as Brazil, and only "tolerates" signs of their foreign policy dependence for tactical purposes, seems to be an oversimplification.

The increasing integration of Latin America into the system of world capitalism and its transformation into an important element of this system as a result of the effects of quantitative and qualitative factors have given Latin American capitalism a certain degree of self-sufficiency and, one could say, irreplaceability within the framework of capitalist division of labor and have given the bourgeoisie and the state in this region substantial means of influencing the activities of multinational corporations and the policy of imperialist powers.

This influence is most evident where the objective process of the concentration and centralization of capital is accompanied by the formation of a strong government and the creation of a powerful state sector, as is the case in Mexico and Brazil--wherever Latin American countries make skillfull use of inter-imperialist conflicts. This influence is not absolute, however, and can only bring about partial successes in the foreign policy sphere, as participants in the discussion correctly noted, but even these successes can be of great significance during various stages of the struggle for an independent policy line.

The reaction of the Latin American countries to the recent Anglo-Argentine conflict testifies to the limitations of their foreign policy independence (in this case, the limitations of their solidarity with Argentina), which stem primarily from their economic and other dependence on the United States and several NATO countries.

On the other hand, the international activity of many Latin American countries confirms and supplements the thesis regarding the mediating nature of the interaction of economics and foreign policy. Virtually all participants expressed this view. It is particularly vividly corroborated by the example of Mexico's recent foreign policy line. The efforts of U.S. imperialism to use its position in the Mexican economy to change its foreign policy, which were particularly apparent toward the end of J. Lopez Portillo's term in office and resulted in a massive outflow of currency from Mexico and the devaluation of the Mexican peso, have had largely contradictory results, motivating the Mexican Government to diversify its foreign economic and foreign political ties even more in order to reduce its dependence on the United States.

This is why I must agree with A. A. Atroshenko's remark that generalizations about dependence are obviously inadequate today; it is important to specify the type of dependence, the object and the sphere. International relations, whose significance has grown immeasurably in our day, must play an important and active role in the reduction of dependence.

The prime movers of progressive changes in the foreign policy of Latin American states are precisely the forces with an interest in reduced dependence. One of these forces is the national bourgeoisie, including the grand bourgeoisie, which has merged with the government, is acquiring more influence in the resolution of major economic and political problems in each particular country and wants to make independent decisions on international matters, especially international economic relations.

Another force is the broad substratum of the high-level bureaucracy and technocracy, which is acquiring more control over public administration and is dissatisfied with the crumbs it has heretofore received from multinational corporations and the governments of imperialist powers. The broad laboring masses with their anti-imperialist and anticapitalist demands represent the major stimulus and, in essence, a tangible driving force impelling these strata to pursue a more independent foreign policy. The ruling classes in the Latin American countries, the "bourgeois authorities," as they were called by some participants, are certainly inclined to comply with the demands for foreign policy independence in order to neutralize the other demands.

I would like to agree with a remark, cited during the discussion, in the article by Academician Ye. M. Primakov, that the national interests of the newly independent countries are in a state of antagonistic incompatibility with the interests and policies of the imperialist states. This fundamental premise is particularly important for an understanding of the role played by the foreign policy of the developing countries, including Latin American countries, in the defense of their true interests, which lie in reduced dependence.

Despite periods of fluctuation and regression, the Latin American countries in general have taken a consistently anti-imperialist stand in the struggle for detente, against colonialism and neocolonialism and for the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair democratic basis. It is in these matters that the main watershed in international affairs exists between

the countries of the socialist community and the majority of developing states on one side and the imperialist states on the other. Evidence of the growing independence of the most influential Latin American countries in international affairs can be seen in their attempts to hold political consultations on a variety of issues with the socialist countries, as well as such existing forms of cooperation between the two groups of states as the exchange of messages between leaders of these states, the organization of visits at the highest level, more active inter-parliamentary exchange and broader trade, economic, cultural and other contacts.

The anti-imperialist activities of Latin American countries in the foreign policy sphere have taken the form of stronger ties with African and Asian developing states in the United Nations, the nonaligned movement, the "group of 77" and other international organizations and associations, as well as closer contacts on the bilateral basis. They are striving to agree on a common platform in important international forums, particularly with regard to the discriminatory policy of imperialist powers, conflicts in various regions and the common economic interests of the "Third World" countries.

Questions of "Latin American solidarity" and joint action in the political and economic spheres to resist the authoritarian behavior of transnational corporations, especially American firms, have traditionally been given a prominent place in the foreign policy activity of the countries of this region. The energetic activity of Latin American states in this area is well known, and their enthusiasm for joint action was recently developed in connection with the Anglo-Argentine conflict in their objections to the preservation of the inter-American system in its previous form, to reliance on the United States, which had proved to be an unreliable ally of the Latin Americans, and to the support of American aggressive policy in Central America and the Caribbean.

These three areas of Latin American foreign policy activity are decisive factors contributing to the reinforcement of international positions and the struggle for reduced dependence on the imperialist system. Of course, this activity is not anticapitalist in nature, and it therefore can only reduce, and not eradicate, dependence. This dependence will exist as long as these countries are part of the world capitalist system.

The intensity of the international activity of Latin American countries depends on several external factors. Despite the desire of the Latin Americans to escape dependence or reduce it with the aid of foreign policy leverage, this was an unrealistic hope 30 years ago. In this connection, I would like to briefly discuss two important questions which were raised by the organizers of the discussion but do not appear to have been elucidated properly. These questions pertain to the influence of worldwide, regional and subregional factors on the policy of Latin American states in the international arena and the influence of the liberation movement on this policy.

As far as global factors are concerned, the most important factor affecting the foreign policy of not only the Latin American countries, but also the entire nature of present-day international relations, was the change in the global balance of power in socialism's favor and the achievement of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States. This exceedingly

important factor, even in the absence of diversified trade and economic ties between the Soviet Union and the Latin American countries, gives our country unprecedented political influence. In light of this, the worries of Americans and other imperialists about the "Soviet threat" to the countries in the Western Hemisphere, a threat which they themselves invented, are indicative. Their absurd attempts to find some kind of "Soviet angle" in the events in the South Atlantic are a perfect example of this.

The moral and political support the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have given the independent foreign policy line of Latin American states is of great significance, as is the fact that the world socialist system has presented them with an alternative form of economic relations.

Another major global factor with a similar effect is the disintegration of colonialism and the abandonment of the imperialist system by dozens of countries which have embarked on the road of independent development. They are the natural allies of the Latin American states, augmenting the support in the international arena for their independent foreign policy actions.

Another factor reducing the dependence of the Latin Americans on imperialism is the international workers movement, the feelings of which have to be taken into account even by social democratic leaders. This is attested to, in particular, by the Socialist International's stance on the situation in Central America.

The regional factors promoting independent foreign policy actions by Latin American authorities include the constant erosion of the positions of their chief exploiter--U.S. imperialism. This became particularly evident recently in connection with the Anglo-Argentine conflict. Other regional factors are the growing influence of socialist Cuba, Nicaragua and the liberation movement in the region, the crisis in the inter-American system Washington created in its own interest, and the consolidation of inter-Atlantic unity and solidarity.

On the subregional level, there are the definite assets accumulated during the process of political and economic integration in the Andean group and the Caribbean countries, the proposal of such peaceful initiatives as the creation of a zone of peace in the Caribbean and the search for fair political solutions to problems in Central America.

Imperialist circles, especially U.S. imperialism, are opposing the emergence of these factors and the independent tendencies, which are being strengthened by these factors, in the foreign policy of the Latin American countries. The specific forms and methods of this opposition and overtly subversive activity are well known.

As for the influence of the liberation movement on the foreign policy of Latin American states, it is evidently dual in nature. On the one hand, this movement, which began as an anti-imperialist and antioligarchic current, could pose a threat to the basis of capitalism, and this is the reason for its resolute resistance by several bourgeois democratic regimes, not to mention military dictatorships. On the other hand, the more farsighted and

nationalist segments of the Latin American bourgeoisie, although they naturally maintain their class positions, see the liberation movement as a means of strengthening the tendency toward an independent policy and solving urgent problems in their countries at the expense of imperialism and obsolete internal structures, but with the maintenance, and even the modernization, of the foundations of capitalism on the basis of a mixed economy and political pluralism. This line is consistent with the struggle of the Latin American countries for an independent foreign policy and reduced dependence on imperialism.

Candidate of Historical Sciences V. P. Sudarev (ILA)

Foreign Policy: Elements of Interaction Between the Basis and the Superstructure

The thesis about the widening gap between the basis and the superstructure of the foreign policy mechanism in the Latin American countries is not a search for imaginary paradoxes, but the result of attempts to view the object of study from a new, non-traditional vantage point. The analysis of this phenomenon should apparently begin with the assumption that foreign policy as such is a more dynamic category than the economy: Foreign policy is directly affected by several elements which either take a long time to affect the more static basis or cannot affect it at all. These include changes in the structure of political authority and the influence of external factors (the international situation in general, the policy of the great powers and so forth).

Many factors contributing to the "autonomization" of the foreign policy of countries in the region were mentioned and analyzed in sufficient detail during the discussion: Global changes in the balance of power, the much broader opportunities for independent action in the international arena by small dependent states (incidentally, one of the characteristic features of Reagan's policy is the attempt to minimize this autonomy), the dispersion of dependence, the use of inter-imperialist conflicts, changes in the "power bloc" of the Latin American states, and so forth. In this connection, I would like to direct attention to a few other factors.

Under present conditions, the foreign policy of the states in this region has become noticeably more "demonstrative." I would even say that it is an imitation of active policy. Latin American diplomacy--or, more precisely, its declarative aspect--which has traditionally been marked by bombastic rhetoric, is now filled, as never before, with anti-American and anti-imperialist slogans and appeals for independence, which are sometimes amazingly inconsistent with the general outlook of ruling circles. On the one hand, this indisputably attests to the popularity of these slogans, and this is a result of the constructive policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole. Ruling circles in Latin America are realizing more and more that prestige and influence in the world arena cannot be acquired without the use of slogans supported by the people, and that the days when adherence to a pro-American line could purchase political influence in international relations have receded into the past. On the other hand, the foreign policy of bourgeois governments in the Latin American countries is serving domestic

policy interests more and more. Given the Latin American societies' mounting social problems, participants in the discussion pointed out, foreign policy, especially its declarative aspect, is becoming one of the major ways of creating a favorable image within the country and diverting the attention of the popular masses from domestic problems.

A broader outlook at a time when the United States is still the main contracting partner is augmenting the role of a specific element of Latin American foreign policy--a kind of blackmail of the United States with Latin American foreign policy activity. In other words, Latin American states are activating non-traditional aspects of policy, to which Washington is particularly sensitive, to gain more beneficial conditions of partnership with the United States. The prestige and international recognition they have won are, after all, also an instrument used in relations with the United States. The example of the Andean group is indicative in this connection. In the late 1970's it became noticeably more active in the foreign policy sphere (expanding its ties with the EEC and Spain, taking an active stance on the crisis in Nicaragua and on events in Central America in general, and so forth). This is one of the reasons, although it is naturally not the only one, why the United States had to view the group in a new way.

On the same subject, I would like to say a few words about Mexico, which is distinguished by perhaps the most noticeable discrepancy between the basis and the superstructure in the foreign policy sphere. I agree completely with all of the reasons cited by M. L. Chumakova for this phenomenon, but I would also add that the long struggle for a more advantageous "modus vivendi" with the United States by Mexican ruling circles is also having an important effect, by virtue of the specific features of their bilateral relations, on Mexico's approach to the liberation movement in Central America. In the first place, the emergence of "hot spots" in this region reduces its own "field of dependence" to a certain degree. In the second place, an active stand on Central American events gives Mexico more political weight in the eyes of the United States and apparently strengthens its position in dialogue with its northern neighbor.

Another factor closely related to the abovementioned is the marked U.S. "tolerance" for signs of Latin American independence in the world arena in Carter's time (Reagan's line of "matching the United States" is an egotistical anachronism, a "journey into the past," a dangerous, even for the United States, throwback to the cold war and an attempt to use primitive methods to attain near-unattainable goals). It is completely obvious that this "tolerance," which appeared simply unthinkable just a few decades ago, was something imposed on American imperialism by the very course of social development, global changes in the balance of forces and the policy of detente. This tendency was particularly apparent less in the relations of rightwing authoritarian regimes than in the relations of the progressive regimes which appeared in the region in the 1970's. Because of the obvious difficulties engendered, firstly, by the "imposed" solution and, secondly, by the need to react simultaneously to several "hot spots" in the region, as was the case, for example, in the beginning of the 1970's, U.S. imperialism had to display more flexibility in general and to demonstrate its "loyalty" to these regimes in some cases.

This kind of "tolerance," and even "loyalty," as American-Peruvian relations in the first half of the 1970's clearly testify, can sometimes confuse leftist nationalist forces and give them illusions about the possibility of comparatively peaceful coexistence with imperialism. Without resorting to armed intervention, imperialism cannot immediately or quickly put an end to a progressive regime and therefore has to begin camouflaged stabilization attempts, which can take a comparatively long time, depending on the state of the regime's economy and its internal political strength, and can be almost imperceptible but still be effective enough in general.

The "field of dependence" plays an important role in this context, and sometimes even the decisive role. It is extremely difficult for a revolutionary democratic government to break out of this field because it is usually simply unwise to make a complete break with the world capitalist economic system, and the leadership of some non-traditional regimes sometimes does not even consider this matter in principle. However, the main issue is not this, but the need for resources to carry out development programs for the purpose of overcoming underdevelopment and dependence. The need which arises in any revolutionary process to redistribute the income of society, partially for the purpose of mobilizing resources for development, often becomes a stumbling block. The efforts of leftist nationalist leaders to maintain stability within the country and "national unity" (and this is often contrasted to the class struggle, which these leaders strive to "abolish" or at least, as in the case of Peru, to "overcome") are precisely what lead to the search for sources of development primarily in the foreign market. It is obvious that there are great temptations here because this does not appear to be related to otherwise unavoidable complex internal problems and, besides this, solves the immediate problem. But excessive reliance on financing from world capitalist sectors can engender, particularly when economic conditions are unfavorable, a spiraling foreign debt, which then provides imperialism with strong leverage in its dealings with the progressive regimes.

In this connection, I would like to say that K. L. Maydanik's idea that dependence is now based primarily on the logic of internal development, and not on foreign ties as such, is absolutely correct in reference to bourgeois reformist and rightwing authoritarian regimes. But it needs adjustment in relation to progressive governments. Under the conditions of a radical change of political authority and the institution of structural reforms by the new government, foreign ties, namely the country's position in the world capitalist economic system, which can still be controlled by its centers for a long time, become a potentially strong inductor, or even the decisive one, of internal difficulties because they virtually become imperialism's only effective channel of influence.

It is obvious, for example, that the reasons for the Peruvian regime's evolution in the mid-1970's cannot be sought only on the domestic front, in spite of its indisputable importance. And it is not that every failure suffered by progressive forces is exclusively due to imperialist intrigues. A. F. Shul'govskiy notes that the Peruvian military leaders tried to put an end to structural dependence on imperialism and to promote the creation of a new system of world economic ties. But was this attempt actually made or was this

also simply a reorganization or modernization of foreign ties? If we do not overestimate conflicts with raw material monopolies, which are only of secondary importance in the structure of Latin American dependence, and a number of ostentatious anti-imperialist actions, we could conclude that the basic forms of dependence were virtually unaffected. In fact, and this seems almost paradoxical for a progressive regime, they became much stronger. For example, Peru's foreign debt reached an unprecedented level during the period of military rule, almost tripling within 5 years; the volume of private American investments doubled during the same period, allowing multinational corporations to strengthen their position in the Peruvian economy.

In this case, how should we assess a foreign policy which was marked by stronger progressive, independent tendencies in the first half of the 1970's (which was attested to, for example, simply by the developmental level of relations with Cuba!)? Does this mean that the basic categories themselves are now starting to play a less significant role in foreign policymaking? In my opinion, when there is a radical change in the structure of political authority in a country, the answer is yes, although this is only a short-term or, at best, a medium-term process. The economic imperative will inevitably have its effect. In the case of Peru, this took the form of a number of measures which were adopted by a country in a state of actual insolvency and which were dictated by the IMF and private North American banks with all of the ensuing consequences that were discussed above.

In conclusion, I would like to make a few comments on the important topic of the connection between foreign policy autonomy and the liberation movement on the continent. The fact that this connection is neither direct nor automatic--but this "cliche" is still found in our works--is completely obvious, and Latin American reality at the turn of the decade provides quite conclusive proof of this. Despite the significance of conflicts between ruling circles of the Latin American bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism and the need for leftist forces to make full use of them, we must not forget that when basic class interests are at stake, these conflicts are often smoothed over by both sides and are consciously shelved indefinitely. In this connection, it is significant that the Reagan Administration is striving in its Latin American policy to "arouse" the class self-preservation instinct of the Latin American bourgeoisie and to convince ruling circles in the countries of this region that Nicaragua is turning into a "second Cuba" and El Salvador might become the "third." In general, however, spurts of energy in the liberation movement and the development of positive tendencies in international relations in Latin America will not necessarily coincide.

V. V. Gorokhov (ILA)

Is the 'Force Field of Dependence' Really Omnipotent?

During the discussion K. L. Maydanik proposed an interesting concept or, more precisely, a sociological categorization of dependence as a kind of "force field" or determinant of sociopolitical, economic and all other developments in the countries of this region. Taking this statement and, consequently, the accompanying system of arguments as a working hypothesis, we will try to

see how well it "works" within the limits of the concrete but exceptionally vast and extremely diverse sphere of the contemporary foreign policy activity of Latin American countries. I am referring here to their policy in the United Nations and its specialized organizations and establishments. This topic was virtually not raised during the discussion. The investigation of this group of questions in connection with the interaction of economic dependence with foreign policy independence seems possible, necessary and productive both from the standpoint of the subject of research (because it will concretize to some degree the excessively abstract, in our opinion, nature of a discussion that was an unqualified success in general) and from the standpoint of the object (in connection with the energetic activity of Latin American countries in the United Nations). Obviously, this analysis can only be, so to speak, a "rough draft."

The analysis of the basic trends in the diplomatic activity of Latin American states in the United Nations in recent years suggests that, despite all of the diversity of positions, opinions, nuances of positions and nuances of opinions, despite the fact that the "Latin American majority" no longer exists in the previous, pro-American sense (which is essentially already a universally accepted fact in Latin American studies), and despite the fact that it is already possible to discern entire groups of countries in this region which behave differently in the United Nations, all of the Latin American states with a non-socialist orientation are nevertheless distinguished by common ideological and psychological stereotypes in their approach to the most vital global problems discussed in the United Nations--problems of war and peace, political and military detente, disarmament, international security, the eradication of international conflicts and so forth. These stereotypes, concepts and beliefs are connected, in our opinion, with the definite influence of the factor of dependence in the form in which it is interpreted by K. L. Maydanik.

These stereotypes are part of the general tendency to contrast the collective interests of the developing countries to those of the "industrial powers," the "small and medium-sized countries" to the "superpowers" and, finally, the "pluralistic United Nations" to the "unilateral actions of great powers" (all of this terminology comes from official Latin American documents). This tendency affects the policy of Latin American countries in the United Nations in many diverse ways--from mistrust in the joint global initiatives of great powers (an eloquent example is the cautious attitude of the majority of states in this region to the joint Soviet-American draft convention on the prohibition of the military or other hostile use of means of influencing the environment, submitted to the United Nations for discussion in 1976) to direct demands for UN intervention in the bilateral talks of great powers (particularly SALT I and SALT II) and the establishment of control over these talks by the international community.

We find a unique reflection of this concept in the Latin American countries' stance in the United Nations on international conflicts in various parts of the developing world. In this connection, it is indicative that although they repeatedly advocated the observance of UN resolutions on the Middle East problem, condemned Israel for violating them and even offered their mediating

services for the settlement of the conflict, many Latin American states, including those which voted with the Afro-Asian and socialist countries on the entire group of questions connected with the situation in the Middle East, did not believe that the main source of tension in the subregion was Israel's aggressive behavior (the overwhelming majority of Latin American countries do not ever use the term "aggressor" in reference to Israel), but "intervention by the great powers."

In all such cases, it is obvious that this is partly due to the influence of Beijing's notorious doctrine of "struggle against the superpowers," but the view of the majority of Latin American states certainly does not have a clearly defined anti-Soviet or, in general, categorical nature, but is, in our opinion, primarily an emotional reaction to the long years of U.S. imperialism's domination of the economic and political life of the region.

In questions of international security, the Latin American countries proceed from the concept of economic security, regarding the establishment of equitable economic relations as something not only as important as political detente, but even as something fundamental in relation to political detente. The concept of international economic security was set forth in its most paradoxical form by Costa Rican diplomat Gonzalo Facio at a UN press conference. He said: "The greatest threat to peace and international security--much stronger than nuclear weapons--is the extreme poverty of huge segments of the population of the southern hemisphere."²⁰ The just demands for equality in international economic relations, deformed under the strong influence of the factor of dependence, can sometimes degenerate into, firstly, a tendency to set the economic interests of developing countries in opposition to the need for political guarantees of lasting peace on earth and, secondly, incorrect behavior by the Latin American countries in the "North-South" talks, in UNCTAD and in other international economic organizations and conferences in those cases when they assign equal blame for their own underdevelopment to all of the developed countries without exception and, in particular, to the great powers, without drawing any political distinctions between the latter but basing their conclusions exclusively on economic indicators. This topic has been discussed in great detail in Soviet scientific literature and there is probably no particular need to say more about it here.

Finally, the completely natural desire of the countries of this region to participate more actively in the discussion of international problems in the United Nations frequently leads not only to attempts to broaden their representation and the representation of the developing countries in general in various UN bodies and commissions, but also to demands for the revision of the UN Charter by some Latin American countries: the cancellation of "veto" rights in the Security Council, the granting of broader legislative authority to the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council or the further expansion of the Security Council by means of the inclusion of permanent members from the developing countries. In this area as well, we feel that the factor of dependence plays far from the least significant role, sometimes transforming the tendency toward greater independence in the international arena on the part of the developing Asian, African and Latin American countries into

unproductive and unconstructive extremist concepts whose implementation could lead to the self-dissolution of the United Nations as an instrument for the regulation of international relations.

At the same time, it is particularly significant that the actual behavior of the Latin American countries in the United Nations often does not coincide with their scholastic a priori aims, and can even refute them. The ability to assess situations realistically and to engage in constructive cooperation and mediation in the most diverse and complex international issues is a characteristic feature, according to foreign and Soviet experts, of the present-day diplomacy of many Latin American countries. What is more, countries in this region are not only actively supporting the proposals of the USSR and the socialist countries in the international arena with increasing frequency, but are also putting forth their own independent initiatives of the very broadest nature.

Experience has proved that the term "autonomy" cannot be used in reference to these tendencies in Latin American diplomacy. In my opinion, it would also be difficult to agree with the statement, made during the discussion, that the entire matter is confined to the narrow limits of specific and rather insignificant economic actions or loud political attacks with nothing to back them up.²¹ The MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY OF THE DEVELOPING STATES, a fundamentally new phenomenon in international life, provides ample proof of this. We believe it would be extremely difficult to categorize its practical moves and, in particular, the Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of States, adopted in the United Nations as early as 1974, as "partial successes" or even as "autonomous actions." It is here that the extremely serious vulnerability of the "omnipotent" "force field of dependence" reveals itself. The very fact that the factor of dependence, as K. L. Maydanik points out with complete accuracy in this case, "the only factor which qualitatively unites all of the diverse societies of the developing world,"²² somehow "does not work" in the UN sphere, suggests that this is not the deciding factor in all areas and in all cases.

Without claiming to have made a thorough investigation of this extremely complex and multifaceted contradiction, we will nevertheless take the liberty to suggest that the degree to which the "force field of dependence" influences a specific foreign policy action by a Latin American state in the international arena (in addition to all types of internal and temporary factors which certainly cannot ever be ignored) depends largely on the country's degree of "involvement" in the multilateral diplomacy of the developing states and is inversely proportional (if this involvement does exist) to the level of the issue discussed in the United Nations (this refers both to the significance of the issue and the level of its discussion).

K. L. Maydanik's suggestion that the factor of "backwardness" might be used to explain the tendencies toward united action in the international arena by the Asian, African and Latin American countries does not seem to be a good one. The fact is that never in history has backwardness, especially "collective backwardness," ensured "collective success." It is obvious that we are dealing here with an extremely complex problem which could hardly be solved on the level of games with definitions like "dependence" or "neodependence."

The severity and pertinence of these contradictions were disclosed to one degree or another by the majority of participants, who reached a deadlock several times in the approach to an extremely important methodological feature, which was formulated as the following: THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS BY STATES UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF DEPENDENT CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT.

In the field of Latin American studies, the future scientific investigation of this matter could be impeded by the lack of coordination in the research of specialists in various fields (which was quite correctly pointed out and logically discussed by, in particular, A. A. Matlina), by the need for a serious study of the foreign policy decisionmaking process in the Latin American states, which was also mentioned during the discussion, and by the existing terminological confusion, which we regard as an extremely dangerous phenomenon. We do not wish to repeat ourselves, but we must say that the first step toward clearing up this confusion should be the clarification of the term "anti-imperialism" as it applies to present-day foreign policy trends in the Latin American countries, or at least the eradication of the already customary and unfortunate equation of "anti-imperialism" with "anti-Americanism" or with any conflicts between rapidly developing local capitalism and multinational corporations. This is already the subject of special discussion and might even be the topic of the kind of scientific debate LATINSKAYA AMERIKA has recently been organizing so efficiently.

FOOTNOTES

1. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, p 44.
2. Ibid., p 49.
3. Ibid., p 56.
4. It is obvious that the term "sub-imperialism" requires clarification. Some Western European countries, in which state-monopoly capitalism has come into being but which are distinguished by some degree of economic dependence, are not called sub-imperialist.
5. E. Lanza, "El Subimperialismo Venezolano," Caracas, 1980, pp 202-203.
6. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, p 56.
7. Ibid., 1981, No 10, p 64.
8. See the report by V. B. Tarasov, *ibid.*, p 66.
9. E. Lanza, *Op. cit.*, p 61.
10. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, p 66.
11. Ibid., p 45.

12. Ibid., 1981, No 63.
13. In this article, Ye. M. Primakov directs attention to the following tendency: "Uneven development under capitalism has caused several newly independent states to stand out sharply from the rest of the group in terms of the growth rate of national income, capital investments and, in some cases, labor productivity." He goes on to say: "In the 1950's, some Latin American countries which are generally assigned to the developing world, were already ahead of the countries on the outside edge of the group of developed capitalist states in terms of the important indicator of per capita GDP. Furthermore, some of them, such as Brazil, Mexico and others, were even ahead of Spain, Greece and Portugal in terms of the growth rate of this indicator in the first half of the 1970's"--MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1980, No 12, pp 31-35.
14. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, p 49.
15. Ibid., p 66.
16. M. L. Chumakova expresses something like the intermediate point of view when she says that "sub-imperialism is not only a U.S. strategy aimed at the creation of support points in various parts of the world, but also a natural internal process of the accumulation of elements of state-monopoly capitalism on the periphery of the 'field of dependence'"--see LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 9, p 71.
17. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 9, pp 57-58.
18. Ibid., p 68.
19. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 10, p 72.
20. EL EXCELSIOR, Mexico, 17 October 1975.
21. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, p 74.
22. Ibid., p 82.

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SANDINISTS INTERVIEWED ON U.S. THREAT, ECONOMIC-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, ROLE OF CHURCH

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 14 Sep 82)
pp 69-84

[Interview with Carlos Carrion Cruz and clergyman Fernando Cardenal, members of FSLN Sandinist Assembly, by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA correspondent: "The Revolution Is Irreversible"; in May 1982 in Moscow]

[Text] Carlos Carrion Cruz and clergyman Fernando Cardenal, members of the FSLN Sandinist Assembly, visited the Soviet Union at the end of May this year as members of the Nicaraguan delegation to the 19th Komsomol Congress. When they were interviewed by our correspondent, they discussed their country's most urgent current problems.

Question: How would you describe the present situation in the country?

C. Carrion Cruz: The nature of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua depends on many factors. The distinctive feature of the present stage is the increased role of the external factors.

As you know, at the beginning of this year, particularly in connection with the situation in El Salvador, the threat of U.S. aggression against our country grew stronger. This was reflected in a number of statements by high-level officials in the Reagan Administration--for example, Haig, Kirkpatrick and some representatives of the armed forces. At the same time, violations of our sea and air borders by U.S. naval ships and planes grew more frequent. In addition to this, counterrevolutionary forces outside the country took more vigorous action, in the form of infiltration attempts by counterrevolutionary gangs from Honduran territory. Some of these attempts were apparently organized with the knowledge and approval of the CIA.

The threat of aggression forced us to take measures in preparation for its repulsion. It was in this atmosphere that a state of emergency decree was passed on 15 March. Its passage, however, did not signify any radical change in public life--it had virtually no effect on the everyday activities of people.

This government measure was taken primarily for the purpose of coordinating economic resources and using them to strengthen the revolution. Control was established over political party activities, periodicals and radio broadcasts. It was after the state of emergency decree had been published that the revolutionary authorities took measures, in connection with new disturbing events, to strengthen our defense capabilities and mobilize the people in army reserve units.

At the same time, we made certain diplomatic efforts to avert aggression. The most important initiative in this area was Cdte Daniel Ortega's speech in the U.N Security Council. It was a concise announcement of our government's intention to alleviate tension and achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes and budding conflicts.

The United States, however, did not display any sympathy for these goals. Furthermore, its representatives made aggressive and provocative statements which excluded any possibility of negotiations. Nevertheless, with the resolute and principled support of Cuba, we were able to achieve what we regard as a definite success in the international arena by exposing the U.S. plans and thereby complicating their implementation.

The maneuvers of imperialism and internal reactionary forces were neutralized to a considerable extent by our actions. In this situation, they decided to derive maximum benefits from the treachery of Eden Pastora. It is understandable that the United States immediately wanted to take advantage of this opportunity. However, in this case, just as in many others, its attempts were unsuccessful. The very fact that the State Department agreed completely with the statements of our recent opponent exposed Washington's intentions to the entire world.

These White House actions testify that its masters will use any means to attain their goals--there is ample proof of this. This was what happened, for example, in the case involving Orlando Tardencillo. American newspapers printed photographs which ostensibly depicted reprisals against members of the Miskito tribe. In fact, they were photographic evidence of Somozist atrocities. The fact that Reagan Administration officials will resort to the use of any method to denigrate, distort and slander our reality is proof of their impotence and desperation: They have not only lost their credibility in other countries, but have even lost the trust of their own Congress.

At the same time, our international initiatives, the increasing weakness of rightwing counterrevolutionary forces and the Nicaraguan people's indignant response to Eden Pastora's treachery have helped to strengthen the position of the revolutionary government and mobilize the masses in defense of our revolutionary gains. Although we have no doubt that the probability of aggression has not disappeared and the threat of intervention could once again acquire distinct outlines, we can use the time we have gained to prepare for the better protection of our country.

Question: Obviously, economic development plays far from the least significant role in this context. The readers of our journal know that the Nicaraguan people had to deal with great economic difficulties during the initial stage of the revolution. What is the present state of affairs?

C. Carrion Cruz: The situation in this area is still quite difficult. It is colored by a number of factors: Factors of a historical nature, the effects of the global and regional economic crisis and the specific problems we inherited from the Somozist dictatorship and the revolutionary war. This is why we are taking a serious approach to the problem of economic development and the eradication of many of the obstacles standing in our way.

Unfortunately, the foreign political situation, which I have already discussed, does not give us a chance to concentrate completely on the attainment of these objectives. For example, after the state of emergency was announced, we had to use some resources earmarked for production development to fill our defense needs. In particular, machines intended for use in road construction are being used to dig trenches and build bomb shelters. There are also difficulties with foreign currency, which we always need.

The most serious problems, however, are connected with the reconstruction of the structural bases of the economy. These are characteristic of the economic development of all Central American countries. They are characterized by the disintegration of industry, the absence of an organic connection between agriculture and industrial production, excessive reliance on foreign economic ties and dependence on foreign technology and financing. We represent, however, the only country in the subregion where there is a real alternative escape from the structural crisis. It is in this area that we are concentrating our efforts.

We believe that the present crisis in our economy cannot be resolved quickly. The problem is that it was engendered by the fall of the old economic regime and the rise of new economic relations, which are not strong enough as yet to pull the country out of the state of crisis. In other words, the old system is already dying but the new one is just being born. Now we are at some point in the middle. In time, when the new economic relations gain strength in the production process, we will be able to overcome our present difficulties. This is how we view the strategic solution to this problem, signifying a break with the structural factors lying at the basis of our present economic problems.

Here is an example of the kind of difficulties we are facing. As you know, we are a major producer of cotton, but most of the fabric we use is imported because we have not had any spinning mills until recently and have had to buy thread abroad. Therefore, the disintegration of production in this field has not only kept us from developing a national textile industry but has also made us dependent on the countries which bought our cotton and sold us fabric. In order to correct this situation, we have already concluded an agreement with France on the construction of a spinning mill.

This example illustrates one of the ways in which our government is striving to establish an integrated economy. This means that, in place of the existing state of affairs, in which each branch of industry is independent--because finished products are imported while raw material is exported--we are striving for a situation in which some enterprises will produce raw materials for others, agriculture will serve as a basis for national industry and the

domestic market will develop on this basis. At the same time, we have been closing enterprises which consume more than they produce. We have no intention of supporting them simply because they already exist.

Therefore, we are seeking developmental alternatives which will ensure full employment and solve major economic problems. We believe that the key to this lies in agrarian reform and the development of construction and power engineering. But all of these changes will take time, and the price we must pay in the interim is the unemployment of a certain segment of the working public.

Question: In what spheres of the economy, in your opinion, will mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviet Union be developed?

C. Carrion Cruz: First of all, I would have to say the development of Nicaraguan power engineering. Our country has colossal hydroelectric power resources--enough to satisfy the power needs of all Central America. If we can develop these resources with the aid of Soviet specialists, we will not only cease to be dependent on imported oil but would also possess an extremely important instrument for the attainment of economic independence and the improvement of conditions for our people. After all, even Lenin said that economic development is accomplished through power transmission lines. This is why the talks with the delegation headed by Daniel Ortega in Moscow this May are extremely important from the standpoint of strategic development.

Question: In spite of the numerous difficulties the country has encountered in the spheres of foreign policy and economics, the Nicaraguan revolution has already won several important victories. Above all, there are obvious achievements on the cultural front. We know that the campaign to eradicate illiteracy--this "second liberation battle," as it is called in Nicaragua--has demonstrated the advantages of the new society that was created as a result of the victory of the Sandinist revolution. We would like to know more about how the struggle against illiteracy was waged and about its results.

C. Carrion Cruz: Metaphorically speaking, if we say that we are moving ahead in the economic sphere at a speed of 50 kilometers an hour and much more quickly in politics, our speed in culture, education and enlightenment would probably be measured at 200 kilometers an hour. These unequal rates of development are quite logical: We want to see the results of the revolution as quickly as possible, and the only sphere in which we can already sum up some of these results is the cultural sphere. We are certain, however, that the plans that are now sprouting in the field of education will bear even more valuable fruit in economics, politics and the life of our society in general within the near future.

Obviously, the campaign to eradicate illiteracy is our most impressive achievement in this area. It represents the realization of the dreams of many Sandinist revolutionaries, nurtured by them throughout 20 years of difficult struggle. What is more, even before the victory, our comrades who planned the reforms that would be instituted after Somoza's fall gave this campaign considerable attention.

The start of the campaign was announced just a few days after the victory on 19 July 1979. Fernando Cardenal became the campaign's chief coordinator. We encountered tremendous difficulties from the very beginning--we had no desks or notebooks and there was a shortage of writing implements. But all of these technical problems were of secondary importance in comparison to the main issues: the total clarity of the goals which inspired us, the extraordinary enthusiasm of all those who participated in the campaign and the understanding and support our intentions won not only from the people of Nicaragua, but also from most of the world public. The supplies needed for the success of the campaign were sent to us from everywhere, giving us tangible proof that we had friends in all parts of the world.

Of course, we had many difficulties, and they were not all of a technical nature. Our comrades did not have enough training and lacked the necessary teaching skills. But this was not the main thing.... I was once sent to a godforsaken village, hidden away in the mountains, where there were not even any proper roads. I was supposed to help in the organization of educational affairs there. Of course, the lack of teaching skills bothered me, but I was relying on the support of the inhabitants. And I was not wrong. When I arrived there, I saw that the entire population had joined the campaign against illiteracy, and the assistance and enthusiasm of these people helped us in the quick and effective organization of our work, which soon produced its first results.

Therefore, the main aspect of the process of the eradication of illiteracy was the fact that the people regarded the campaign as their own vital affair. It became something like a repetition of the revolutionary uprising, but whereas perhaps 15,000 people took part in the armed overthrow of the dictatorship, 200,000 people joined the campaign against illiteracy. In spite of the slanderous statements and provocative behavior of the revolution's enemies, the people were not merely on our side--it was obvious that teachers and students had a common cause of great importance to every one.

Only time will reveal the full significance of the sharp decline in the number of illiterate individuals in our country. However, many of the adults who have learned to read and write are now entering technical schools. After 3 semesters of study, which is regarded as a continuation of the campaign against illiteracy, they can master, for example, the profession of a tractor operator and learn the most effective ways of conducting farming operations and combating pests and weeds. And after all, they previously knew much less about this.

But these are only the immediate results of current achievements in the sphere of education. Imagine how much talent might be discovered in the future, and how many people, who are now unaware of their actual abilities and capabilities, will become writers, scientists and engineers! All of this could become a reality within 5 or 10 years.

There is also another, equally important aspect of the campaign against illiteracy. Even before the campaign began, we coined the slogan that Nicaragua is like a big school where everyone can learn something. And this is true:

We did not have any instructors who taught others and did not learn anything themselves. After all, our pedagogues were mainly young urbanites whose living conditions were incomparably better, despite the poverty of our country, than the living conditions of the rural population. When they went out to teach in the countryside, they experienced the sad and hard life of the peasantry. They saw with their own eyes, for example, the agony of a mother whose child had fallen ill and died because there was no way to get to a hospital only 10 kilometers away from the village after the road was flooded by a swollen river.

This campaign became a gigantic school for all of our young people. Young men and women grew closer to our people and learned to love them. This is why we feel that the campaign passed the traditions of struggle and belief in our cause on to the present generation--to the people who will be continuing our work in coming decades.

Question: What fundamentally new problems did the campaign against illiteracy raise for the educational system? What are your plans, in view of your past experience, for its future development?

C. Carrion Cruz: The greatest problem we encountered was probably the education of adults--this form of education did not exist in our country prior to this time. The importance of this problem can be judged simply from the fact that 250,000 people in a country with a total population of 2.6 million--or almost 1 out of every 10 people--are now studying in the system of adult education. This statistic would be incomplete, however, if we did not add that the total number of students in our country is almost half a million.

These figures represent the future of our country. They signify that the cultural level of Nicaraguans will be incomparably higher in 10 or 15 years. This, in turn, will help us cross the existing abyss of economic underdevelopment and make fuller use of the achievements of technical progress.

As for our plans for the future, we are now working on a reform of the system of secondary education. This system now consists of a general education in all subjects. This means that when students want to take all of these subjects, they rarely acquire any kind of specific practical skills and knowledge. This is why we would like to develop specialized secondary education. We already have, for example, special technical and agricultural schools, but they are still few in number and enrollment is limited. It is true that we have recently been able to increase the number of these schools with the aid of the socialist states.

We want a system in which a person who acquires a secondary education will already have a profession and will participate directly in the production process. After working for a while, he could continue his education in a higher academic institution. In this way, by combining our own experience with the progressive experience accumulated in other countries, we are striving to create an educational system completely in line with our needs.

Personnel training is a particularly pressing problem for us now. After all, Nicaragua was once a kind of peripheral area or backyard of the United States in the sphere of cultural development, and dependence in this area was in

Somoza's interests. It is therefore not surprising that our level of cultural development was extremely low. What is more, the distorted moral values which were cultivated in our people had a completely specific purpose. Suffice it to say that no more than 100,000 books a year were sold in our country in those days, and most of those were inferior cowboy adventures about the "wild West" and other such "masterpieces." Our country was not only made inaccessible to the achievements of advanced science and culture, but attempts were even made to divest us of our own cultural traditions.

The force of the culture "boom" in our country is attested to merely by a fact cited at a session of the Sandinist Assembly in January of this year: A million books on political subject matter alone were sold in our country in 1981! This figure seems almost incredible in comparison to the previous one, but it reflects the advances that have been made in Nicaragua and testifies to success in the development of the educational and informational network at our people's disposal today.

F. Cardenal: I would like to add a few words to what Carlos said about the specific features of the present stage of Nicaragua's cultural development. It seems to me that the main feature is precisely the eradication of the obstacles standing in the way of the establishment of our own national culture. Above all, we must eradicate the legacy of imperialist dependence in our people's view of the world and overcome the enforced stereotypes of the "American way of life." In addition to this, we attach great significance to the restoration of our own cultural traditions. All of the main cities in our country now have cultural development centers, whose functions include the restoration and development of our unique national culture.

The potential importance of the immediate effects of this activity is attested to, for example by the following fact. Soon after President Reagan took office, in March of last year, our purchases of wheat from the United States were deliberately complicated. In response to this, a national fair was organized in Nicaragua and was given the name "xilone"--this is the name for the goddess of maize in one Indian dialect. The purpose of the fair was to popularize meals based on maize--the main agricultural crop, which played the main role in our population's daily diet for centuries.

The significance of this fair did not stem only from purely economic factors; it was clearly of a political nature by virtue of its anti-imperialist aims. In this way, the restoration of national cultural traditions aids in eradicating current difficulties and simultaneously serves as a medium of ideological indoctrination for the people, especially youth.

Question: Young Nicaraguans proved their loyalty to the Sandinist revolution more than once in the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. How could you assess their contribution to the construction of a new Nicaragua?

C. Carrion Cruz: Our young people have played an extremely important role in all areas of national development since the revolutionary victory. They have been actively involved in all major undertakings conducted by the government of national reconstruction. This was the case during the campaign against

illiteracy and during the harvest of the main export crops--coffee and cotton. When the foreign political situation was exacerbated and the threat of aggression grew stronger, our young people did most of the work to reinforce our country's defense potential. This is why we have every reason to say that our young people are the most dynamic force of the Nicaraguan revolution and are confidently reforming all spheres of national reality under the firm guidance of the Sandinist National Liberation Front.

F. Cardenal: I would say that the Nicaraguan revolution is a young people's revolution. After all, most of the participants and leaders of the struggle against dictatorship and the reconstruction process have been young people. The hard school of past years gave our young people what I regard as their two most important qualities--their high degree of involvement in the struggle and their maturity. It was precisely because of these characteristics that the youth of our leaders never impeded the resolution of the country's difficult problems, but, rather, guaranteed highly dynamic behavior with the proper degree of balance in political decisions and the flexibility of our revolutionary process.

Question: Like your brother Ernesto Cardenal, Nicaragua's minister of culture, whose views have been expressed several times in our magazine, you have devoted your life to the revolutionary cause. Like him, you joined the revolution under the influence of the "theology of liberation." Soviet scholars of Latin American affairs are quite interested in this relatively new phenomenon in the development of the continent, particularly as it applies to your country.* As a clergyman and a revolutionary, what is your view on the role of the church in the liberation movement in Nicaragua and in Latin America in general?

F. Cardenal: With regard to your investigation of the status and role of the church in our country, I must say that I read the article about this in LATINSKAYA AMERIKA with great interest. The author's analysis and conclusions seemed completely objective to me. In my opinion, the final section of the article was particularly important, where the author said that the alliance of Christians and Marxists in Latin America will have an important effect on the development of the revolutionary movement in our region. Nicaragua's experience provides quite conclusive evidence of this.

A comparison of the revolutions in Cuba and in our country could be of great value in this context. These two historical events were separated by a period of only 20 years. Although this is a negligible interval in the broad historical context, the church made exceptionally important advances during this period. Many of the values defended by the Catholic Church in the past were reassessed in line with the decisions of Vatican II, and this led to important changes in the position of part of the clergy. In Latin America this was particularly apparent--this is confirmed by the second and third conferences of the Latin American Episcopal Council (SELAM), held in Medellin in 1968 and in Pueblo in 1979.

* See, for example, LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1980, No 9, pp 27-63; 1981, No 9, pp 27-41, etc. (Editor's note).

The Medellin decisions, which were adopted by the bishops and were actually based on a Marxist analysis of our current situation, allowed many clergymen to participate in the revolutionary reforms on the continent. This is precisely when the "theology of liberation" received official recognition. I would like to say in this connection that, in contrast to European theology, the Latin American "liberation theology" was not the creation of armchair scholars or professors of theology. It was engendered by political fighters, acting in conjunction with the people, and became a kind of philosophical summary or generalization of the practical results of the struggle of clergymen who had taken the side of the underprivileged and the oppressed. It was the ideological substantiation of their activity.

The revolution in Cuba took place before all of these changes. In 1959 the Cuban church was still taking the conservative stance which had undergone virtually no significant changes since the 16th century. For this reason, it is completely understandable that most clergymen had a hostile response to the revolution. Many of them went to Miami and began to engage in counterrevolutionary activity there.

The Nicaraguan revolution, on the other hand, took place under different conditions, at a time when many clergymen were well aware that the road of revolution was the only road that could be taken to help the people in a country like ours win freedom and independence. During the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship and after the victory, the FSLN leadership always considered the feelings of the large religious public and the position of church leaders. These two intersupplementary factors--the involvement of parts of the clergy in the political struggle on the side of the people and their support by the revolutionary leadership--will indisputably continue to have an extremely important effect, primarily in such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala, where the armed struggle has many features in common with the development of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua.

The significance of our experience and our example of interrelations between the revolution and church consists primarily in the fact that the religious masses--and religious feelings are quite strong in our countries--and the clergy learned from their own experience that participation in the revolutionary struggle does not require the abandonment of religious beliefs. This fact cannot fail to expand the social base of the revolution because the Christian masses and Christian leaders will become increasingly involved in the just struggle against oppression and exploitation.

It is precisely because Nicaragua's example could have too much influence on the millions of believers throughout Latin America that the reactionary segment of the top Catholic clergy, most of whom are bishops who occupy positions of responsibility in the SELAM, are making every effort to neutralize this influence. The conservative SELAM leadership is well aware that present-day Nicaragua, in addition to everything else, is an arena of fierce struggle for the future of the Catholic Church on our continent. The events here will largely decide the future allegiance and future course of the church: They will decide whether the church will take the side of the people or the side of the powers that be.

The SELAM leaders are fully aware that the "theology of liberation" could be of great danger to them and are therefore making every effort to impede its development and to minimize its influence on broad segments of the religious public and the clergy. This was the problem they wanted to solve at the conference in Pueblo. Although they were able to win the necessary support for their resolutions in some areas, they did not attain this main goal. It is therefore understandable that they are now making every effort to retain their influence in Nicaragua. For this purpose, they have sent us many priests who are loyal to the principles of the traditional church, and they are striving to win the support of Nicaraguan church leaders, particularly Monsignor Obando y Bravo, Archbishop Managua and several other bishops.

With this line of behavior, SELAM is not only trying to exacerbate relations between the bishops and the revolutionary government, but also to turn the church leadership into a bourgeois opposition leader. Relations between the state and the church have recently become more strained. The complexity and the contradictory nature of these relations are described quite well in the article I mentioned.

The reason for this strain was the irresponsible document, signed by a number of church leaders with the bishop of the Atlantic coast at their head, criticizing the government for the resettlement of the Coco River Miskito in the south. This document, which was based on the testimony of biased individuals whose contacts with counterrevolutionaries, former large landowners and merchants connected with foreign capital had discredited them, was published on opening day of the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties (COPPPAL). For this reason, the bishops' statement cannot be interpreted as anything other than provocation for the purpose of discrediting government policy toward Indian tribes. It is understandable that the church leaders' action was severely criticized by the general Nicaraguan public and by thousands of clergymen who had expressed their full support and approval of the government's actions.

Question: Our readers would be interested in learning more about the resettlement of the Indians on the Atlantic coast.

F. Cardenal: When counterrevolutionary forces wanted to retaliate and take new provocative actions against the people's regime, they decided to take advantage of the nationalist feelings of part of the population. As you know, the ethnic mixture in Nicaragua is the result of the merger of three main components: European (descendents of the Spanish and English), African (descendents of Negro slaves) and native Indians. The Indians, who now constitute around 3 percent of the population, can be divided into two large linguistic groups: the descendents of meso American tribes living in the center of the country and on the Pacific coast, and the descendents of South American Indians from the Chibcha group who settled on the Atlantic coast. The latter initially consisted of two tribes--the Sumu and Rama. Later, after some of the Sumu Indians had intermarried with Africans, another tribe came into being--the Miskito.

As soon as the Sandinist Government had taken power, it began to conduct an ethnic policy based on the principles of the equality of all citizens, regardless of race, nationality or religion, and prohibiting all forms of ethnic,

linguistic or cultural discrimination. The living conditions of the population on the Atlantic coast were extremely adverse, however, as a result of the centuries of colonial oppression and decades of the Somozist regime. Medical services were almost nonexistent in these regions, most of the population could neither read nor write and there were tremendous economic problems.

In spite of all the difficulties inherited from past regimes, however, the revolutionary government did all it could to promote development in these fields. Above all, efforts were made to improve medical care and education and to solve economic problems. For example, 12,500 people were taught during the campaign against illiteracy, and the teaching was conducted in their native languages--Miskito, Sumu and English. The number of teachers there increased by almost 85 percent, reaching 855, and 480 schools were opened. The number of medical personnel tripled, new hospitals were opened and existing ones were enlarged. Work began on the construction of roads to connect the Atlantic coast with the Pacific; telephones and television sets, which had never been seen in these areas, were installed.

Several important positive reforms were also instituted in the political sphere. Consistently implementing democratic principles, the revolutionary government supported the formation of the Miskito Misurasata organization at the end of 1979, which was represented in the State Council. The creation of the Sukavala association of Sumu communities and other popular organizations in this region began in 1980. All of these facts testify that members of ethnic minority groups participate directly in political decisionmaking.

Considerable advances were also made in the sphere of social relations. On 29 February 1980 all of the miners in this area--most of them Miskito--were covered by a social security system which augmented their rights and protected the interests of their families. Laws of this kind had never been passed in Nicaragua before. Besides all of this, there was the organizational expansion of the miners' trade unions and the regulation of their wages.

Some leaders of the Misurasata organization, however, betrayed the interests of their people and followed the lead of the pro-imperialist forces attempting to kindle interethnic strife. The imperialist plans led to the bloody events of the so-called operation "red Christmas," launched last November. Counter-revolutionary gangs on the border with Honduras provoked clashes with units of the Sandinist people's army by crossing over into our territory, committing terrorist and violent actions in villages where Indians lived, and forcing some of them to emigrate to Honduras.

The tragic result of these criminal actions by counterrevolutionary forces was the murder of 60 people, who included fighters from the Sandinist armed forces and members of the local civilian population. In particular, a few of the victims were Miskito.

In response to these provocative actions, the revolutionary government began to carry out a program for the resettlement of the Coco River Miskito on 14 January 1982. It envisaged the resettlement of 8,500 people in five settlements located around 60 kilometers from the border with Honduras. This project was called "Tasba pri," which means "free land" in Miskito. During the course

of the resettlement operation, the Miskito were guaranteed security and all types of assistance, including food, medical treatment, the transport of children and the elderly on army helicopters, etc.

In the new settlements, the Miskito were guaranteed living conditions fully in line with their family and neighborly principles so that their previous social ties would remain unchanged. All of them were vaccinated against malaria, measles and tetanus, and good medical care was organized everywhere. Children were divided into age groups to attend the schools that exist in each new settlement. Religious ceremonies are held regularly, mass cultural undertakings are constantly being organized, and young people and adults take part in athletic competitions.

The "Tasba pri" program was certainly not a spontaneous or improvised measure. It was already being drawn up in November 1980 at the Nicaraguan Atlantic Institute for the purpose of improving the living conditions of the Coco River Miskito and protecting them from raids by counterrevolutionary gangs. They have been allocated over 50,000 hectares of fertile land, the quality of which far surpasses their previous holdings. The main agricultural crops used in their diet will be cultivated there--maize, rice, bananas, string beans and yucca. The government has allocated 62 million Cordobas for the first sowing season, and allocations for 1983 will increase by 7.5 million Cordobas. Each family has been supplied with a lot of 250 square meters for housing, while the average family's territory in the past amounted to only 40 square meters.

Therefore, the attempts of some church leaders to slander and distort the ethnic policy of the revolutionary government are destined to fail, just as all of the other unsuccessful reactionary efforts to inhibit the development of the revolutionary process in our country and reverse the course of history.

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ARGENTINE-SOVIET MARXIST SYMPOSIUM ON ARGENTINE CAPITALISM

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 14 Sep 82)
pp 135-140

[Report by I. Sh. on joint scientific symposium organized by Institute of Latin America, USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Argentine Victorino Codovilla Center for Marxist-Leninist Research, held in Moscow on 26-28 May 1982]

[Text] A joint scientific symposium organized by the Institute of Latin America (ILA) of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Victorino Codovilla Center for Marxist-Leninist Research (Argentina) was held in Moscow from 26 through 28 May 1982. The Argentine delegates were O. Arevalo (delegation head), member of the political commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA); M. J. Grabivker, member of the PCA Central Committee and representative of the party to PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA magazine; and M. Isakovich, M. Lebedinski and J. Fuchs, members of the PCA Central Committee. The Soviet delegates were prominent researchers and experts on Argentine affairs from the ILA, USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by Professor V. V. Vol'skiy, doctor of economic sciences and institute director. The symposium was also attended by representatives of other scientific and academic centers.

The symposium was the next step in the cooperation between Argentine Marxists and Soviet scholars after the 1980 publication of the joint collective monograph "Argentina: Tendencies in Economic and Sociopolitical Development." It was held to discuss an extremely important and pertinent topic: the socio-economic structure of Argentina today. The main areas of this subject matter were discussed at four sessions. Individual and collective reports compiled at the Center for Marxist-Leninist Research and the ILA were discussed.

In an introductory speech, V. V. Vol'skiy spoke of the peculiarities of the formation and development of Latin American capitalism, as exemplified by the origins and developmental phases of capitalism in Argentina. He believes that the determination of Argentina's place in the world capitalist system must begin with a look at the dichotomy of the oppressed countries and oppressor countries. All other definitions--"underdeveloped," "backward" and others--are derivative. He spoke in detail about the peculiarities of the genesis of Argentine capitalism and the forms of its initial accumulation, which were colored by the peculiarities of the country's development. Among

these factors of initial accumulation, the speaker listed the conquest of the pampas, the export of capital from Europe, the immigration of manpower to Argentina and the colonization of Chaco and Patagonia. Imperialist expansion at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th halted the "normal" development of capitalism in the Latin American countries (but this stage actually did not even take place in the majority of these countries) and subordinated it to the interests of foreign monopolies. Besides this, V. V. Vol'skiy stressed, the free development of capitalism in the region was impeded by latifundism. Reforms of pre-capitalist agrarian relations were limited in nature, and the expropriation of land from Indians and local property owners by force augmented large estates. The latifundists, who had concentrated colossal wealth in their hands, became the first capitalists without ceasing to be landowners. Proceeding from the characteristic features of the historical development of the capitalist structure in Latin America, V. V. Vol'skiy raised questions about the general and particular features of the socioeconomic structure of present-day Argentina and outlined the basic areas of research in this matter.

O. Arevalo expressed his satisfaction with the concordance of the basic premises of individual and collective reports presented by Argentine and Soviet participants. At the same time, he noted that there are still some obscure and disputed questions in the study of the Argentine socioeconomic structure, and that the determination of the nature of the Argentine revolution and its stages depends on the answer to these questions. The determination of Argentina's role in international capitalist division of labor and the external factor's degree of influence on its socioeconomic development is also of fundamental importance. The country's dependence on imperialism is not diminishing but is taking different forms, and this is exacerbating the anti-imperialist struggle. O. Arevalo also discussed the socioeconomic and political implications of the efforts of Argentine ruling classes to perpetuate the country's dependent status. In the speaker's opinion, economic independence can only be achieved through an anti-imperialist, democratic liberation revolution with immediate socialist aims. He described the basic stages of the revolutionary process in Argentina, as summarized in PCA policy documents.

The peculiarities of the origins and historical stages and a general description of the Argentine socioeconomic structure were the topics of discussion at the first session of the symposium. Speaker M. Isakovich noted that the capitalist development of Argentina, under the conditions of dependence on imperialism and the prevalence of latifundism, has been accompanied by the intensification of the crisis of the socioeconomic structure. At the basis of the division of Argentina's historical development into specific states lie the stages of world capitalism, which influenced forms of dependence on imperialism and phases in the development of Argentine capitalism and the structural crisis. According to M. Isakovich, the level of capitalist development in Argentina depends on whether its economic dependence decreases or increases as the prevailing system is updated. According to the speaker, this dependence is increasing. Concentration of capital here is accomplished on a dual basis--a limited domestic market and an international capitalist market controlled by monopolistic capital. The structural crisis therefore affects the interests of all strata of the Argentine bourgeoisie, including

the grand bourgeoisie. The idea of creating "agripower" for competition with the developed capitalist countries in the foreign market has been abandoned.

Candidate of Economic Sciences P. N. Boyko, co-author of a report, agreed with the Argentine researchers' description of Argentina as an economically dependent country exploited by international financial groups allied with the local oligarchic elite. He also discussed the specific features of the multi-leveled socioeconomic structure, consisting of four main levels--private capitalist (foreign and local), state capitalist and latifundist, which is the prevailing form in Argentine agriculture. According to the speaker, this basic definition avoids the onesidedness of discussions about the "middle level" of capitalist development" which divert attention from the main contradiction in Argentine society. P. N. Boyko directed attention to the new forms of dependence connected with transnational corporate activity in Argentina and all of the Latin American countries.

During the discussion of this topic, questions connected with the origins of capitalism in Argentina, various stages in its development, the peculiarities of the prevailing structure and the degree of its maturity in comparison to other Latin American countries were examined. Candidate of Economic Sciences Z. I. Romanova discussed the 19th century reforms instituted by B. Rivadavia to stimulate the progressive development of Argentina. Candidate of Economic Sciences A. S. Berezova discussed latifundism as the main point of departure for the formation of the Argentine socioeconomic structure and as an organic part of this structure, uniting pre-capitalist and capitalist features. Doctor A. Bassols Batalla (National Autonomous University of Mexico) commented on the differences in the capitalist development of Mexico and Argentina.

Dependence as an external and internal factor of socioeconomic development was the topic of discussion at the second session. Speaker J. Fuchs analyzed various stages and forms of foreign capital's penetration of the Argentine economy and pointed out the tendency toward the incorporation of multinational firms in the country's present socioeconomic structure. The dominant position of imperialist monopolies and the continued existence of latifundios have sharply restricted the possibilities for the accumulation of capital. Multi-national corporations take up to 40 percent of all new capital investments out of the country in the form of profits. Economic dependence is extending to the spheres of finance and technology. Latifundism is influencing methods of capitalist modernization, the attempts to establish "agripower" and to denationalize the state sector and the tendency toward de-industrialization. The concentration of capital in Argentina is a reflection of the model capitalist center, and not a result of free capitalist development. This is why it has been difficult to form monopolies in the country and even more difficult for them to enter a foreign market already divided up among multinational corporations. J. Fuchs also discussed forms of transnational corporate control over the Argentine domestic market.

When the stages of Argentine capitalist development are being determined, Professor L. L. Klochkovskiy, doctor of economic sciences, said in the report he co-authored, the process must begin, as V. V. Vol'skiy pointed out, with the dichotomy of the world capitalist system of dependent and exploited

countries and countries which oppress and exploit other states, with a view to the fact that the gap between the economic indicators of the development of the two groups of countries is constantly growing wider. To corroborate this statement, he cited data attesting to the decline of Argentine economic growth rates in the last decade. L. L. Klochkovskiy directed attention to the fact that, despite the relative reduction of direct foreign capital investments in Argentina, imperialist monopolies have strengthened their positions in various spheres of the economy. They have been able to impose the "model of economic development" proposed by the Milton Friedman school on Argentina and several other Latin American countries, and this has led to the further deformation of the country's socioeconomic structure and to stronger dependence on transnational corporations.

In the report he co-authored, Professor A. N. Glinkin, doctor of historical sciences, examined the external factors with a decisive effect on Argentine capitalist development. The incorporation of transnational firms in the country's socioeconomic structure is a definite feature of capitalist modernization and the further concentration of capital. The transnational corporations with their international means of leverage can bring about the economic destabilization of governments not to their liking or establish obedient regimes. Transnational corporate activity in the dependent countries is intensifying the structural crisis and exacerbating ethnic conflicts and class antagonism. A. N. Glinkin also directed attention to other peculiarities of Argentine history which have nurtured its desire for independence. They include its exceptionally favorable natural conditions, its specialization in agricultural products, which are always in demand in the international market, its fairly developed state sector, the influence of its working class, which favors economic independence, and the attempts of some dominant circles to achieve foreign political independence and to take advantage of inter-imperialist conflicts.

Various aspects of Argentina's economic dependence were mentioned during the discussion. The new forms of dependence on transnational corporations, which, in contrast to traditional economic dependence, are apparent in all spheres of life in the Argentine society, were examined by Candidate of Economic Sciences S. N. Solodovnikov. Technological dependence, Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. A. Karpukhina said (Higher Komsomol School, Komsomol Central Committee), is complicating the creation of national scientific and technical potential. The expansion of imperialist capital in Argentine power engineering in order to adapt it to the needs of the international capitalist market was discussed by Candidate of Economic Sciences N. N. Malkova. Professor A. F. Shul'govskiy, doctor of historical sciences, reported on the increased penetration of the socioeconomic structure by transnational corporations and on their transformation into an internal factor of capitalist development. In his opinion, the state-monopoly tendency is the prevailing one in Argentina, and the basic aims of the revolutionary movement are now antimonopoly rather than anti-imperialist.

Questions connected with mounting socioeconomic contradictions, clashing tendencies and the role of the state sector in social development were discussed at the third session. In his report, M. Lebedinski described the peculiar contradictions in Argentina's multileveled socioeconomic structure,

stemming from the dependence on latifundism and the dominant position of foreign monopolies as well as from the considerable development of local capitalism. For this reason, the term "average capitalist development" is only an approximation and does not reflect the entire complex picture. In his opinion, the dependence of the Latin American countries is not confined to the economic, financial or commercial spheres, but is also apparent in the "model" of capitalist development, which has assigned them a subordinate position in international capitalist division of labor. Inequality and dependence in relations between imperialist and developing countries are particularly apparent in comparison to the mutually beneficial and equitable economic and trade relations with the socialist countries. M. Lebedinski also spoke of the role of the state capitalist sector in the Argentine socioeconomic structure and the conflicting attitudes of local and foreign capital toward this sector.

Problems in capitalist accumulation and the development of the state sector at a time of structural crisis in Argentina were the subject of the report co-authored by Doctor of Economic Sciences I. K. Sheremet'yev. Real opportunities for the accumulation of capital in the production sphere, in his opinion, are not being used sufficiently for social progress in the country. This is being impeded by factors connected with deep-seated structural disparities, the external factor of inequitable relations with the leading capitalist powers, and the activities of transnational corporations, which have assigned Argentina a specific role in the peripheral zone. Demands for the reorganization of international economic relations and attempts to replace dependence with "interdependence" have not affected the actual state of affairs and have not canceled the urgent need for radical changes in the Argentine socioeconomic structure.

The discussion of this matter focused on the reasons for the exacerbation of socioeconomic and anti-imperialist contradictions during the stage of capitalist modernization in Argentina. The continuous struggle of broad sociopolitical forces in defense of the state sector in the Argentine economy was discussed by Ye. A. Kondrat'yeva. According to her conclusions, state activity has always been one of the main levers of economic development and its significance will increase as modern productive forces develop. The intensification of internal contradictions in the structure of the Argentine bourgeoisie as a result of the appearance of new monopolistic groups was noted by Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Ye. Pitovranova. The new contradictions connected with conservation and environmental protection under the conditions of the technological revolution and the growing strength of transnational corporations were analyzed by Doctor of Economic Sciences K. S. Tarasov. Differences in the means and methods of capitalist development in agriculture in Argentina and Venezuela were noted by Professor S. A. Taborda Sanchez (Zulia State University, Venezuela).

Questions connected with the social class structure of Argentine society and the role of the working class in social processes were discussed at the fourth session. Speaker M. J. Grabivker analyzed the negative ways in which the working class has been affected by the structural crisis and the capitalist modernization efforts since 1976. The speaker made special mention of

the relative reduction of the industrial and rural proletariat, the growth of marginal strata and the increased emigration of skilled manpower. In spite of this, Grabivker emphasized, the working class is still the largest class in Argentine society and is playing an important role in today's social and anti-imperialist struggle. Energetic demonstrations by worker organizations and popular movements prevented the establishment of a Pinochet-type regime in the country. The regrouping of all democratic forces and the transformation of a multipartite coalition into a multiclass national union capable of serving as a basis for a new type of democratic government will depend largely on the reorganization of proletarian ranks.

The leading role of the working class in social processes in Argentina, as Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Ye. Shokina, co-author of a report, pointed out, stems objectively from its connections with the three dominant economic sectors, the combination of anti-imperialist and social class conflicts in the Argentine society and the historical features of the development of this class. Many obstacles will stand in the way of the realization of this opportunity, however: the multileveled social structure of the Argentine proletariat, the insufficient organization of some strata, the influence of the bourgeois nationalist ideology and the policy of Peronism in trade unions and the absence of unity in their ranks.

This discussion focused on the ideological struggle over the role of the working class in social processes and some of the peculiarities of the structure's interaction with the political superstructure. Candidate of Historical Sciences A. I. Stroganov (Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov) criticized nationalist assessments of stages in the development of the Argentine proletariat in works by bourgeois and petty bourgeois authors. In his opinion, the main focus of the ideological work conducted by democratic forces for the purpose of increasing their influence on the laboring masses should be a struggle against the tendency to contrast the "truly national," "creole" proletariat of the 1930's and 1940's, formed as a result of internal migration, with the proletariat resulting from European immigration. Candidate of Historical Sciences A. V. Goncharov discussed the need for a dialectical approach to the assessment of the role of the armed forces and the significance of taking the specific features of this integral part of the political superstructure and social structure of Argentine society fully into account.

The "Latin American type" of capitalism, V. V. Vol'skiy said in his concluding speech, is governed by the general laws of capitalist development but nevertheless has its own specific features, which can be revealed through objective and concrete historical research. The complex, multileveled nature of Latin American capitalism does not lend itself to simple definitions. In his concluding speech, O. Arevalo, the head of the Argentine delegation, spoke of the peculiarities of the present economic and sociopolitical situation in Argentina and the objectives of the Victorino Codovilla Center for Marxist-Leninist Research in this area.

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ARGENTINE EX-SENATOR WRITES ON CLAIM TO FALKLANDS

[Editorial Report] Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 1982, publishes on pp 141-144 a 1500-word article entitled "Argentina's Rights to the Malvina Islands" by Ipolito Solari Yrigoyen, described as a "famous Argentine politician and jurist", and author of the books "These Are the Malvinas Islands" and "The Malvinas Islands Today", and a former senator who now lives in France. The article argues the priority of the Spanish and Argentine historical claims to the Falklands over British claims; it states that the islanders are not entitled to self-determination and that in any case Argentina would better protect the islanders' interests than Britain has.

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USSR STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, AGAINST WESTERN AGGRESSIVENESS DESCRIBED

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 82 pp 3-25

[Article by Academician L. F. Il'ichev and Yu. N. Rakhmaninov: "The USSR in the Struggle for the Implementation of the Peace Program for the 1980s"]

[Text] The Soviet people and all progressive mankind are celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On 1 December 1922 the First All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a Declaration and a Treaty on the founding of the USSR, which consolidated the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the radical social changes which were made in its aftermath. The creation of an inviolable union among equal Soviet republics, as an event of universal-historical significance, is a triumph of the Leninist national policy of the CPSU and a vivid testimony of its truly internationalist nature and the great accomplishment of socialism. The USSR is exerting a growing influence on the course of history by the very fact of its existence, the real practice of a new type of social and inter-nation relations, and the power of its example in resolving most complex problems which capitalism is unable to deal with. "The example of a socialist Soviet republic in Russia will be a living example to the peoples of all countries and the propaganda and revolutionizing effect of this model will be gigantic,"¹ V. I. Lenin said.

The founding of the USSR was dictated by the objective course of historical development. During the first post-October years a close political, military, economic and diplomatic alliance had already been established among all then-existing Soviet republics, legalized with a number of treaties concluded among them.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unified even more closely the peoples of these republics in fraternal cooperation and for mutual aid in building socialism, the further joint strengthening of the country's defense, the pursuit of a unified foreign policy in relations with the capitalist countries and in the struggle for peace and international security. "All of these circumstances," the Declaration on the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 30 December 1922, noted, "imperatively demand the unification of the Soviet republics within a single union state able to ensure the external safety and internal economic prosperity and free national development of the people."²

The Soviet Union offers an attractive example in the successful solution of the national problem--one of the most complex problems in the development of human society. Naturally, it does not impose any stereotypes or "models" of state system which would ignore the characteristics of one country or another. It is exerting a growing influence on the course of history by the very fact of its existence, the real practice of the new type of social relations among nations, and the power of its example in resolving most complex problems which capitalism is unable to deal with. The Soviet example in national construction is reflected in the activities of the communist and worker parties of the members of the socialist comity.

The socialist world has a tremendous influence on the solution of the national problems which arise in the international worker and national-liberation movements. The peoples of the liberated countries, particularly those with a socialist orientation, make use of the rich experience gained by the CPSU in resolving the national problem in accordance with their specific historical development conditions.

In recent years, national processes have become particularly grave in the developed capitalist countries as well, the United States, Canada, England, Belgium, Spain, and others, in particular. Despite all the characteristics of the national problems existing in these countries, the USSR and the countries of real socialism provide live examples in the efforts to resolve it. Ensuring the true equality, development and rapprochement among nations and nationalities and eliminating national oppression are possible only by combining the struggle for the solution of the national problem with that for radical antimonopoly changes, the class interests of the working people and social progress.

The founding of the USSR, which strengthens even further the economic, political and defense power of the Soviet state, considerably broadened the possibility of its influence on the development of international relations as a factor of prime importance in the struggle for peace and social progress. "The founding and successful development of the USSR is of permanent international significance. It marks an important historical milestone in the age-old struggle waged by progressive mankind for equality and friendship among nations and for the revolutionary renovation of the world," stipulates the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR."³

With the emergence of socialism in the world arena it has become a determining component of the motive forces of our time, called upon to reorganize the entire system of international relations on the basis of its proclaimed principles of peace, equality and friendship among nations. The application of these principles in international relations creates prerequisites which lead to the rejection of the use of force in international relations and to the development of trust among states and nations.

The new social system gives birth to entirely different international relations free from discrimination, domination and subordination. Socialist foreign policy exerts the type of influence on the development of the global

situation under which it becomes possible for all dependent peoples to become free from national oppression and unequal status, while all states which aspire to peace, regardless of their power and size, obtain the possibility of pursuing an independent foreign political course. In assessing the global significance of the birth and development of the Soviet republic in terms of the fate of the world, V. I. Lenin pointed out that "we won a victory which is a conquest not only for our country but for all countries, all mankind."⁴

It has become even more obvious today that the builders of socialism are successfully implementing their historical mission of eliminating war from the life of society, rescuing civilization from the threat of thermonuclear war and establishing durable democratic peace on earth.

The 26th CPSU Congress, which proved that the Soviet Union is firmly retaining the historical initiative in resolving the vital problems of global development, is the most important landmark along this way. It defined the real ways for the preservation and consolidation of peace, intensification of detente and restraining the arms race. New many-faceted and comprehensive proposals were formulated to this effect. Particularly important among them are proposals aimed at resolving the most urgent problem of our time--rescuing mankind from the threat of nuclear war. Based on the concept that peace is indivisible, the Soviet proposals cover the solution of problems related to safeguarding universal peace and international security and turning some areas on earth into zones of guaranteed peace, stability and mutual cooperation. "There is no more important international task facing our party and people and all peoples on earth than the defense of peace," emphasized L. I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, in addressing the 26th party congress.⁵

The new foreign policy initiatives formulated at the congress are the organic extension and development of the Soviet peace program adopted at the 24th and 25th party congresses in terms of the most topical problems in contemporary international life.

One of the most important foundations of the foreign policy course pursued by the USSR is peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems and the solution of all disputes between them through peaceful means. This is the principal meaning of the peace program for the 1980s, which was adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress. It pits the Leninist policy of peace and constructive approach to the solution of international problems and honesty in talks against the militaristic course pursued by imperialism of intensifying the arms race, a policy of force and subversion of detente.

In discussing the world situation with a delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party, headed by A. Cunhal, its secretary general, on 21 June 1982, L. I. Brezhnev described it as alarming above all as a result of the increased aggressiveness of U.S. policy.⁶ Washington is formulating one after another new programs for increasing armaments, both conventional and nuclear. The Washington strategists are openly proclaiming their aspiration for American imperialist global hegemony. The U.S. administration does not shy at interfering in the affairs of other countries and is triggering dangerous crises and conflicts in various parts of the earth.

Under such complex conditions Soviet foreign policy, as defined at the 26th CPSU Congress, is a stabilizing factor in the international arena. Since the congress the Soviet Union has submitted a number of new proposals on grave global policy problems, covering many areas yet essentially aimed at terminating the arms race, the nuclear above all. They are the practical extension and development of the peace program for the 1980s. Furthermore, they include new constructive elements which are particularly important under the current situation in terms of weakening the threat of war and making use of all opportunities and possibilities with a view to consolidating peace and intensifying detente.

The 26th CPSU Congress paid great attention to summing up new phenomena in life and ensuring the creative development of Marxism-Leninism. The party's theoretical arsenal was increased by a number of important concepts, assessments and conclusions related to the elaboration of the concept of developed socialism, the establishment of a communist system and defining the laws governing the development of the main revolutionary forces in our time--global socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement, and the course of the global historical process today.

The Soviet communist congress defined the ways leading to the further strengthening and development of socialism as a decisive factor of peace and progress. The experience of cooperation with the members of the socialist comity, representing a new, a socialist type of international relations, was summed up. The influence of socialism on the increased role of the people's masses as an active primary factor in global policy, changing the very nature of international relations, was defined in its entirety. "Relations among countries have always been known as international. However, it is only in our time and in the world of socialism that they have truly become relations among people. They directly involve the participation of millions and millions of people. This, comrades, is the essential gain of socialism and its great service to mankind,"⁷ said L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. The theory and practice of peaceful coexistence as well were enriched.

The greatness of the foreign policy tasks of the new social system of creating entirely different international relations, free from discrimination, domination and subordination, which are characteristic of the capitalist world, is entirely compatible with the truly insuperable and inexhaustible sources of strength possessed by socialism. Let us emphasize above all the broad objective historical foundations on which the foreign policy of the new social system rests and the common nature of the tasks of ensuring peaceful conditions for building socialism and the interests of the international working class, the national liberation movement and all forces favoring peace, democracy and social progress. "We represent the peace interests of the majority of the population on earth," V. I. Lenin emphasized, "opposed to the military-imperialist predators."⁸

The indivisible unity between socialism and peace has been the base of all activities of the Soviet state in the international arena ever since it was founded. The principles of the peaceful Leninist policy, legislatively

codified in the country's fundamental law--the USSR Constitution--define the approach of the Soviet Union to all aspects of relations among states and nations.

The Soviet people and its state march in the leading ranks of the fighters for peace, independence, freedom and happiness of the peoples. The foreign policy of the Soviet state, notes the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR," "is profoundly humanistic. It has an open democratic nature and is consistent with the interests of the peoples of the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries and all peace-loving mankind."⁹

The Soviet Union is a peace-loving state. This is defined by the very nature of its socialist system on which the objectives of its foreign policy as well are based: together with the other socialist countries ensuring favorable internationalist conditions for building socialism and communism; strengthening the unity and cohesion among socialist countries and their friendship and fraternity; supporting the national liberation movement and promoting comprehensive cooperation with the young developing countries; systematically defending the principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, firmly rebuffing aggressive imperialist forces and saving mankind from a new world war.

The victories won by the Soviet people in building socialism, above all in the field of economics, lay a firm foundation for the successful progress of the Soviet Union toward communism and its pursuit of an active foreign policy of peace. In emphasizing the organic link between domestic and foreign policy tasks facing the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress that "we intend to concentrate all our forces along two interrelated directions. The first is building communism and the second is strengthening peace."¹⁰

Starting with the first act promulgated by the Soviet republic--Lenin's Decree on Peace--and ending with the peace program formulated at the 24th and developed at the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses, the entire 65-year-old history of the Soviet state convincingly proves that socialism is implementing the historical mission it assumed--the elimination of war from the life of society, the salvation of civilization from the threat of military catastrophe and the establishment of a durable democratic peace on earth.

The history of the land of the soviets offers a number of examples of its peaceful nature. It eloquently proves that imperialism is the steady source of the threat of war. In the first days following the Great October Socialist Revolution, when our country called for making peace among all warring nations, the Western countries answered with intervention. In the 1930s, when the USSR called for European collective security, the Western answer was the Munich Accord and the Hitlerite aggression which followed it. After the defeat of the fascist aggressors, when the Soviet Union undertook to rebuild its national economy dislocated by the war, the West mounted a cold war against it and began to blackmail it with nuclear weapons, clearly relying on the fact that, weakened by the war, the USSR would yield to foreign diktat.

All of these groundless considerations of talking with the Soviet Union in the language of power were refuted thanks to the growing might of the socialist country and its peaceful policy. Life has repeatedly confirmed the sterility and harmfulness of a policy from the position of strength and cold war.

The implementation of the foreign policy tasks formulated at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses, among which the creation of normal conditions for peaceful coexistence between socialist states and capitalist countries, based on the recognition of territorial and political realities, which had developed as a result of World War II and postwar developments, were ascribed great significance, was a major historical stage in the struggle waged by the Soviet Union for the great cause of peace. This task was essentially implemented.

Thanks to the efforts of the socialist countries, supported by other peace-loving states and peoples, a turn was made in the development of international relations in the 1960s-1970s from cold war to detente and peace. It was quite natural that this process developed most extensively in Europe, where the positions of socialism are the strongest.

The fact that many initiatives formulated by the Warsaw Pact have become the foundation of decisions passed at major international meetings or have been reflected in a number of important bilateral intergovernmental acts, is indicative of the increasingly deep influence of socialism on the development of global international circumstances. Let us recall that the collective action taken by the socialist countries on convening a European conference assumed a central place in European politics and was supported by the communist and worker parties the world over and the progressive European public and was positively accepted by all European countries, the United States and Canada.

In the 1970s, the USSR and the United States and the Eastern and Western countries made an attempt to organize international security on firmer foundations based on the principles of equality and identical security of the parties, a principle which proved to be fully justified in developing normal international relations and conducting a dialogue. A provisional agreement on some measures in restricting the systems of antimissile defense were concluded and enacted and SALT II was concluded. All of this led us to believe that the policy from a position of force was to become a thing of the past.

The Soviet Union has never aimed at gaining military superiority. However, as historical experience proves, it has always found a fast and efficient answer to any challenge hurled by militant imperialism. Students of international problems in the West, even those who do not share socialist views, are unable to deny this. For example, in his book "The Age of Deterrence," the American author G. Lowe describes the way in which the attempts of American extremists to lead the United States into the path of unleashing a so-called "preventive war" against the USSR were defeated by Soviet accomplishments in the field of defense.¹¹

The military-economic potential of the USSR protects the peaceful building of socialism and serves the cause of peace and security of all nations. The Soviet Union, which rejects the "export of revolution," also opposes the "export of counterrevolution," and is ready to help the victims of aggression. Today socialism has become the main bulwark of peace and a natural center of gravity for all peace-loving forces on earth.

Thanks above all to the strengthened unity among fraternal socialist countries, the development of their comprehensive cooperation in building a new society, their successes in economic and scientific and technical development, and the fact that they have maintained their defense capability on the necessary level and increased their active joint contribution to strengthening peace the tragic cycle of breathing spells between world wars has been broken.

The fact that since 1945 mankind has not plunged into a new world war, despite the attempts made by aggressive imperialist circles to lead the peoples along this fatal path, and the fact that imperialism was defeated in the colonial wars it waged against national liberation movements, are to a tremendous extent the result of the growing influence of the countries of real socialism and their persistent and joint efforts in the struggle for peace and international cooperation.

The only conclusion possible in the light of postwar historical experience is the fact that those who are truly interested in preserving peace can firmly rely on the support of the socialist countries. All attacks on peaceful socialist policy, however well concealed they may be and whatever reasons may dictate them, objectively weaken the chances of safeguarding peace.

The Warsaw Pact--the combat alliance of the peoples of the socialist countries--has been standing guard over peace and international security for more than a quarter of a century. It serves the great cause of socialism and progress. Its achievements in the creation and development of detente, expanding comprehensive peaceful cooperation and supporting the struggle of the nations for freedom and national independence, have gained it its high prestige and the respect of the entire world.

The objective historical possibility of establishing a strong democratic peace on earth today was the result of the radical changes in the global historical process and the entire system of international relations created by the victory of the Great October Revolution.

The development of the international working class and the national liberation movement reached a new level; the activeness of the people's masses in the struggle for peace increased and new laws of global development and trends within the capitalist world contributing to the prevention of war began to operate. The imperialist policy of power and aggression plunged into a deep crisis.

The international working class and its political vanguard--the communist and worker parties--are making a tremendous contribution to preserving peace.

This was exemplified by the 1976 Berlin Conference of Communist and Worker Parties of Europe. The Paris meeting among European communist and worker parties, held in 1980, provided a new impetus in the struggle against the threat of war. It contributed to energizing the struggle waged by the popular masses on the continent against the serious danger of threatening Europe in connection with the decision of the NATO bloc of deploying new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. In turn, the systematic struggle waged by the communists for peace and against aggressive imperialist policy is a powerful factor in the further unification and increased prestige of the global communist movement.

The struggle for the materialization of detente and for ensuring peace and the security of the peoples requires the tireless efforts of all peace-loving forces. That is why the wave of the antiwar movement is swelling everywhere and ever-new antimilitaristic organizations are appearing; an increasing number of political, social and religious leaders in different countries are speaking out against the continuation of the arms race.

In our time, when mankind is threatened by the most terrible of dangers--a nuclear war--such movements have become a major political factor whose role will continue to grow. This is exemplified by the mass public activities in Europe and in the North American continent opposing the aspirations of the aggressive imperialist circles to impose a new round in the arms race and to undermine detente. The type of broad association which opposes the threat of nuclear war today is unparalleled in the history of mankind. The struggle waged by the people's masses for peace has become a most important manifestation of their increasing democratic nature and influence on the shaping of global policy. "The greatest manifestation of democracy is found in the basic problem of war and peace,"¹² V. I. Lenin pointed out.

The broad national-liberation movement, which has been actively supported by the socialist countries and the world proletariat, brought about the elimination of colonial systems and the appearance of new independent countries, whose influence on international relations is growing. The appearance of the new countries which had rejected the yoke of colonialism considerably broadened the front of peace-loving forces. The joint efforts of the peoples of the liberated countries and the socialist states in the struggle against the threat of war is today a major factor of universal peace.

Socialism, which is in a state of historical offensive, blocks the aggressive imperialist forces and offers possibilities to the members of the bourgeoisie who deem it more sensible to promote cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries on a mutually profitable basis. The force of global economic relations as well is in favor of peaceful coexistence as the only sensible alternative. The development of mutually profitable cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries, particularly on a stable long-term basis, provides a material foundation for peaceful coexistence.

The objective opportunities for peaceful coexistence have considerably broadened today.

First of all, as a result of the scientific and technical revolution and the vital need to resolve global contemporary problems, peaceful coexistence among countries belonging to opposite social systems has become an imperative necessity both from the viewpoint of ensuring their safety and requirements related to economic, cultural and social development.

Secondly, in the age of nuclear missile technology, relying on an outbreak of a new global conflict is just as unpromising as it is fatal and criminal.

Thirdly, the military-strategic balance reached between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has become an acquisition of historical significance. "The socialist countries," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "have reached a military-strategic balance with global capitalism. This balance is a factor which restrains the aspirations of aggressive forces. Considerations related to disturbing this balance are doomed to failure. A military balance based on the lowest possible level of armaments is our constructive approach to nuclear disarmament in the interest of all nations. We are prepared to undertake a considerable reduction in nuclear armaments. However, any violation of the balance in this area would be fraught with the danger of violating stability and would threaten the preservation of peace."¹³

That is why in our century peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems is the only possible form of relations among them, assuming the nature of a competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and acting as a specific form of the class struggle between them: "The appearance of this form of class struggle," noted A. A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, "has a tremendous positive impact on the development of all directions in the global workers movement and on the progress of all nations toward social justice and durable peace."¹⁴ Peaceful coexistence expresses the dialectical unity of opposites, which includes the competition between the two world systems and mutually profitable cooperation among countries with different social systems. Its purpose is to provide conditions for the historically inevitable struggle between the two systems--the capitalist and the socialist--in the fields of ideology, politics and economics does not take a turn toward confrontation which brings threats of wars and dangerous conflicts, and for intergovernmental relations among countries, regardless of their social systems, deregulated by the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The practice itself of the development of international relations clearly proves that there is no sensible alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems.

It is natural that in resolving the main problem--the prevention of a new world war and achieving real results in disarmament--will also provide the necessary prerequisites for the solution of other global problems facing mankind and of vital importance to the peoples of the world.

This includes, for example, the need to supply huge masses of people with food, raw materials and energy sources. According to estimates, by the end

of the century the earth's population will increase from 4 to 6 billion. This also includes the elimination of the economic backwardness of Asian, African and Latin American countries, caused by colonialism, and which is necessary in the normal future development of relations among countries and, in general, in terms of human progress as a whole. Finally, this means the protection of mankind from numerous dangers brought about by a further uncontrolled technical development or, in other words, a question of safeguarding nature for the sake of man.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are also laying a path to the solution of the basic global problems of our time. Therefore, socialism has assumed the historical mission of protecting the environment from destruction and doom, a most important area in the development of human civilization.

However, historical experience proves something else as well. With tremendous material and financial possibilities at their disposal and other means of pressure, the aggressive imperialist forces and their accomplices are using all possible means to lead their countries to preparations for war. Pointing out the danger of provoking wars, V. I. Lenin cautioned that "the most important problems such as war, peace and diplomatic matters are being resolved by an insignificant handful of capitalists who are swindling not only the masses but frequently parliaments as well."¹⁵ Is this not confirmed by the hostile anti-Soviet campaign raised in the West on the myth of the "military threat" presented by the East and the demagogic related to human rights? This lie, which has been raised to the level of official policy, was needed to enable the United States and some other NATO countries to chart a course toward a spiraling arms race which increases the threat of war. Its beginning was laid in 1978 at the May session of the NATO Council in Washington, which adopted the decision of drastically increasing military budgets and the adoption of a long-term (through 1995) program for increasing armaments on a bloc-wide scale.¹⁶

This was followed by the artificially far-fetched Afghan affair and Polish events, the purpose of which was to wreck decades of developing mutually profitable trade, scientific and technical, cultural and other relations among European countries, to poison the situation everywhere and thus to prevent international talks on most topical contemporary problems.

Therefore, the current break in international relations did not begin with the Afghan events, as the opponents of detente claim, but was caused by a general turn taken in U.S. policy from cooperation to confrontation.

The confirmation of this turn was the adoption by the United States and its allies of new, more extensive armament programs; the creation of new U.S. military bases far beyond its borders, including the Middle East and the area of the Indian Ocean; attempts to broaden the realm of NATO activities, in particular by involving new countries in this bloc; the establishment of a so-called "rapid deployment forces" as an instrument of foreign intervention policy, and others.

The culminating point of this turn was NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in several West European countries--108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 474 cruise missiles.

Efforts are made to justify this step, threatening to peace, with false claims to the effect that the deployment of Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles allegedly changed the ratio in medium-range nuclear armaments to the detriment of NATO. This, however, is an obvious fabrication! Data, particularly those cited by the USSR Ministry of Defense in the book "What Is the Origin of the Threat to Peace?"¹⁷ in particular, prove that the deployment of SS-20 missiles was an updating of armaments, for the Soviet side, adopting the new carrier, removed one or two similar older ones. Although, naturally, the new weapon is an improvement over the old, its purpose is to resolve the very same problems--to counter the existing medium-range nuclear armaments deployed by NATO in Europe. Even Western specialists are forced to acknowledge this fact. A publication by the French Institute of International Relations notes that Soviet medium-range missiles, including the SS-20, are pitted against the entire Western nuclear potential in Europe, including American theater nuclear weapons and British and French nuclear forces.¹⁸

The NATO countries as well have repeatedly updated their medium-range nuclear missiles.

At the present time an approximate parity in terms of delivery of medium-range nuclear missiles exists between NATO and the USSR: the NATO members have 986 while the Soviet Union has 975 units of such arms.

Should an additional almost 600 new American missiles be deployed in Western Europe, in terms of means of delivery NATO would gain a 50 percent advantage; in terms of nuclear warheads its advantage would approximately double, as a result of which the approximate balance which exists, taking all factors into consideration, would be severely disturbed and a severe threat would face the security of the USSR and its allies.

Furthermore, this would disturb the balance of strategic USSR-U.S. forces, for the new American missiles would be a strategic weapon in terms of the Soviet Union. They could hit targets of strategic importance on USSR territory in 5 to 6 minutes after launching (modern intercontinental missiles take 20 to 30 minutes). This substantially changes the strategic situation not only in Europe but also far beyond it.¹⁹

Therefore, it is a question of a desire to lay a material foundation under the militaristic doctrines formulated by the United States. The Pentagon estimates that the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe would give the United States the type of military advantages which it was unable to secure for itself in the talks on strategic armament limitations. This would be an attempt to undermine the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States in favor of the American side, a balance which was stipulated in the SALT treaty.

The Pentagon considers the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe one of the channels leading to the creation of a potential for a first strike at the USSR, in the hope that in such a case a nuclear war would be restricted to Europe. "To an increasing extent American strategy itself is relying increasingly on Europe to eliminate the possibility of a nuclear destruction of the American continent," wrote the Italian journal PANORAMA.²⁰ Efforts are being made to convince the people that a nuclear war could be "limited." In discussing this matter, L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that "this is an open swindle of the peoples! A nuclear war 'limited' in the American concept which would be waged in Europe, for example, would mean from the very start the certain doom of European civilization. Naturally, the United States itself would be unable to stand aside from the flames of war. It is obvious that such plans and 'doctrines' represent a major threat to all nations, including the American."²¹

The deployment of the new American missiles in the FRG, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, or Belgium, aimed at the USSR and its allies, cannot fail to affect relations between the USSR and these countries. The implementation of this decision would also directly threaten the safety of nations along the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa, which would be within the radius of action of the American medium-range missiles.

This would also open a new channel in the arms race and would complicate the efforts to reach agreements on disarmament in Europe.

The United States has also undertaken the production of new types of chemical weapons. The Pentagon plans to deploy cruise missiles, bombs and shells equipped with new chemical charges above all in the American bases in Great Britain, the FRG and Italy and, subsequently, other Western European countries,²² thus planning the waging of large-scale chemical warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Pact members, i.e., to fight the war not in North America but in Europe.

International treaties and agreements aimed at banning the arms race in outer space notwithstanding, of late Washington has been developing a broad program of measures to militarize outer space. The so-called Space Command, the purpose of which is to prepare for war in space, became operational as of 1 September 1980. Corresponding weapons, including the use of multiple-use space vessels of the "shuttle" system are being developed to this effect.²³

It is through the implementation of such programs that the United States is trying to change the existing military-strategic balance in its favor and achieve military superiority over the USSR. According to the American newspaper THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, it is the American "hawks" who inspire the arms race and "oppose any real regulation and control of armaments. They prefer the chimera of nuclear superiority. Instead of reducing nuclear armaments they are encouraging the production and deployment of MX, Trident II and Pershing II missiles which, in their words, would enable the United States to wage a nuclear war and win. Their aspiration is to turn the use of nuclear weapons into a rational means of waging war. This aspiration is not only exceptionally dangerous but insane."²⁴

The effort to gain superiority in the arms race and a reliance on victory in a nuclear war, as is the case in Washington, is a dangerous madness. It is only suicidal people who could start a nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Whatever means for unleashing a nuclear war the attacker might choose he would fail in his objectives. An inevitable retribution would follow.

The dangerous consequences of the adventuristic policy of confrontation, which ignores the real state of affairs in the world, is triggering increased concern not only in Western Europe but in the United States itself. Such a course has been criticized, among others, by noted American personalities such as M. Bundy, former national security adviser to the president, G. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, R. MacNamara, former secretary of defense, and G. Smith, head of the American delegation to the SALT negotiations. Writing in the American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, they have expressed themselves in favor of the adoption by all nuclear powers of the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In their view, such a step could "help open the way to a serious reduction in nuclear armaments."²⁵ In support of this proposal, they have proved that NATO's current concept of being the first to use a nuclear missile triggers the drafting of a scenario for "limited nuclear war," in Europe in particular. Such scenarios are absurd and dangerous, for the outbreak of such a war is "linked with the serious and inevitable risk of its developing into a universal nuclear war which would bring death and destruction to all and victory to no one."²⁶ Writing in THE NEW YORK TIMES, G. Smith appealed to the U.S. administration seriously to undertake talks on limiting and reducing nuclear armaments, pointing out that the current attitude shown by the American government toward this matter has already harmed the security of the United States itself.²⁷ The growing mood in the U.S. Congress in favor of the proposal of reciprocal freezing of U.S. and USSR nuclear arsenals, formulated by a large group of Democrat and Republican congressmen, reflects the increased concern shown by the Americans for their own fate. Although it was rejected, the proposal was supported by 202 members of Congress. A group of U.S. congressmen proclaimed its intention to work for the adoption of a resolution on this matter, for, according to Sen M. Hatfield, the spokesman for this group, 75 percent of the U.S. population is against the negative policy pursued by the current administration in the area of control of armaments.²⁸

Washington's efforts to convert Europe into a theater of "limited" nuclear wars and the urging on of the arms race in other directions could boomerang and threaten the security of the United States itself. They encourage destabilizing of the strategic circumstances and the appearance of an explosive situation. Therefore, the near-sighted plans of the U.S. administration threaten the vital interests of the American people as well. On this subject, L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress that "the military threat hanging over the United States, as it does over all other countries throughout the world, is actual. Its source is not the Soviet Union or its mythical superiority but the arms race itself and the tension maintained throughout the world. We are ready to fight this true rather than imaginary threat, hand-in-hand with America, the European countries and all other countries on our planet."²⁹

The time factor becomes particularly important in the age of headlong scientific and technical progress. Wasting it, under present-day conditions, means, in the final account, wasting the opportunity itself of reaching an agreement on restraining the arms race which, should it continue, could become totally uncontrolled and uncontrollable. The arms race exhausts the economy, worsens the living standard of the peoples and increases inflation. Unless the arms race is turned back detente would be left without a material foundation and would be undermined.

The threat hanging over the world demands of all countries, the United States above all, a display of restraint, respect for mutual legitimate interests and an honest desire to find a common language in ensuring safety and developing cooperation. The Soviet side has repeatedly emphasized its readiness to deal with the United States on a constructive basis and the wish to cooperate as an equal partner, providing that the United States would show its readiness to do so.

The Soviet Union is not seeking a confrontation with any country, including the United States. Readiness for a constructive dialogue with the United States was expressed yet once again by L. I. Brezhnev in his answer to questions asked by PRAVDA's correspondent on the possibility of a Soviet-American summit meeting.³⁰

The USSR proceeds from the fact that the preservation of peace, ending the arms race and preventing a war, a nuclear war above all, is needed by the capitalist countries no less than it is by the Soviet Union and its allies, if they are truly concerned with the security of their nations rather than acting like gamblers ready to bet anything, including their own lives. There can be no future for a policy which threatens peace and international cooperation.

Today the entire world is faced with a choice. What is preferable: intensifying the arms race or disarmament? A return to the dark times of the cold war or further development of detente and consolidation of peace?

As to the Soviet Union, it made its decisive and irreversible choice as early as 1917. Since that time it has tirelessly and consistently struggled for the prevention of wars and for a just and democratic peace.

Under contemporary conditions marked by an aggravation of the international situation, caused by the policy of the most aggressive circles of American imperialism, the active implementation of the Leninist strategy of peace and disarmament is of prime importance to the fate of mankind.

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous to mankind among the various existing mass destruction weapons. The Soviet Union is firmly struggling for putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Soviet proposals to this effect were clearly presented by L. I. Brezhnev in his speeches at the 17th USSR Trade Unions Congress and the 19th Komsomol Congress.³¹

The Soviet Union calls for a practical and constructive approach to reaching an agreement on specific measures aimed at substantially reducing the strategic nuclear armaments of both sides. In order to achieve this, it is necessary above all for the Soviet-American talks to be truly aimed at restricting and reducing such armaments. The legitimate reciprocal security interests must be heeded and the basic principle of equality and identical security must be observed strictly. Finally, everything positive already achieved in this area should be preserved, for the talks are not initiated from scratch and extensive work has already been done.

At the same time, the USSR has expressed its readiness also to agree to a freeze on the strategic weapons of both sides the moment the talks begin. "We are convinced," L. I. Brezhnev has stated, "that this is the only approach which could lead to reaching an agreement on specific measures aimed at reducing the strategic armaments of both sides."³² The main purpose of the Soviet initiatives is to facilitate the reaching of an agreement.

After long delays caused by the American side, Soviet-American talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments finally started in Geneva at the end of May 1982. Naturally, this is a step in the proper direction. However, what is even more important is that they be held in the proper key and lead to real results rather than serve as a shield behind which the arms race would continue and the existing parity would be destroyed, for even the NATO countries, including the United States itself, widely acknowledge that the position with which Washington is entering the talks is unrealistic. It is absolutely one-sided, for the American side calls for a reduction of exclusively strategic means in which the numerical superiority, assuming that this factor is considered by itself, favors the USSR. At the same time, the question of other strategic armaments in which the United States enjoys superiority is deliberately suppressed, such as long-range cruise missiles on which, as we know, today Washington particularly relies, or the strategic air force in which the United States also enjoys a substantial advantage. They also ignore the fact that the number of warheads placed on ballistic missiles carried by U.S. submarines exceed those of the USSR manyfold. They also keep totally silent on the American theater armaments and the nuclear potentials of the U.S. NATO allies.

In exposing the entire groundlessness of this U.S. position, A. A. Gromyko said at a press conference given in New York that "its adoption would drastically change the ratio of strategic forces between the Soviet Union and the United States in favor of the United States and to the detriment of the Soviet Union."³³ At the same time, this would mean the implementation of the Pentagon's plans of deploying the most destabilizing new MX missiles, the Trident I and Trident II naval ballistic missiles, the B-1 and Stealth bombers, and the long-range cruise missiles. In other words, the United States is hoping to reach the type of agreement on reducing strategic armaments which would grant it unilateral advantages and substantially harm the defense capability of the USSR and all members of the socialist comity.

The Soviet Union also deems it extremely necessary that all channels leading to a continuing strategic arms race, whatever their nature, be reliably

blocked. The development of new types of such weapons should either be banned or maximally restricted within agreed-upon parameters.

The purpose of these important proposals made by the USSR is to prevent the threat of an outbreak of a global nuclear catastrophe. That is why they have met with the extensive support on the part of anyone concerned with peace and the fate of civilization.

Lowering the level of nuclear armaments in Europe is an important problem the solution to which brooks no delay. In his speech at the 19th Komsomol Congress, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "today speaking of peace is not enough. Specific and practical action is needed. The key task today on this level is to reduce the nuclear confrontation in Europe, which has reached dangerous levels, and to terminate the further growth of nuclear potentials here. We should not allow the appearance of a real threat of an outbreak of a global nuclear fire at any moment in Europe, in which two world wars have already originated."³⁴

The Soviet Union is trying to achieve mutually acceptable agreements not in words but in action. It is precisely to this effect that the USSR applied a moratorium on the further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has initiated their considerable reduction, proclaiming that no medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in areas where Western European countries would be within their range.

As to similar weapons deployed in the eastern part of the USSR, the problem of limiting and reducing them can be resolved only on the basis of reciprocity, through talks with those who hold in their hands nuclear arms countering the Soviet missiles. Naturally, the USSR does not object to such talks as well.

The United States is clearly trying to calm down public opinion with the very fact that Soviet-American talks have been initiated in Geneva, although the so-called American "zero option," formulated at the talks, directly clashes with the principle of equality and identical security, the observance of which is necessary if agreement is to be reached. In particular, this option does not contemplate any reduction in the American medium-range nuclear missiles already deployed in Europe. It does not take into consideration the British and French nuclear potentials but presumes only the nuclear disarmament of the USSR. What kind of "greater safety for all" proclaimed by the NATO oracles is this? The desire is to deprive the USSR of the necessary means of protecting itself against the nuclear threat presented by NATO, while hypocritically asserting that this would benefit the USSR.

All basic elements of the rough military balance which exists between the USSR and the United States, as well as between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, should be taken into consideration in approaching the solution of military detente and disarmament problems. Such an approach, which is consistent with the principle of equality and identical security of the sides, is particularly necessary if an agreement is to be reached on limiting and reducing nuclear armaments. Currently NATO nuclear arms are directly targeted on

sites within the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. In the Ottawa Declaration, which was adopted in June 1974, the NATO members confirmed that "their joint defense is single and indivisible." This was also stated by C. Cheysson, the French minister of external relations, who emphasized the impossibility of separating the defense of Europe from that of the entire Atlantic Alliance.³⁵

In presenting the Soviet position at the Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear armaments, in Geneva, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, answered the questions of a TASS correspondent as follows: "In Geneva the Soviet Union has submitted proposals which call for the creation of a vast European zone of limited and restricted nuclear weapons, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to Africa and from the mid-Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. Within this zone existing medium-range nuclear missiles (1,000 kilometers or more but not intercontinental) would be reduced in such a way that 5 years after the agreement has been reached, the USSR and NATO would have no more than 300 missiles of this class. This reduction would affect all types of nuclear medium-range facilities--missiles and aircraft. The deployment of new types of nuclear armaments would be banned in the zone. Naturally, this would include the American Pershing II and cruise missiles.

"The Soviet proposals do not stipulate any obligation affecting third parties. However, British and French missiles and airplanes must be added to the American in this overall total of 300 medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that such missiles are part of the medium-range nuclear armaments of NATO members. They are targeted at the USSR and its allies.

"Our proposals call for the implementation of parallel measures in Europe aimed at limiting nuclear arms with a range of under 1,000 kilometers. Such restrictions affecting numerous types of arms would unquestionably serve the interests of all European countries. We have also suggested that medium-range nuclear weapons outside the European limited and restricted zone be deployed in such a way as to not reach targets on the other side within the zone."³⁶

The Soviet proposals provide a real opportunity for substantial armament reductions. The Soviet Union also confirms its readiness to free Europe from nuclear weapons, medium-range as well as tactical.

A number of important initiatives which the Soviet Union and its allies have submitted over the past 5 years have been approved by the United Nations. At the 36th United Nations General Assembly the overwhelming majority of the members supported the Soviet proposal that the use of nuclear weapons first be proclaimed a most severe crime against mankind.³⁷ Such resolutions, which meet the expectations of the peoples the world over, were rejected only by the United States and its closest allies.

The implementation of the United Nations resolution on concluding agreements on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries which have no such weapons at the present time would be of great importance. The

problem of concluding a universal treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations must be resolved. The Soviet Union is systematically urging the banning of chemical weapons, banning the development and production of new types of mass destruction weapons and weapons systems and preventing an arms race in space. It calls for the immediate elaboration and conclusion of an international treaty on the total and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries are persistently calling for the making of decisions which would factually lead to an end to the arms race and to disarmament and would provide a new impetus in the talks on such matters. It was in this sense that the Soviet Union worked during the second U.N. General Assembly Special Session, which was held in the summer of 1982.

The Soviet Union did everything possible for this disarmament session held by the leading U.N. organ to end successfully. This was confirmed by L. I. Brezhnev's message to the U.N. members, which included the decision of the Soviet Union to assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, effective as of the moment of its publication.³⁸ It is a decision of historical importance. As we know, the military doctrine of the United States and the other NATO nuclear powers is based on the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took this step, for it proceeds from the inevitable and determining fact of the contemporary international situation that the outbreak of a nuclear war could mean the elimination of human civilization and perhaps even of life itself on earth. Were the other nuclear powers to follow the example of the Soviet Union, a nuclear war, the terrible threat of which hangs over mankind, could be avoided. The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the other nuclear powers will follow the Soviet step. This would radically change for the better the entire military-political situation in the world. The military confrontation would lose its present gravity, strategic stability would be strengthened and once again international trust will cement relations among countries with different social systems.

The Soviet Union will continue to structure its policy in accordance with the behavior of the other nuclear powers--whether they respond to the voice of wisdom and follow its good example or push the world down the slope.

The USSR memorandum "Deflect the Growing Nuclear Threat and Restrain the Arms Race," and the Soviet draft basic proposals for a convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons, submitted to the United Nations for consideration, are a major contribution to strengthening universal peace. The memorandum presents the basic positions and most important specific proposals of the Soviet Union.³⁹

U.S. President Reagan's speech at the second U.N. General Assembly Special Session was an attempt to justify the U.S. policy aimed at the aggravation of international tension. It was reduced to attacks against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.⁴⁰ Global public opinion negatively reacted to the fact that the President had not answered with a similar step the pledge of the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons first.

Reality also raises the question of the need for the adoption of urgent measures to ensure security on the regional level, in Europe above all, for in this century of scientific and technical progress world wars threaten the existence of human society throughout the world, while local wars conceal the danger of growing into a global conflict.

The peace program for the 1980s, which was adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress, contains new initiatives related to military detente and disarmament in Europe, confirming the resolve of the USSR to follow the path laid in Helsinki. "We believe," L. I. Brezhnev said, "that the process initiated at the European conference should be a continuing one. Talks of any kind--multilateral or bilateral--should be used to resolve the problems concerning Europe."⁴¹

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries believe that today the main thing is, first of all, to preserve political detente and, secondly, to supplement it with military detente. Military detente means strengthening and broadening the measure of trust, abandoning the use of force or the threat of force, limiting armed forces and armaments of individual countries or groups of countries, reciprocally abandoning attempts at gaining military superiority, limiting and subsequently reducing the levels of military confrontation, and taking practical steps aimed at reducing armed forces and armaments. These problems occupy a central position, for their solution determines the consolidation of peace in Europe today.

The socialist countries propose the reaching of an agreement according to which the signatories to the European conference pledge not to be the first to use against each other nuclear or conventional weapons, not to increase the number of existing ones and not to create new military blocs in Europe.

The Soviet Union and its allies have called for holding a European conference to discuss and resolve problems of military detente and disarmament in Europe. This problem is in the center of attention at the Madrid meeting. L. I. Brezhnev's proposal submitted at the 26th CPSU Congress on the readiness of the USSR to extend the zone of the application of measures of trust to the entire European part of the Soviet Union, providing that a corresponding broadening of the same zone is accepted by the Western countries as well, marked a turning stage in promoting the idea of holding such a conference.⁴²

A great deal of work has already been done in Madrid. Positions on basic problems covering all parts of the Final Act have come considerably closer to each other. Let us note that a substantial agreement has been reached in terms of the objectives and tasks of a conference on measures to strengthen trust, security and disarmament in Europe. In particular, a preliminary agreement has been reached for measures of trust, on which an agreement should be reached at such a conference, would be substantial in terms of military affairs. They would be politically mandatory and would ensure control methods consistent with their content.

In December 1981 the neutral and nonaligned countries submitted a constructive initiative by officially submitting a draft final document which, in the

opinion of most participants in the meeting, provides a good base for a positive completion of the Madrid meeting. Therefore, favorable objective prerequisites have been created for completing the meeting with the type of results consistent with the basic national interests of the European countries, given the existence of political will and realism on the part of the participants. The course of the Madrid meeting proved the positive role which the neutral and nonaligned countries have played and continue to play in Europe as supporters of a continuation of the constructive dialogue and talks.

However, everything seems to indicate that the successful completion of the meeting is not part of the plans of the leading NATO circles, the United States above all. At the very start of the talks they tried to aggravate the situation in Madrid and, using a variety of fictitious pretexts, to lead the meeting away from the solution of the vital problems of European security and cooperation. It is to such unseemly purposes that they tried to interfere in Poland's domestic affairs and impose a discussion on the situation in that country, thus turning the Madrid meeting into an arena of political confrontation. Such intrigues openly clash with the principles of intergovernmental relations included in the Helsinki Final Act and the norms governing relations among sovereign countries.

The Soviet Union, which supports the need for reaching an agreement on convening a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, proceeds from the fact that detente and disarmament are needed by the Western countries, including the United States, as much as they are to the Soviet Union and its allies.

The USSR and the other peace-loving countries are also interested in reaching acceptable decisions on all sections of the Final Act at the Madrid meeting. This applies to the further assertion in European political life of the principles of intergovernmental relations, their strict observance and the implementation of the agreements based on the principles contained in the final act in humanitarian and other areas (culture, education, information and contacts) as well as problems of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Reaching agreements on the development of economic cooperation is also of great importance.

At the meeting between L. I. Brezhnev and G. Husak, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee general secretary, held in Crimea on 30 July 1982, both noted with satisfaction that the results of the Helsinki conference, which was held 7 years previously, had not been annulled in the least by the current development of the situation in Europe and the world. On the contrary, the more difficult the international conditions become, the more expressive becomes the entire significance of the Helsinki Final Act, concluded at the summit meeting of heads of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. The successful completion of the Madrid meeting and, above all, the adoption at the meeting of a decision to convene a conference on strengthening trust, security and disarmament in Europe, could become a proper assertion of the Helsinki spirit.⁴³

The Vienna talks on limiting the size of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe are an important direction in the area of restraining the arms race in Europe. Here again, the Soviet Union has formulated specific peace initiatives. Furthermore, it withdrew unilaterally from GDR territory 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks. However, the United States not only failed to reciprocate but is planning to increase its military forces in the FRG.

On 18 February 1982 the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia came out with an important initiative. They proposed a draft "Agreement on Reciprocal Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and Related Measures in Central Europe as a First Stage," which provides a constructive base for reaching a reciprocally acceptable agreement on practical measures to reduce the high concentration of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

On behalf of the Western participants, the FRG delegation submitted a draft "Treaty on Reciprocal Reduction of Armed Forces and Related Measures in Central Europe," in July. In assessing this proposal, the head of the Soviet delegation noted that the draft does not show that the Western side has advanced in areas which have so far blocked the reaching of positive results in Vienna. It does not essentially answer several basically important stipulations contained in the draft agreement submitted by the socialist countries.⁴⁴ This is no accident. As we know, the document "On Defense Policy," which was adopted at the NATO session held in Bonn in June 1982, calls for increasing all types of armaments, including conventional weapons. As a whole, the Western plan on basic problems to be discussed in Vienna is a reflection of the negative position adopted by the NATO countries. It stems from the general course followed by this bloc of accelerated military preparations and securing for itself military advantages to the detriment of the legitimate security interests of the USSR and its allies.⁴⁵

The Soviet Union favors safeguarding peace and reliable safety in Asia. The successful development of cooperation between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and other peace-loving countries on that continent, on the other, is an important factor in strengthening security in that area.

One of the comprehensive and broad initiatives formulated at the 26th congress, directly related to ensuring safety in Asia, is the proposal on formulating and applying measures of trust in the Far East. Talks on such measures could be held by the USSR, the PRC, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and Japan, which are Far Eastern neighbors, as well as the United States, which maintains military bases in Japan, South Korea and other territories and is engaged in active military efforts in this area.

As historical experience proves, gradual progress toward peace and stability in that part of the world could become an effective means in solving the problem of Asian security.

The proposal submitted by the Mongolian People's Republic on concluding a convention between Asian countries and countries along the Pacific Ocean

basin on reciprocal nonaggression and nonuse of force received a favorable reception in the USSR and many other countries.

The Soviet Union supports the idea formulated by the nonaligned countries of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and is actively participating in preparations for holding an international conference on this matter. It is prepared for a resumption of talks with the United States on restricting and subsequently reducing military activities in the Indian Ocean anytime.

The USSR has repeatedly proclaimed its resolve to develop good relations on an equal and reciprocal basis with Turkey and Iran and to organize mutually profitable cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and other ASEAN countries.

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have expressed their readiness to achieve a just political settlement of the Afghan situation. The proposals formulated by the Afghan government on 24 August 1981 provide a good foundation for this. The Soviet side will continue to provide the DRA with comprehensive aid on the basis of the 5 December 1978 Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation, in the development of its national economy and culture and in its struggle against armed and other forms of imperialist intervention from without.

The Soviet Union fully shares the peaceful efforts of Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea, which consistently favor the normalizing of the situation in Asia and the conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability.

The development of Soviet-Indian relations is an important factor of peace and international security. For more than one-quarter of a century the Soviet Union and India have actively and tirelessly worked on the development and intensification of their friendly cooperation. A great deal has been achieved in this respect, which enables the Soviet Union and India successfully to interact in the international arena in the areas of preservation and consolidation of peace and development of peaceful cooperation among nations.

In his 24 March 1982 Tashkent speech L. I. Brezhnev stated that, as in the past, the USSR is a supporter of good neighborly relations and broadest possible mutually profitable cooperation with Japan and is ready to act in this area on the basis of reciprocity. A specific proposal was formulated of holding talks on measures of trust in the Far East, initially on a bilateral basis.⁴⁶

The Soviet Union has expressed itself in favor of concluding a treaty of good neighborhood and cooperation with Japan, a draft of which was delivered to the Japanese side on 9 January 1978.

L. I. Brezhnev also confirmed the readiness of the USSR to reach an agreement with the PRC, with no preliminary conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides aimed at improving Sino-Soviet relations on the basis of reciprocal respect of interests, noninterference in domestic affairs and mutual profit and, naturally, not to the detriment of third countries. The USSR also indicated its readiness to discuss possible measures to strengthen reciprocal trust along the Sino-Soviet border.⁴⁷

The Soviet Union believes that normalizing and gradually improving relations between the USSR and the PRC would be a good contribution to strengthening the foundations of peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world.⁴⁸

Concerning the struggle for ensuring peace and security in Asia, L. I. Brezhnev said: "As a whole, our policy on that continent, as everywhere else, is a policy of strengthening peace and firmly rebuffing the enemies of peace, a policy of peaceful cooperation with anyone wishing to do so, a policy of fraternal friendship with the socialist countries, solidarity with all forces of social progress and protection of the sovereign rights of nations."⁴⁹

The circumstances in Asia remain tense. In the Indian Ocean, bordered by 36 countries, two aircraft carrier groups consisting of the Sixth and Seventh U.S. Fleets, remain permanently based. The largest Pentagon base in the central part of the ocean, on Diego Garcia Island, is being expanded and American nuclear missiles are already being installed there. All in all, today there are more than 90 large U.S. military bases in Asian countries, 40 in South Korea and 32 in Japan. It is precisely in East Asia and the Western part of the Pacific basin that the largest group of American military bases and bridgeheads has been deployed, the second largest after Western Europe.⁵⁰

In an effort to strengthen U.S. positions in Asia, the American strategists are intensively developing alternatives for energizing already existing and creating new military blocs.

The recently taken good will actions on the part of the three countries of Indochina were noted with satisfaction during the meeting held between L. I. Brezhnev and Y. Tsedenbal, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the People's Great Hural Presidium: withdrawal of some Vietnamese forces from the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and constructive and practical measures to develop a dialogue with ASEAN members, with China and other neighboring countries. It was emphasized that the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic proceed from the fact that the countries in the Far East can build their relations exclusively on principles of good neighborhood and mutually profitable cooperation. Given the sincere interest of the sides and rejection of prejudices and mistrust, there are no problems which could not be resolved through talks.⁵¹

The Soviet Union favors the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Historical experience proves that peace in the Middle East can be achieved only through a general settlement rather than the policy of the "Big Stick," diktat and separate deals. As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, such a settlement should consist of three organically interrelated features: putting an end to the Israeli occupation of all Arab territories seized in 1967, allowing the Arab people of Palestine to exercise their inalienable rights, including the creation of their own state, and ensuring the security of all countries in the area.⁵²

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon raised most urgently once again the question of the situation in the Middle East as a whole. Once again it

reminded us of the need to ensure the fastest possible elimination of the conflict in that part of the globe, a conflict fraught with very dangerous outbreaks. The tragedy of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples is a consequence of the generally unsettled situation in the Middle East and the adventuristic course pursued by the United States, which has taken the path of separate deals based on the Camp David conspiracy, which only unleashed the hands of the Israeli aggressor and worsened the situation even further.

Historical experience, which is saturated with acts of aggression and military conflicts, proves that the path of armed confrontation, as that of separate deals, has neither brought nor could bring about a settlement of Middle Eastern problems. The Soviet Union has submitted a constructive plan for a comprehensive, just and durable Middle East settlement based on six fundamental principles consistent with the norms of international law and resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on the problem.⁵³

The Soviet Union is on the side of the African states and peoples in their efforts to strengthen their independence, free the continent from vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid and their desire to control their own natural resources freely and independently, and to achieve economic independence and true equality. This is the principled line of socialist foreign policy. The USSR firmly condemns the aggressive actions of the racist South African regime mounted against Angola and Mozambique. It is providing the necessary support to the just struggle waged by the people of Namibia, headed by SWAPO--the true representative of the Namibian people.

The USSR supports the search for peaceful means of normalizing the situation in other parts of the world, in Central America in particular, on the basis of actual respect for the rights of each nation to structure its life as it deems necessary. It firmly condemns the continuing menace to Cuba and Nicaragua on the part of the United States and increasing American interference in the domestic affairs of El Salvador. The explosive situation in Central and Latin America is a major threat to international peace and security.

The Soviet Union calls for a consideration of problems related to converting the Mediterranean into a zone of durable peace and cooperation and strengthening peace and security in the Persian Gulf area. It supports initiatives on establishing nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and other areas, in addition to Latin America.

The Soviet Union and the members of the socialist comity firmly favor the elimination of the vestiges of colonialism. They are against neocolonialism and racism, economic and political diktat and inequality. They consistently support the anti-imperialist traditions of the nonalignment movement and practically help in the struggle waged by the developing countries for restructuring international economic relations on a democratic basis.

Naturally, a turn from confrontation to dialogue and from aggravation to settlement of conflicts is no simple task. However, it is necessary. It can

be resolved only jointly, through the efforts of anyone who is in favor of peace and acts in that direction. The Soviet Union is applying all possible efforts to lower tension, preserve detente and secure its further progress.

While steadfastly pursuing an active peaceful foreign policy, the CPSU and the Soviet state never forget the truly existing military threat and are taking measures to ensure their own safety and the safety of their allies and friends. Whatever weapons and in whatever quantity they may appear in the United States, L. I. Brezhnev has said, "the Soviet armed forces will have a proper counterweight for such armaments."⁵⁴

The armed forces of the USSR are and will remain the reliable defender of the peaceful constructive toil of the Soviet people and the great gains of socialism and peace.

As they welcome the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, the Soviet people are justifiably proud of their achievements and the revolutionary historical mission honorably implemented by the land of the soviets, as it marches in the leading ranks of the fighters for peace, independence, freedom and happiness of the peoples. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress inspire the working people of all nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union to new labor accomplishments for the triumph of communism.

The entire Soviet practical foreign policy convincingly proves the revolutionary historical mission assumed by the USSR, honorably implemented by the land of the soviets, which is marching in the leading ranks of the fighters for the peace, independence, freedom and happiness of the peoples. "The peace program for the 1980s, formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress and supplemented with L. I. Brezhnev's new initiatives," notes the CPSU Central Committee 19 February 1982 decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR," "indicates realistic and constructive ways of reducing the threat of war, intensifying detente and developing extensive cooperation among countries with different systems. It offers opportunities for resolving complex international problems not through confrontation but on the basis of honest and equal talks."⁵⁵

The foreign policy of the Soviet state, as an effective counterbalance to the forces of war and aggression, is profoundly humanistic, open and democratic. It is consistent with the interests of the peoples of the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries and all peace-loving mankind. This ensures it the support of the broadest possible international circles and all people of good will.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 250.
2. "Sovetskoye Sodruzhestvo Narodov (Ob'yedinitel'noye Dvizheniye i Obrazovaniye SSSR). Sbornik Dokumentov 1917-1922 Gg." [The Soviet Comity of Peoples (Unification Movement and Founding of the USSR). Collection of Documents 1917-1922], Moscow, 1972, p 313.

3. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 19 February 1982 CPSU Central Committee Decree," Moscow, 1982, p 20.
4. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 173.
5. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 31.
6. PRAVDA, 22 June 1982.
7. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," Moscow, 1981, p 6.
8. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 96.
9. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," p 24.
10. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," Moscow, 1981, p 217.
11. Lowe, G., "The Age of Deterrence," Boston, 1965, pp 50-59.
12. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 92.
13. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1982, p 19.
14. "Sovremennaya Diplomatiya Burzhuaznykh Gosudarstv" [Contemporary Diplomacy of the Bourgeois States], Moscow, 1981, p 16.
15. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 285.
16. "Sovetskaya Programma Mira Dlya 80-kh Godov v Deystvii" [The Soviet Peace Program for the 1980s in Action], Moscow, 1982, p 217.
17. "Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Miru" [The Source of the Threat to Peace], Moscow, 1982.
18. "La securite de l'Europe dans le annees 80" [European Security in the 1980s], Paris, 1980, pp 30-31.
19. "Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Miru," p 78.
20. PANORAMA, 10 August 1981.
21. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," p 21.
22. "Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Miru," p 53.
23. Ibid., pp 40-41.
24. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 9 February 1982.

25. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring, 1982, p 767.
26. Ibid., p 757.
27. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 June 1982.
28. PRAVDA, 8 August 1982.
29. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," p 23.
30. PRAVDA, 18 April 1982.
31. Ibid., 17 March; 19 May 1982.
32. Ibid., 19 May 1982.
33. Ibid., 23 June 1982.
34. Ibid., 19 May 1982.
35. LE MONDE, 2 December 1981.
36. PRAVDA, 20 August 1982.
37. "Sovetskaya Programma Mira Dlya 80-kh Godov v Deystvii," pp 336-338.
38. "Safeguarding Peace and Preventing Nuclear War. Proposals Submitted By the Soviet Union at the Second Special United Nations General Assembly Disarmament Session," Moscow, 1982, pp 3-6.
39. Ibid., pp 23-45.
40. "Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Miru," p 90.
41. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," p 25.
42. Ibid., p 28.
43. PRAVDA, 31 July 1982.
44. Ibid., 9 July 1982.
45. Ibid., 7 August 1982.
46. Ibid., 25 March 1982.
47. Idem.
48. Ibid., 27 September 1982.
49. Ibid., 25 March 1982.

50. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 August 1982.
51. PRAVDA, 12 August 1982.
52. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS," p 15.
53. PRAVDA, 16 September 1981.
54. Ibid., 8 September 1981.
55. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," pp 23-24.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON 1968-1969 EVENTS SCORES CSSR 'SOCIALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE'

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 144-148

[Review by A. M. Rumyantsev, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and I. M. Mrachkovskaya, candidate of economic sciences, of book "Zavoyevaniya Sotsializma Otstoyali v Bor'be" (They Defended the Gains of Socialism in Battle), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 375 pages]

[Text] Politizdat has published a collection of documents, articles, and material about the struggle of the CPCZ to overcome crisis phenomena in the party and in society in 1968-1969.¹

This book is especially valuable if we consider the rise in intensity of the struggle on the ideological front that is now occurring. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress noted: "A marked intensification of the ideological struggle is also a fact. For the West it does not amount merely to a battle of ideas. They are launching a whole system of weapons figured at undermining the socialist world and breaking it apart."²

The present age is an age of struggle between two opposed socioeconomic systems, the age of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale. In his day V. I. Lenin wrote the following about the class struggle in a transitional period: "The transition from capitalism to communism is an entire historical age. Until it is completed the exploiters will inevitably continue to hope for reversion to the old, and this hope will become attempts at reversion."³ These attempts were precisely what happened in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1980-1981.

The experience of the CPCZ's struggle against antisocialist forces is very valuable for the international communist movement. L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "The victory over the forces of counterrevolution in 1968 and the ability to draw profound and long-standing political conclusions from the events of that time are another significant contribution by Czech communists to development of the world revolutionary process, a service they have done for all the fraternal countries."⁴

In addition to documents and materials the collection under review includes articles and interviews with General Secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and President of Czechoslovakia G. Husak and articles and features by V. Biljak, J. Lenart, A. Indry, L. Strougal, A. Kapek, O. Svestky, M. Yakes, Ja. Fojtik,

and other leading figures of the CPCZ. They give a convincing presentation of the true picture of events in 1968 and the activities of the CPCZ to overcome the crisis in the party and in the country.

These published materials give a thoroughly scientific Marxist evaluation of the class essence of the events of 1968. This refers above all to the document "Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Society after the 13th Congress of the CPCZ," a document that summarizes the experience of the CPCZ's struggle against counterrevolutionary forces. It evaluates the situation in the CSR at that time as follows: "In August 1968 a critical counterrevolutionary situation had taken shape in Czechoslovakia. Our country found itself on the brink of civil war. The question of who would destroy whom arose with full urgency. Either the counterrevolution, relying on the support of international reaction, would complete its dark deed or socialist forces would manage to repulse the counterrevolution and defend the cause of socialism."⁵

The Marxist-Leninist core of the CPCZ headed by Comrade G. Husak was able, and this is to its great credit, to mobilize all the healthy forces in the party and the country. The counterrevolution was crushed, the gains of socialism were defended in battle, and at the present time the CSR is successfully building a developed socialist society according to a program worked out by the 15th and 16th congresses of the CPCZ.

Reflecting the experience of the CPCZ's struggle against counterrevolution, the collection shows, in the first place, which social forces counterrevolution relied on and can rely on in a certain situation. Secondly, it shows the kinds of methods and procedures used by internal and external counterrevolutionary forces to undermine the foundations of socialism and attempt to eliminate it. In the third place, it shows the means and measures taken by the CPCZ to repulse the counterrevolution, how it achieved victory and insured the consolidation and further development of socialism.

The document "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." notes that the counterrevolution relied on "a gradually growing faction which had formed long before the 13th congress from petty bourgeois elements, representatives of the defeated bourgeoisie" (p 13). G. Husak pointed out this social source of counterrevolution. He noted that as early as 1960 the previous party leadership had drawn an incorrect conclusion when it rejected the interpretation of the socialist state as a weapon of power for the working class and all working people. They forgot that representatives of the former bourgeois classes were still living in the CSR, "people who until February 1948 were joined in the bourgeois parties, and that their views continued to be disseminated, for example among young people, and that imperialist propaganda as well as mistakes and shortcomings that occurred in the course of building socialism were exercising a strong influence on people's consciousness" (p 34).

This same social source is named in other materials in the collection. For example, V. Dolezal, in the article entitled "Poisonous Mold," notes that in 1968 the population of Czechoslovakia "continued to include generations of former large, medium, and small factory owners, members of the police who had

been driven out or retired, crooked lawyers who had been legally barred from practice, and doctors who had diplomas to conceal their fraud. There were also among them former landowners and kulaks who had not accepted the loss of 'their' land, managers who had accumulated capital in industry and trade, as well as many other possessors of large and small amounts of property who lived in the republic, but did not accept socialism" (p 223).

The antisocialist forces received every possible support from emigre circles who dreamed of bringing Czechoslovakia back to capitalism. The reactionary part of the clergy also became involved. As noted in the document "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." all these elements formed a bloc among themselves and with right-wing revisionist forces. It was precisely these social strata that nourished and made wide use, as a kind of theoretical substantiation, of all the conceptions worked out by right-wing revisionist elements concerning the inappropriateness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the general rules of building socialism to the conditions of Czechoslovakia, the special model of "humane socialism" or "socialism with a human face," and the need to realize the ideas of "market socialism" in Czechoslovakia. To do this they proposed to divorce the socialist state from management of the economy and abolish the guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist party in the life of Czech society. The bloc of internal counterrevolutionary elements and right-wing forces was closely linked to the centers of world anti-communism. It "found comprehensive political, moral, and material support from the imperialists" (p 17).

The book gives facts that reveal the close link between internal antisocialist forces and international imperialist centers. With the connivance of the former leadership of the CPCZ the internal counterrevolutionaries formed a far-flung network of counterrevolutionary organizations in the country, among which was Klub 231. In M. Gajek's article "The K-231 Network and Its Role," there is a thorough description of its counterrevolutionary role.

K-231, which was founded in March 1968, declared that it was not a political organization, that it was supposedly set up to promote the rehabilitation of citizens who had been caused to suffer illegally. But in reality K-231, which was led by people linked to the CIA and other foreign intelligence services, carried on subversive antisocialist propaganda and aimed at eliminating the party's guiding role in the life of society. The political program of this counterrevolutionary organization included restoring the political structure of bourgeois Czechoslovakia and re-establishment of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties, including social democrat, Christian democrat, and Zionist organizations. The activists of this club were recruited from former bourgeois and petty bourgeois figures as well as from antisocial and declasse elements. The club prepared lists of communists to be put in concentration camps and physically eliminated "as soon as the proper time arrives" (p 102).

The article "KAN — Organized Counterrevolutionaries" reveals the true essence and role of this organization. KAN, the "Nonparty Activist Club," began its activities in March 1968. In its "Manifesto" it declared that "for the time being" it was not claiming the role of a political party (p 159). But in reality the organizers of this club were pursuing profoundly political goals: to pit all nonparty members in the country against the Communist Party of

Czechoslovakia, to drive a wedge between CPCZ members and nonparty members, and to mobilize nonparty members for a struggle against the guiding role of the party in the life of society, against the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. KAN established close contacts with K-231 and coordinated certain actions with it (see p 163).

The heads of KAN claimed a place in the National Front, but the nature of its activities did not suit them. They demanded a "separation of the state from political ideology" (p 164), that is, an elimination of the socialist content in its activity. They considered their principal job to be opposing the line of the CPCZ and undermining its influence among the masses. Both KAN and K-231 ceased to exist after August 1968 and the organizers of both clubs fled to the West.

The counterrevolutionary forces delivered their main strike against the party and its guiding role in society. Fertile ground for this was created by certain mistakes in the activities of the former CPCZ leadership, above all the relaxation of ideological work and the struggle against bourgeois ideology, violations of Leninist principles and norms of party life,⁶ and a relaxation of control over the activity of ideological organs and mass information media. As the article "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." notes, "the party was gradually disarmed ideologically" (p 13).

The counterrevolution took advantage of the party's weakened condition, the fact that it was not adequately armed and prepared for an organized and concentrated attack on internal and external antisocialist forces. "The Central Committee of the CPCZ as the highest organ of the party in the period between congresses and its executive agencies stopped playing the role of a guiding headquarters in the development of socialist society and the defense of its revolutionary gains" (p 21). This is how the article "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." characterizes the situation in the party on the eve of the 1968 events.

Following this even the "decisive elements of the executive and legislative authority in Czechoslovakia gradually stopped playing their class role in the political system of a socialist state. The agencies of state security, justice, and the army were paralyzed. The guiding agencies of the party and state were not in control and were unable to oppose the swift attack of the counterrevolutionary underground and the subversive moves of foreign enemies" (p 21).

Under the banner of "creative development of Marxism" the right wing designed its own "model of socialism" which it advertised broadly and opposed to real socialism using the mass information media. But that which "was being passed off as specifically Czechoslovakian conditions was in reality just an expression of the common traits of revisionism" (p 242).

Using the economic reform as a cover they tried to turn enterprises over to the group ownership of individual collectives. Plants and factories were removed from the control of the state and its planning agencies. Group interests predominated over national interests, which led to the appearance of disproportions in the national economy and to the development of inflationary processes.

G. Husak described the situation that took shape in the economy at that time as follows: "In 1968 the idea of a commodity economy won out. Our country rejected the plan as the primary stabilizing factor and spontaneity was allowed to enter the economy" (p 35). Right-wing elements who had worked their way into positions of economic management tried to restore private management in the country (see p 248) and to eliminate public state ownership.

The modification of the economic structure of society was supposed to become the basis for a change in its political system, for implementation of the principle of pluralism.

The counterrevolution hoped to divorce the CSR from the socialist community. Czechoslovakia's ties with the socialist countries, above all with the Soviet Union, were subjected to slander.

International reaction had great hopes for the counterrevolution in the CSR. "Czechoslovakia was supposed to be the implement for undermining the unity of the socialist community and the international communist and worker movement," wrote RUDE PRAVO (p 249).

But thanks to the heroic efforts of the Marxist-Leninists led by Gustav Husak, the counterrevolution was not able to "move Czechoslovakia to the other bank 'quietly'" (p 37). Czechoslovakia remained a solid member of the socialist community and is successfully building a developed socialist society.

The book under review thoroughly reveals the methods and content of the CPCZ's struggle against counterrevolution and for strengthening and development of socialism in the CSR. The article "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." says: "In order to normalize life in the country the first thing necessary was to organize all healthy forces inside and outside the party for a decisive strike against reaction, to expose the right-wing opportunists and their true plans, to crush the right-wing forces in open political struggle, to deprive them of their decisive positions and instruments of power, in particular mass information media, and to bring the broad masses of working people out from under their influence" (p 25).

The new leadership elected at the April 1969 Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, as G. Husak wrote, "operated on the principle of beginning with the main force. This main force was the party, and within the party it was primarily the key sectors; central organs, oblast committees, and rayon committees. It was with these elements that we had to begin" (p 333). As pointed out in the resolutions of the May 1969 Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, it was necessary "to destroy the right-wing forces ideological and organizationally, to restore party unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, and to completely eliminate the positions of antisocialist forces in society" (p 26).

This was done. The CPCZ conducted an exchange of party documents during which the party strengthened its ranks by removing all who occupied clearly hostile positions and all passive elements, and finally, by patient explanatory work it brought honest people who had been misled by right-wing and bourgeois

propaganda back to correct, Marxist viewpoints. Economic policy was revised and, in the words of G. Husak, "from the idea of actually unplanned, in fact spontaneous market development, the idea which Sik and his company dragged into practice and which opened enormous opportunities for manipulations at the expense of society," Czech society returned to the planned system of managing the socialist economy (see p 36).

The resolutions of the May 1969 Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee pointed to the need to "renew and strengthen international ties with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and restore the reputation of the CPCZ in the international communist movement" (p 26). This too the new leadership of the CPCZ did consistently and successfully. G. Husak observes, "In the space of a few months we were able to gain complete trust in relations between us and the Soviet Union and our other allies not by means of eloquent words, but thanks to development within the country that proved that the new leadership of the CPCZ was honestly striving to consolidate the situation in Czechoslovakia as a socialist state in full conformity with our national and international interests" (p 38).

Many documents in the collection emphasize that healthy forces within the party and the country, taking advantage of the international aid given to Czechoslovakia by the countries of the socialist community, played the principal part in defeating counterrevolution. The Marxist-Leninist core of the CPCZ led by G. Husak was able to mobilize all healthy forces in the party and the people for a struggle to overcome the crisis and they were able to bring the country out of it. The document "Lessons of the Crisis Development..." correctly notes that international aid "created the necessary conditions for Czech communists who, thanks to this aid, were able to turn their own political struggle completely against the counterrevolutionary, antisocialist, and right-wing opportunist forces and overcome the counterrevolutionary threat to the cause of socialism in the CSR by political means" (p 308).

As the editorial in RUDE PRAVO correctly observes, the international aid by itself promoted the establishment of favorable conditions for victory over the counterrevolution. But this was just the beginning. Internal forces had to deliver the final defeat of the counterrevolution. Final victory was won by the working people under the leadership of the Communist Party as the result of stubborn, patient, and constant struggle for further development of the socialist character of Czech society. One cannot disagree with the thesis of this article, that "the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries did not mean final victory by itself. That we had to achieve by ourselves" (p 310).

In the RUDE PRAVO editorial dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the May 1969 Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee it is observed that "1968-1969 were a permanent lesson for us, one to which we look as a history textbook so that these mistakes will never be repeated, to prevent the disintegration of socialism, to defend and creatively develop the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism, to apply Leninist methods and norms of work, to strengthen the unity of the party and the people, and to preserve and defend our friendship with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community as the 'apple of our eye'" (pp 347-348).

This article gives convincing facts that testify to successful national economic development, growth in the well-being of the working people, and progress in social policy, public health, culture and art, and other spheres of the life of society (pp 362-363).

The reputation of the CPCZ in the international arena has improved and the friendship of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries has become even stronger.

The lessons of the events of 1968-1969 in Czechoslovakia are of enormous international importance. One of the authors of the collection, noting that counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia suffered a defeat, that its card was trumped, noted: "However, the card that was trumped in one game may still be used in another" (p 288). This we cannot forget.

As long as capitalism exists, so will the question of who eliminates who and attempts will be made to restore capitalism. That is why it is important to study the experience of our friends in the struggle against counterrevolution. The publication of this collection of materials can be viewed as a significant contribution to the study of this experience.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. I. Kolesnikov compiled the collection and was the general editor of translation.
2. "Materialy XXVI S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU] Moscow, 1981, p 9.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], vol 37, p 264.
4. PRAVDA, 8 April 1981.
5. Page 23 (hereafter all references to the collection are given in the text).
6. After the February 1948 victory 320,000 former members of bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties entered the ranks of the CPCZ, many for opportunistic reasons (see p 269).

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HOPEFUL SIGNS SEEN IN NATO RESPONSE TO WARSAW PACT NONAGGRESSION PROPOSAL

PM101221 Moscow NOVOYE VREMENYA in Russian No 6, 4 Feb 83 pp 5-7

[Article by L. Bezymenskiy, NOVOYE VREMENYA political observer: "If You Seek What Unites Us"]

[Text] The month which has elapsed since the signing of the political declaration of the Warsaw Pact states in Prague has been an important indicator of the world situation. Lines of political discussion now converge around this profound document. One clear feature--and of no small importance!--of the world reaction to the Prague decisions has emerged. Whereas there was formerly a tradition in the West to reject out of hand any proposals from the socialist community, this time prominent Western figures deemed it necessary to assure the world public that the new proposals will be thoroughly studied.

This applies fully to the major new proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and on maintaining relations of peace between the North Atlantic Treaty states and the Warsaw Pact states.

The Logic of the New Proposal

What considerations led the leaders of the socialist community countries to become convinced of the need for a treaty? Of course, modern international problems are highly complex; the problems of modern Europe are complex too. But the prospects for the development of the situation depend to a very great extent on whether it is possible to eliminate distrust and lower the level of confrontation between the two biggest military-political alliances. A clash between them would have fatal consequences for the whole world.

What is to be done? Should we look on calmly as tension grows and tolerate the increased level of confrontation and the growing threat of conflict? After all, if the world is, so to speak, crammed with nuclear weapons, then most of them are in Europe. At one time, in the late 19th century, the Balkans were called the "powder keg of Europe." Now Western Europe has become a "nuclear powder keg."

The danger of catastrophe--accidental catastrophe included--exists. Modern armaments are crossing the symbolic "red line" which divides controlled actions from uncontrolled actions. "That is why it is important," Yu. V. Andropov said 21 December 1982, "to take our fingers off the triggers and put the weapons on a reliable safety catch."

Where is that safety catch? In seeking it, socialist foreign policy has turned more than once, and turns now, to the only true compass--the compass by which common goals and interests are measured, interests which do not divide, but unite the two groupings. Unfortunately our Atlantic partners turn to the opposite formula much more frequently. Thus quite recently Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. assistant secretary of state, speaking about the new proposals in an interview for the Yugoslav journal DANAS, rejected them scornfully, stating that they "only distract attention from the substantial problems which divide the two countries." There is the philosophy of confrontation for you: Thinking only about what disunites us!

The Warsaw Pact countries propose something different. They reaffirm that they do not seek military superiority over NATO and have no intention of attacking. They also note that the NATO states declare that they lack aggressive intentions. So what is to hinder everyone from making corresponding mutual pledges?

The peculiarity of the situation which has arisen for the West since the publication of the Prague declaration lies first and foremost in the fact that NATO propagandists have seen the total collapse of the traditional argument which has been cited in recent years to substantiate the rejection of proposals from the Warsaw Pact countries. Thus when, in 1976, it was proposed that an agreement be concluded on renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other, the objection was: No, that is unacceptable, since it is not only a question of nuclear arms, but of conventional arms too. After all, you can start a war with conventional weapons too....

Speaking at a press conference in Bonn, A. A. Gromyko characterized in this way the train of thought which led to the birth of the idea for a treaty:

"The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies came to the conclusion: Why not propose to the North Atlantic Alliance grouping the signing of a treaty on the nonuse of not only nuclear, but also conventional weapons, that is, on preventing war between states and ensuring that all disputes are resolved at the conference table, by peaceful means. Is there not logic in that proposal? Everyone who thinks objectively and tries to assess the world situation objectively must recognize that logic...."

That is why, as the core of the treaty, it is proposed that the states belonging to the alliances make a mutual pledge renouncing the first use of either nuclear or conventional arms against each other and thus renouncing the use of military force against each other at all. This pledge would cover the territory of all the parties to the treaty and also their military and civilian personnel, ships, aircraft and spaceships and other facilities belonging to them, wherever located.

Attentive observers could not fail to note that the Warsaw Pact countries had taken account of Western considerations. Prof Horst Ehmke, a prominent figure in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, assessing the new proposals, noted at once that they go halfway to meet NATO's ideas; Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky believes that the new proposals creates a "climate of dialogue."

Counterarguments or Tricks?

But NATO would not be itself if various kinds of counterarguments did not emerge within its circles. The signal was given for this by General Rogers, commander in chief of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, who--evidently using his habitual concepts!--described the new initiatives as a "stick and carrot" and proposed that NATO study them..."before we reject the carrot." What arguments are being put forward in circles accustomed to using the Atlantic stick as a threat and mollifying their own public with the carrot of an imaginary love of peace?

For Mr Eagleburger, for instance, the matter is clear. In the above-mentioned interview he stated that "the Prague proposals introduced nothing new." At the same time certain Western press organs refer to the fact that the conclusion of such a treaty has been proposed before more than once, and that therefore this is only a "repetition of the past...."

This argument is nothing more than a pretext for avoiding discussing the crux of the matter. True, the idea which forms the basis of the new proposal has been put forward before. But in fact its "diplomatic prehistory" is an argument not against, but /for the treaty/ [words in boldface].

The socialist countries have proposed more than once that the two military-political groupings take on mutual treaty commitments in one form or another. Moreover a similar proposal was made immediately after the socialist countries created their defensive organization in 1955 in response to the creation of the NATO aggressive bloc in 1949. As early as the second session of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) a draft pact on nonaggression between the two groupings was elaborated. The draft was published 24 May 1958 and the proposal was officially reiterated in 1960. Moreover in 1963 the draft nonaggression pact was officially submitted to the committee of 18 states on disarmament.

But why did this idea have to be "repeated"? The answer is simple: Because NATO stubbornly and crudely rejected any proposal from the Warsaw Pact. They did not even want to consider such proposals!

Historical and diplomatic experience teaches us that a positive idea must not be discarded by its originators solely because there is no reaction to it. A vivid example of this is the story of the All-European Conference. Following the logic of those who are criticizing the Warsaw Pact's ideas and demanding that only "new proposals" are put forward, the socialist countries should have renounced, after 1966, their proposal on convening a conference on questions of European security (Bucharest Declaration, 1966)

at the time the proposal was called "propaganda" and NATO was unwilling to react to it.

But the PCC did not listen to the advice of supposed well-wishers. The idea of all-European security was stubbornly, creatively developed in Budapest (1969) and Prague (1969). The positions of the NATO countries' governments and important shifts in Western public opinion were taken into account. There is no need to speak of what happened next--particularly now that some people are trying to represent the historic Helsinki conference of 35 countries as a "Western achievement." Socialist foreign policy has never regarded Helsinki as "its victory" alone. It was a joint victory for common sense. Common sense must secure the victory now too, in the cause of preparing a treaty on the mutual nonuse of force.

Creative Development

The proposal submitted 5 January 1983 is by no means a "repetition of the past"--in either form or content. Never before has the idea of the nonuse of force been developed so extensively and so fundamentally. The Prague declaration proposes that the mutual commitment of nonuse of force be widened and extended to all countries of the world, whether they have bilateral allied relations with the two groupings or whether they are non-aligned or neutral. The commitment would thereby be made to each other--and to the whole world.

Another important new feature is that the principle of nonuse of force is supplemented by the pledge to hold disarmament talks in a spirit of good will, to examine measures to avert a surprise attack and so forth. It is no accident that the title of the treaty itself incorporates the provision on maintaining relations of peace. This is a very broad concept opening up wide opportunities.

At the same time the treaty is entirely concrete. It is "clearly addressed," since it must be concluded between the NATO states and the Warsaw Pact states. Why is the form of a treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact logical? Obviously because the greatest threat to peace in Europe lies in the confrontation between the two groupings.

The socialist countries' proposals are not put forward on a "bloc basis." Repeated proposals to end the division of Europe into blocs have emanated precisely from the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact has always opened the doors to anyone with an interest in the cause of peace. So too this time. It was proposed in Prague that any interested European state could take part in the elaboration and signing of the new treaty. The treaty would then be open for other states of the world to adhere to it as equal participants should they so desire.

There is another group of counterarguments too. This group raises the question not of procedure, but of the nature of the proposed treaty. It is pointed out that the UN Charter contains a commitment on the nonuse of military force and on maintaining relations of peace, and since all the

countries in the two groupings are UN members, there is no point in their adopting the same commitments again. But does the fact that a particular idea is contained in the UN Charter exclude its concretization and creative application? With this line of reasoning, the UN Charter would have become the first and last document in modern diplomatic practice, condemning the world to total inaction....

Of course, the United Nations does not want that. And the letter and spirit of the UN Charter demand that its most important provisions are applied in practice. That is what happens. For instance, they were reflected in the Helsinki Final Act and in many other international documents. The concretization and "regionalization" of the UN principles are an important, fruitful cause.

The initiators of the new treaty not only take strict account of the UN Charter. They seek to combine the commitment on nonuse of military force with provisions on strengthening the United Nations. In particular, it is proposed that the treaty express readiness to cooperate in increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations and fulfilling tasks--on the basis of its charter--in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflict situations, the suppression of acts of aggression and the elimination of the threat to international peace and security. Other concrete elements of the future treaty proposed in Prague have the same thrust.

Up to the West To Reply

It is not particularly surprising that arguments which resemble boomerangs often appear in the polemics against the Prague proposals by Western politicians and journalists. When Mr Todenhoefer, a figure in the West German Christian Democratic Union, asserts for the 100th time that the aim of socialist diplomacy is to "split" the United States and Western Europe, how can he be taken seriously? After all, it is proposed to conclude the treaty not without or in spite of the United States, but with its full participation. More, a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and on maintaining relations of peace would be ineffective without the participation of the United States, with its vast military arsenal. At the same time, if you look at Soviet-American agreements now in force, they include elements which facilitate U.S. participation in the treaty.

Such elements exist in a number of recent NATO documents. For instance, British Foreign Secretary F. Pym and a number of other leaders of NATO countries note that in recent NATO decisions the idea of holding talks is not rejected in principle. In particular, during the NATO session at summit level in June 1982 there was talk more than once of the so-called "(Armel) report," which states that the desire for talks must be one of the "props" of the Atlantic Alliance. It was asserted in the Bonn statement that "no weapon of ours will ever be used for any purpose other than in response to any attack."

So where is the difficulty? Why not adopt a similar statement in the form of a mutual principle? After all, it will then take on a much more convincing

and--even more importantly--binding form. A step will be taken in the direction of strengthening trust and toward overcoming the legitimate distrust of NATO's actions which exists among the governments and peoples of socialist countries. Let us add: Among the Western public too. On the other hand, since it has become a bad habit in the West to accuse the Warsaw Pact countries of "aggressiveness," there is no better means of obtaining an authoritative refutation of this fabrication in international legal form.

The Warsaw Pact countries want serious, constructive discussion. But some things give the public in socialist countries grounds for concern. Thus the following note has crept into a number of Western press comments: Does not NATO's conduct conceal nothing but tactics? "In fact," Paris' LE MATIN writes, "NATO is afraid that if it disregards this proposal, it will create the impression that it is not sufficiently concerned about the fate of peace."

The proposals are on the table. They are based on the political philosophy of peace-loving forces, which understand the mortal danger of confrontation and are making one more attempt, at a difficult, crucial moment, to find not what divides us, but what unites us.

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